Imagery believed taken at Tehran. Foreground: IRIPF (NAJA) Special Unit, SWAT-equivalent sergeant major.
IRIPF (NAJA) Special Unit motorized section, Tehran
IRIPF (NAJA) Special Unit, SWAT-equivalent counterterrorism (CT) demonstration
IRIPF (NAJA) Special Unit, SWAT-equivalent counterterrorism (CT) force aboard Mercedes-Benz E240 police car
Foreground: what appears to be NAJA-attached army conscripts in the Border Protection Police
What appears to be contingent from the IRI Coast Guard
MASHHAD
Believed to be Mashhad: motor officer equivalent stunt demonstration
IRIPF (NAJA) Special Unit, SWAT-equivalent counterterrorism (CT) demonstration
SARI
IRIPF (NAJA) Border Protection Police contingent
IRIPF (NAJA) "Iron Man" demonstration of strength (1)
IRIPF (NAJA) "Iron Man" demonstration of strength (2)
Motor officer equivalent stunt demonstration using late model Honda CR-type dirt bike
IRIPA Bell 214A Isfahan medium-lift helicopter
IRIPF (NAJA) Iranian-built AMICO quad used for acrobatic demonstration
IRIPF (NAJA) Special Unit motorized section, Sari
What appears to be NAJA-attached army conscripts, Sari
ISFAHAN
IRIPF (NAJA) Special Unit motorized section, Isfahan
Motor officer equivalent stunt demonstration using vintage 90's era Suzuki TS 185
What appears to be NAJA-attached army conscripts, Isfahan
SHIRAZ
Mounted law enforcement contingent outfitted in BDUs and body armor
IRIPF (NAJA) Special Unit aboard Toyota J100 series Land Cruiser
Photos:
Abbas Pustindouz and Mostafa German at Mehr News Agency
Farhad Babaei, Nima Najafzadeh and Hossein Heidarpour at Tasnim News Agency
Mostafa Kazemi at Fars News Agency
Supervisor Ross Mirkarimi, the liberal lawmaker, police academy graduate, Naval Reserves veteran and a founding member of the California Green Party (who is now a Democratic), declared victory today in the race for sheriff.
Ross Mirkarimi (pronounced Meehr-kah-reem-E) was born in Chicago in 1961 to an Iranian father, Hamid Mirkarimi, and a Jewish Russian-American mother, Nancy Kolman. He grew up in Jamestown, Rhode Island, where he graduated from the Catholic, all-male Bishop Hendricken High School in 1979. "I totally credit my childhood in Jamestown for my green views," Mirkarimi said. "I'll never forget living near Fort Getty and exploring the unspoiled island with my dog Oscar when I was a boy."
He has a Bachelor's degree in political science from St. Louis University, a Master's degree in international economics and affairs from Golden Gate University, and a Master of Science degree in environmental science from the University of San Francisco. He has lived in San Francisco since 1984.
Mirkarimi is a graduate of the San Francisco Police Academy, where he was the president of his class. Before his election to office, he served in the San Francisco District Attorney's Office investigating white collar crime.
On April 21, 2009, Ross Mirkarimi became a father, as Eliana Lopez, a Venezuelan telenovela star whom he met at an environmental conference in Brazil, gave birth to his son, Theo Aureliano Mirkarimi.
Congratulations to Ross Mirkarimi and the City & County of San Francisco!
From what I can discern from the open source, there are key differences between recent Iranian and Syrian law enforcement approaches to unlawful assemblies.
In the Iranian case, law enforcement wasn't well prepared at first for the large-scale demonstrations that took place following the 2009 presidential election and there were dozens of fatalities. But soon afterwards Iranian authorities enforced a less-lethal policy of crowd control, even though it endangered the lives of police officers particularly during the Ashura rioting. One more advantage the Iranians possess is an ideologically driven volunteer auxiliary force attached to the police.
The Syrians, on the other hand, are contending with multiple poles of demos across the country (where the Iranians were primarily concerned with the capitol) and are escalating their policy of lethal force in contending with the demos. In addition, the Syrian establishment really has no ideological equivalent to the Basij and the majority support base of followers to the Islamic revolution, as is the case in the Islamic Republic of Iran. Like the other countries of the Arab Spring, the Syrians have employed the military as their ultimate means of fallback. Big differences between the two approaches.
Also, even with the less-lethal policy in effect, the Iranian opposition did not have the staying power on the street, and contained itself to attempted hijackings of official, pro-establishment events. The Syrian opposition, on the other hand, seems to possess the staying power. This could be indicative of the fact that Iranian support for their governance is a higher majority, as well as the Iranian political system encompassing a representative element to its interwoven and, to varying degrees, balancing branches of government.
In any event, where the Iranian demos have declined significantly with a less-lethal law enforcement policy in effect, the Syrians appear to be contending with an escalating demo movement with their own escalating lethal force policy. Contrary to the Iranian experience, this appears to be bringing Syria to a heightening sense of insecurity.
There are distinct differences between the Iranian response to civil disorder in 2009 and the current Egyptian response now in progress. Below is a pictorial highlighting some of these differences.
click photos to enlarge
The Egyptian Army deploys on the streets of Cairo. Visible are elements of a mechanized force including M60 main battle tanks and M113 armored personnel carriers. In stark contrast to Iran's response which did not encompass a military mobilization and deployment, relying instead on Iran's law enforcement agency, NAJA. It's unclear as to the reason Egyptian authorities decided to withdraw their police forces and substitute the army. However, in the Iranian response, authorities never seemed to have doubted the reliability of NAJA and the self-perceived justness of their cause. Recent public opinion polling of ordinary Iranians also reflects majority support for their law enforcement efforts by a margin of 3:1, which may help explain Iran's confidence in NAJA.
An Egyptian Army M60 main battle tank on the streets of Cairo. At no time during Iran's period of unrest in 2009 were Iranian military battle tanks deployed on the streets of Tehran.
Egyptian M60s mobbed by protesters. Note the lack of perimeters established by any supporting infantry as a means of crowd control.
Egyptian Army Fahd IFVs deploy on the streets of Cairo. Unlike Egypt, Iran did not deploy military IFVs or APCs during the civil unrest following the 2009 election.
Egyptian Army M113 mobbed by protesters. Note the issuance of assault rifles indicating the potential for applications of lethal force. In the Iranian context, early on efforts were made to restrict law enforcement to applications of less-lethal force.
In the foreground an EA M113 APC, knocked out by protesters. In the background, an M60 whizzes by.
An Egyptian M88 armored recovery vehicle, to be used in situations depicted in the preceding photograph.
There are indications of a high level of fraternization occurring between protesters and elements of the Egyptian Army. This is reminiscent of the relationship that emerged between the Iranian Army and protesters in 1979, not 2009.
Here an Egyptian Captain is hoisted onto the shoulders of protesters on the streets of Cairo. In contrast, Iran's law enforcement remained for the most part motivated and attentive to duty during the period of unrest following the election.
Video:
A U.S. supplied M1 Abrams main battle tank heads an armored column at the the Rehab main gate in Cairo. This is indicative of the $35 billion dollars of military aid that has been provided by the U.S. to Egypt's ruling establishment to assist with maintaining itself in power.
Another big difference between the Egyptian and Iranian approaches to civil unrest: Here Egyptian law enforcement commits their armored water cannon vehicles (AWCVs) in efforts at crowd control. For their part, the Iranians did not appear to deploy their AWCVs following the 2009 election.
A recent poll taken by the International Peace Institute with Charney Research shows results consistent with three previous polls by other organizations, mirroring closely the official results of Iran's 2009 presidential election. In addition, by a solid majority Iranians support Islamic Republic governance as well as support Iranian law enforcement efforts during the post-2009 election demonstrations. Iran's nuclear program also enjoys majority support, including an aversion to dealing aspects of it away. Link to the complete poll and methodology available here.
New Police-110 motorcycles appear to be Bajaj 150 cc 4-stroke singles, imported from India.
With two-up riding, the new motorcycles appear to be exceeding maximum payload specifications. Note fully compressed rear shocks and flattened rear tire. (They'd be advised to try making adjustments and, failing that, searching for more suitable tires and heavier duty shock replacements.)
Inadequate safety procedures in effect, such as the non-use of protective hand gloves and instances of flipped open visors without eye protection.
(Any corrections appreciated in the comments section.)
Kyrgyzstan's opposition forces appear to have gained the upper hand over security forces, where Iran's law enforcement have met similar pressures but persevered. Of the few photos available from Kyrgyzstan's current civil unrest, we'll point out just a few detectable differences.
(click all photos to enlarge)
Above: Well equipped Kyrgyzstan antiriot forces
on the brink of disarray.
Above: A Kyrgyzstan law enforcement firing line, equipped with AKS-74U "Krinkov" short assault rifles. In contrast, post-June civil unrest, the IRIPF has not distributed battle rifles, assault rifles or SMGs (or most any firearms loaded with lethal rounds) to its antiriot forces. It must be noted this claim is disputed. However there are no photos available to this writer's knowledge of IRIPF firing lines equipped with assault weaponry, using lethal force against rioters. (Excluding the defense of a Basij base in Tehran, where an AK-47 type assault rifle was utilized from a rooftop position.)
Above: Kyrgyzstan law enforcement on the run. Abandoned by their own leadership, they are in headlong retreat. Even during the height of Asura rioting, Iran's leadership carried on, resolutely. In Kyrgyzstan's case, the leadership finds itself heavily swayed and manipulated by external foreign powers, whereas the Islamic Republic of Iran remains fiercely independent. This is the fundamental difference between the two cases of civil unrest, and naturally it corresponds to the level of effectiveness between the two countries success or lack of success in combating cvil unrest.
A footnote: Ironic that Kyrgyzstan's government recently attempted to dispute Iran's rendering of its dramatic Rigi capture operation- by changing its own previous reporting- only to now find itself apparently out of power only a few weeks later.
According to the Los Angeles Times, a source inside Iran claims the Islamic Republic of Iran Police Force (IRIPF, or Iranian acronym: NAJA) is preparing for the potentiality of as many as 3 million protesters taking to the streets of Tehran this Thursday. The occasion is 22 Bahman: the 31st anniversary of the founding of the Islamic Republic.
In addition, the same source told the LAT that the government will be mobilizing 500,000 supporters to rally at the event, where President Ahmadinejad is scheduled to deliver a public speech, with invited members of the foreign press included in the audience. (Remarkable, given the scope of projected protests.)
Figures for IRIPF deployment have not been cited, but the LAT provides a figure for Basij volunteers at ~12,000, with many elements of this force being mobilized from various provinces around the country. Accordingly, it can be projected that the number of IRIPF policemen (cadre and conscript-soldiers) could actually be as high as triple that amount or more, with significant numbers of reinforcements being drawn from local, regional and border protection police forces.
IRIPF Mercedes-Benz C200 police car with cadre policemen
It would be surprising to see the less-lethal antiriot policy be lifted in favor of lethal force. However, given the number of cases of violence inflicted upon IRIPF police officers during the Ashura protests, there may or may not be a number of firearms distributed to key personnel, for purposes of self-defense. It can be assumed that IRIPF police officers would be in favor of such, but Iranian government policy so far- initiated after the June 2009 protests- means to prevent or minimize police-inflicted fatalities wherever possible. Perhaps there will be a greater distribution of less-lethal forms of ammunition provided for use in police officer firearms. We'll see how this plays out this coming Thursday.
It will be interesting to see if the IRIPF makes any changes to the tactics employed by its motorized reconnaissance units, which appeared vulnerable under certain conditions during Ashura, as well as if there'll be more effective use of Islamic Republic of Iran Police Aviation (IRIPA) resources, in terms of sustained, coordinated crowd control management.
Also, yet to be deployed in meaningful numbers, is the prospect of uniformed IRGC forces actively participating in crowd control operations, as a full or partial military unit(s). Perhaps they will continue on in a reserve force role, to be fully activated upon emergency.
Lastly, it is safe to assume that additional preparations are being made to accommodate large numbers of arrests, at various jail and correctional facilities.
Given IRIPF's crowd control management estimate of potentially 3 million protesters massing for 22 Bahman, this coming Thursday may see the IRIPF's greatest challenge to date.
The Islamic Republic of Iran Police Force (IRIPF, also referred to as NAJA) appeared hard pressed and even overwhelmed at times, during anti-government demonstrations held during Ashura. There were incidents reporting varying levels of protest around the country, including Tehran, Shiraz, Esfahan and Mashad. However, by far the greatest confrontations took place in Tehran, and that's where nearly all the photo and video evidence has been sourced (with most of the documented action located at Vali Asr Square, Azadi Avenue and under Hafez Bridge).
At times, protesters in Tehran showed exceptionally high levels of resistance to IRIPF attempts at imposing law and order. There are a number of photos and videos showing large groups of protesters seizing the initiative, and in a number of instances taking full control of key road and city centers. There are also photos and videos showing police officers beaten by angry mobs, police equipment captured, vehicles wrecked and set ablaze, and even at least one IRIPF police station and one Basij base stormed, looted and set ablaze. Protesters engaged in opportunistic destruction of public property, while elements of the IRIPF- including its motorized SF- were at times overwhelmed and rendered ineffective.
For all the protest violence and lack of effective IRIPF control over key areas of the city, it is surprising that Iran's military wasn't activated. Instead, the IRIPF (and Basij) were left to duke it out with an ever more radicalized protest movement. In fact, while the anti-establishment movement of June 2009 may have had far greater numbers, nevertheless this comparatively smaller anti-government protest (seemingly composed predominantly of students or those of similar age) is certainly willing to take increasingly more violent and destructive measures. It does so while the IRIPF has apparently (unlike in June) been ordered to confront the protesters with less-lethal means of crowd control (no standard outfitting of firearms equipped with lethal rounds).
IRIPF anti-riot management appears to rely on preplanned defensive positions, adapting to changing conditions with radio communication and applications of motorized (motorbike) reconnaissance. Despite possession of airborne police support, it doesn’t appear the IRIPF engages in sustained air-to-ground assisted tactical management.
Politically, so far the IRIPF seems to be the public face for the government’s anti-riot response during Ashura. Iran's Deputy Police Chief Ahmad Reza Radan appeared on IRINN television, to inform the Iranian public that 300 protesters had been arrested and there were several killed. Meanwhile, contrary to one of the many wild rumors propagated over Twitter of high ranking members of the government being evacuated to safety, Supreme Leader Khamenei and President Ahmadinejad attended the Ashura ceremony at Tehran's Hosseiniyeh Imam Khomeini, seemingly unaffected at all by the disturbances occuring at other parts of the city. The Iranian leadership’s strategy appears to consciously downplay the unrest. This would explain the government’s refrain from activating the military or even declaring full or even partial martial law. Instead, it appears the IRIPF is burdened with less-lethal force (in instances where even US law enforcement would use lethal means of defending itself), in confrontations that stretch its summoned resources beyond the maximum. The other side of the government's anti-protest strategy appears to be the targeted arrest of anyone perceived capable of providing any aspect of leadership to this so far leaderless movement, or anyone suspected of being able to provide linkage to identified internal and external threats.
Videos from Ashura 1388:
Incredible video of protesters engaging police forces with rocks; then on a signal from a spontaneous leader, the mob surges forward to engage the police at close quarters.
IRIPF/SF motorized detachment, contained and trapped against a doorway by vastly superior numbers. Note how quickly fires are generated, suggesting the use of molotov cocktails, but more likely ignited by the simple use of cigarette lighters.
Another view of the same incident: fully equipped anti-riot policemen cornered, surrounded and (lacking firearms or adequate backup) subjected to stoning and multiple beatings.
IRIPF/SF First Lieutenant (Sotvan Yekom) from the same detachment, beaten and stripped of gear. Demonstrators unsuccessfully attempt to set his field jack on fire.
A bloodied IRIPF anti-riot policeman is escorted away by protesters, while a IRIPF (cadre) First Lieutenant (Sotvan Yekom), with 2-way radio in hand, feebly waves him aside.
Protesters engage a heavily outnumbered IRIPF detachment at a cross street, to be dispersed by what could be shots fired (possibly less-lethal rounds, unfortunately there is constant sound buffeting on the mobile device which produces similar sounding effects). The protesters reassemble, but are then successfully outflanked by motorized IRIPF anti-riot forces approaching from up the street.
Overturned IRIPF vehicle, set afire by demonstrators. Location: Khosh Avenue.
IRIPF police van overturned and set ablaze. There are a number of YouTube videos showing IRIPF vehicles torched and destroyed during Ashura demonstrations in Tehran.
At the end of this video, two IRIPF policemen become separated from their unit and surrounded by violent protesters, to be brutally beaten and bloodied.
IRIPF police station stormed, looted and set ablaze at Vali Asr Square. At the end of the video, a severely wounded and bloodied protester is taken away; purportedly a victim of being run over by a police vehicle.
IRIPF police van surrounded and heavily vandalized. Its officers- lacking firearms and adequate backup- are seized and beaten by the angry mob.
Street melee: IRIPF anti-riot police officers are put on the defensive and swarmed, firing tear gas in retreat.
Yet another IRIPF police vehicle set afire.
Possibly an IRIPF Bell 214 helicopter zooms overhead. It appears to be operating in a transport role, rather than any sustained effort at air-to-ground, emergency management.
IRIPF police van (a type used for transporting arrested suspects) is overturned and set ablaze.
Tehran Fire Department vehicles on emergency call, situated (perhaps immobilized) at the scene of an overturned IRIPF police van.
And yet another view of an IRIPF police van attacked and overturned.
By dusk, apparently the IRIPF had still not gained full control over the city. Note several fires burning at this Tehran intersection.
Photos from Ashura 1388:
Well equipped IRIPF/SF firing a tear gas anti-riot gun, in an attempt to disperse protesters.
Well disciplined platoon of IRIPF conscript-soldiers in a defensive phalanx formation. Note the level of aggression shown by the stone throwing protesters, and the amount of expended debris on the ground.
Another shot of IRIPF conscript-soldiers in a defensive phalanx formation, with IRIPF (cadre) officers looking on. Protesters were seen tearing out slabs of concrete from Tehran's city sidewalks and smashing it to hurl stones at security forces.
Photo of incident depicted in videos 2, 3 and 4. Motorized IRIPF/SF policemen are trapped, forcefully dismounted and surrounded; to be stoned, beaten and their motorbikes set ablaze. They are not equipped with firearms for personal defense.
Another photo of the cornered IRIPF/SF policemen. At right, an un-helmeted and bloodied First Lieutenant (Sotvan Yekom) pleads on behalf of his beleaguered motorized SF detachment. This is the same officer shown in a previous video, subsequently beaten and partially stripped by the enraged mob.
IRIPF conscript-soldiers (most likely 18-20 year olds serving out their mandatory conscription terms) overwhelmed at close quarters by violent protesters; in retreat minus various pieces of their anti-riot equipment.
An abandoned IRIPF utility vehicle stoned and set ablaze by protesters.
And another demolished IRIPF utility vehicle seen burning amidst a crowd of destructive protesters.
IRIPF conscript-soldiers engaged in a contest of stone throwing with protesters on a Tehran street.
Good view of an assembled IRIPF street position, including mixed elements of conscript-soldiers and police regulars, as well as the use of an IRIPF utility vehicle. Protesters' expended stones can be seen everywhere.
Note the protesters' captured anti-riot police helmet, the combusted contents of a metropolitan garbage bin, the use of a makeshift club and the ubiquitous throwing stone.
An IRIPF regular First Lieutenant (Sotvan Yekom) leads a group of conscript-soldiers; engaging protesters in a contest of stone throwing.
A protester attempts to pick up and repel an expending tear gas smoke cartridge.
An IRIPF/SF detachment retreating, in the face of overwhelming numbers of protesters engaged in stone throwing. Note the visible expenditure of stones ssen scattered about the street.
