From Havana to Tehran

by Paul Iddon

Rare anti-American mural in Tehran.

We live in very interesting, perhaps historic, times. 2015, it appears, will be the year when two of Washington's longstanding sanctions regimes will gradually be discontinued. The ones leveled against Cuba and Iran.

Both sanctions regimes were introduced not longer after the respective revolutions (1959 and 1979) in each country. Since their respective introductions however the regimes in Havana and Tehran have solidified their holds on power rather than become weakened and the people they rule over disempowered from enacting any meaningful internal political change. Not wholly unlike how the crippling sanctions leveled against the Saddam Hussein regime in Iraq, between 1991 and 2003, actually helped to empower that regime and not only weakened the people over which it ruthlessly ruled, but made them highly dependent on the tyrant in Baghdad.

Despite what the Cuban and Iranian populations might think of their rulers the broad and sweeping nature of the sanctions either saw them, like Iraqis in the aforementioned period, rendered dependent on their regime or rally around it, due to that pressure emanating from the outside. Similar to how countries rally around the flag during a particular crisis or war, regardless of what they might otherwise think about their government. This was particularly evident in Iran in the early days of the Islamic Republic when its western province was invaded by Iraq. That war and the external threat Iraq posed proved to be a formative moment for the then nascent Islamic regime as patriotic Iranians sought to defend their land despite whatever other feelings they might have about who is in power in Tehran. Which historically was similar to how Soviets of all stripes fought under the tyrannical Joseph Stalin during the Second World War against invading Nazi Germany.

This also explains how, in both cases, the respective Cuban and Iranian diaspora haven't been able to enact regime change from the outside. Cuban opponents of Fidel Castro based in Florida were unable to topple his regime from there in the infamous 1961 Bay of Pigs invasion of their island nation in much the same way the Iraq-based Iranian opposition group the Peoples Mujahideen of Iran (MEK) were unable to topple the regime in Iran from the outside in a similarly botched Bay of Pigs-esque attempt in August 1988.

Today with the prospect of Washington lifting the over half-century old embargo it has been leveling against Cuba coupled with sanctions relief on Tehran could gradually open up those two societies and perhaps see to gradual political change in them in the long-run.

Some tourist agencies have urged people to book trips to Havana over the course of the last few months by implying it will soon fundamentally change and the retrograde time-warp in which Cuba has been stuck for the past half-century, as a direct result of the trade embargo, will itself be a thing of the past – hence those iconic 1950s-era cars which Havana has become famous for in recent decades may become gradually replaced by more modern automobiles and the country will lose some of the character which attracts tourists who want a different but unique travel experience. Of course such changes should be welcomed if it means that greater openness for that island-nation will lessen the poverty which permeates throughout it.

Similarly the prospect of McDonalds coming to Iran has been talked about in light of the recent nuclear agreement between the P5+1 countries and Tehran and the prospects of economic sanctions being eased and, in the long-term, possibly done away with altogether. Not unlike how the comprehensive nuclear talks between the Soviet Union and the United States in the mid to late 1980s led to the opening of a massive McDonalds in Moscow questions have been raised about the possibility of such a fast-food joint opening in Tehran. An urban center many westerners believe to be an irrevocable hotbed of anti-American and anti-western sentiment.

Interestingly Iran is already home to many western fast-food knockoffs. A fake McDonalds knockoff in Tehran recently raised the consternation of Iran's Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei who is resolutely opposed to, what he sees as, demoralizing western influences in society and has accordingly vowed to prevent the spread of western cultural influences in Iran. He has even told his regimes paramilitary enforcers, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, to be on high alert against, what he calls, the “political and cultural intrusion” which he believes could prove to be more harmful to his regime than “economic and security breaches.”

Khamenei's aversion to a sudden change is not unlike how many in the west fear the potential consequences of a botched Iran deal and an overly rapid lifting of the sanctions. However whereby the bringing about of political change in Cuba and Iran is concerned western policy over the last few decades has done little to influence change in those capitals or to alleviate the suffering and repression of their respective populations. This indicates that it may well be time to change these longstanding policies which, more likely than not, have done a lot more harm than good.

Another way to assess Iran's support of Assad

by Paul Iddon

Many detractors of former U.S. President Jimmy Carter lambaste him for leaving a former ally of the United States, the last Shah of Iran Mohammed Reza Pahlavi, fly around the world in exile without a country in which to take refuge. As Ronald Reagan put it during the 1980 presidential campaign, the Shah was a “stalwart ally” of the United States in that region and did its “bidding” there. Not assisting him or giving him refuge when he went into exile Reagan believed was “a blot” on America's record.

When the Shah died in 1981 former U.S. President Richard Nixon, a friend of the Shah, attended his funeral in Cairo wherein he called the Shah's treatment by the U.S. in exile as “shameful”, since it had “turned its back on one of its friends.” He too believed it had been a mistake not to assist that former American ally. After all, the Shah was an autocrat who he had helped elevate to be become a major regional power during his presidency as part of his administration's Nixon Doctrine.

Both these now deceased former American presidents voiced their view that even after the Shah had fallen the U.S. should not of snubbed him after he having had, in Reagan's words, “carried our load” for so long in the region they believed it was only right that they stand by their friend and ally until the end.

I'm often reminded of that episode of history when I see the lengths to which the current regime in Iran is going to prop-up the regime in Syria of President Bashar al-Assad. Yes, Assad is a strategically important ally and his fall would undermine Iran's strategic interests in the region vis-a-vis Hezbollah in Lebanon. But at the same time there is a much more personal component to the support Damascus has been receiving from Tehran given the fact that it was the Assad regime in Syria which had given decisive assistance to Iran during its brutal eight-year war with Saddam Hussein's Iraq.

The fostering of the Tehran-Damascus alliance came at a time when the help Iran got from the outside world during that war was extremely limited. Even after Iraq began to use chemical weapons on the battlefield. Many in the Iranian regimes Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) paramilitary still remember the help Syria gave them at a crucial and critical time for them shortly after their inception and see their support of the Assad regime today as one way to repay that support. Which is one reason why IRGC forces are also being sent to Syria to ensure Damascus and the remaining parts of the country Assad still retains remain under his control -- and possibly even to help him undertake an offensive aimed at retaking Idlib Province.

As the Shah had held the fort for Washington for so long in the Persian Gulf region so too did Assad for Iran in the Levant. And many in the establishment in Iran feel that another reason Assad should be supported when his rule is being directly threatened.

The comparison is obviously highly imperfect in many respects. After all, there have been weeks in Syria in the last four years whereby the Assad regime killed and tortured to death more people than the last Shah did during the entirety of his lengthy 38-year reign. Additionally, the last Shah did not authorize the bombing of his own country's cities like Assad did. And while the primary reason Tehran has sacrificed blood and treasure in keeping Assad in power is indeed strategic there is also that more personal component to this support which shouldn't be readily forgotten. Assad may well be a mass-murdering bastard, but it's worth remembering that from Tehran's point-of-view he is – as was Somoza to Washington once-upon-a-time – their bastard. 

Misunderstanding Munich

Obama is not Chamberlain, Lausanne is not Munich and Iran isn't Nazi Germany.

by Paul Iddon

Neville Chamberlain waving Munich Agreement, 1938.

A recent article on Slate discussed a 2008 interview in which an American senator adamantly argued that U.S. President Barack Obama was like Neville Chamberlain vis-á-vis Iran, even though he did not actually know who Chamberlain was. The short article concluded that Munich analogies for modern day politics and events “needs to be taken into a bunker with Eva Braun and shot.”

This scribbler loves historical comparisons and believes that any analogy to Munich should only be used sparingly, if ever, given the magnitude and significance that event has in the history of the 20th century. In accordance with this firm-held belief I believe that comparing Obama to Chamberlain and contending that the recent deal over Iran's nuclear program is the equivalent to Chamberlain's appeasement of Adolf Hitler and ceding to him the Sudetenland, when the Führer was on the ascent to conquering most of Europe, is fatally flawed, not to mention overly simplistic.

For one thing Iran wasn't necessarily appeased. Yes it gets to keep parts of its nuclear program but it is clear that the U.S. is ceding much less to Iran than Iran is ceding to it in order to get some of the economic sanctions leveled against it lifted. It appears clear that many of the wide-ranging sanctions on Iran are impediments and obstacles, not assets, to welcome bottom-up political change, in the long-term, to the present order in Iran. Furthermore, the salient distinction for anyone who knows anything about Munich is the fact that the United States is tremendously more powerful militarily than Iran. The opposite was the case with the United Kingdom and Nazi Germany in 1938. Also, don't forget that Germany was appeased and allowed to rearm substantially before Chamberlain became Prime Minister (the Anglo-German Naval Agreement was in 1935, Chamberlain became Prime Minister two years later) and when it became self-evident that appeasement wouldn't quell Hitler's ambitions to conquer Europe it was Chamberlain's Britain, along with France, which warned Germany that if it would go to war over Poland if Germany invaded it. And indeed it was that September 1939 invasion of Poland which sparked the wider war between the UK and its allies on the one side, and Germany on the other. The rest, as the saying goes, is history.

Merely implying that the United States is a weaker power militarily than Iran today is risible. Also, the notion that it is appeasing it and will ever let it, especially under this regime, become anything more than a nuclear “threshold” state which could potentially threaten Israel or its regional allies is also extremely doubtful. A war against Iran will likely serve to empower the regime, do great damage to the country, and probably see to the population suffer tremendously as a result. This regime, remember, cemented its hold power following Saddam Hussein's 1980 invasion of western Iran and the Ayatollah Khomeini's subsequent counter-offensive into Iraq in mid-1982. Another war will likely see that regime further empowered, the Revolutionary Guards garner even more economic clout and power and the Iranian people as a whole weakened further and further rendered unable to determine the trajectory their ship-of-state is taking them. Surely a deal which will see Iran prevented from becoming a nuclear power would be a much better outcome. Especially if one really does care about Iran and its people but isn't enamored, to put it mildly, by the ruling regime and its various actions and policies at home and abroad.

Could Iran really sink an aircraft carrier?

Abraham Lincoln carrier battle group.

Iran recently built a mock-up prop depicting a United States Navy Nimitz-class aircraft carrier. Then, as part of a much flaunted military exercise, used “swarming” tactics consisting of small speedboats, helicopters and anti-ship missile fired from Iran's coast in order to practice interdicting and attacking it. The whole exercise had a clear political dimension to it, Tehran wants to project an image of its asymmetrical abilities which enable it to, if necessary, sink one of America's capital vessels if it were directly threatened or attacked.

Plenty of articles have been written, and will be written, addressing both the military and political implications of this exercise. Can Iran really sink an aircraft carrier? Is the timing of this exercise – which after all comes amid more collapsing nuclear negotiations and as Iran's continued, and ever more conspicuous, involvement in the conflict in Syria grows increasingly more costly – Tehran's way of reminding the U.S. that it will make any attack as costly as possible?

I suspect that is the case. But the much more interesting question is whether or not Iran could do it. We've all heard the rhetoric time and again over the years concerning how the regime has threatened to retaliate if its nuclear program is targeted by either the Americans or the Israelis, or both. But this particular exercise does serve as an apt reminder of how finely tuned the relatively unique, and doubtlessly formidable, the defense mechanisms of Iran are.

A controversial 2002 war games simulation, Millennium Challenge, arrived somewhat controversial conclusions. Iran's asymmetrical abilities, the American simulation estimated, could well take out not just a lone carrier but an entire battle group if it were operating within the gulf or near Iran's coastal waters. The blow was so severe that the simulation was overhauled to ensure a U.S. victory – which sounds like a  ludicrous move since, after all, in the real world one cannot hit the reset button like a video game when it's not going the way one would like it to. 

Unlike in the late 1980's when the U.S. Navy responded to Iran's mining of the Persian Gulf, during the so-called Tanker War phase of the Iran Iraq War, by attacking its British-made naval frigates (and in the process sinking the Sahand and crippling the Sabalan, which it let limp away) Iran's posture today focuses more on a complex network of much smaller crafts using asymmetrical tactics as part of a broader defensive infrastructure. And a networked defensive posture which is relatively decentralized and consists of units which can operate independently if circumstances necessitate it from along Iran's massive coast could indeed make any American attempts to operate in that area a costly nightmare, especially if they are relying on relatively conventional tactics against a largely unconventional adversary. An adversary which, operating from its own territory, would likely be, as was said of the Viet Cong, everywhere and at the same time nowhere.

Any potential U.S. effort to hamper Iran's ability to attack from its own coast would have to be very sizeable and would doubtlessly incur considerable civilian casualties in Iran itself. Such a scenario is highly likely in the case of a protracted war against Iran and the U.S. in the region. Especially if such an escalation is sparked off by a U.S. and/or Israeli strike targeting Iranian nuclear facilities. If ensuing exchanges of fire became prolonged and intensified, to the point of a de-facto war, Iranians would likely rally behind the regime, regardless of whether or not they agree with it or its policies. Another sombre reminder of what could possibly be at stake in the not too distant future.

Iranian Newspaper Shut Down for "Je Suis Charlie"

Mardom-e Emrooz (People of Today) Banned

By: Jabbar Fazeli, MD

Yesterday, the Iranian government ordered the shut down of an Iranian newspaper for quoting George Clooney saying "Je Suis Charlie". This is closest any Iranian newspaper came to showing support for their fellow journalist at Charlie Hebdo. A solidarity gathering of Iranian journalists on Jan 8th was reportedly blocked by the authorities.

There is political complexity in Iran, even in the Charlie Hebdo issue. The newspapers could not come out in solidarity with the French journalists killed in the terrorist attack and say "Je Suis Charlie", as many Iranians overseas have. The president and the foreign ministry were only allowed to condom "any violence" against "anyone", "anywhere". To his credit, the president did say that he condemns violence committed in the name of Islam, but these remarks were for foreign consumption.

Mardom-e Emrooz tested the boundaries and proved that Iranian newspapers can not even report on someone else saying "Je Suis Charlie". 

The English language Tehran Times also tested the Iranian censorship yesterday by printing the front page of the banned paper in the course of reporting on the banning. They were NOT banned for that. Conclusion, as of today,  three levels of separation are required for "Je Suis Charlie" to be kosher for the Iranian censors. It also helps if the paper is not printed in Farsi.

The Iranian sensitivity on this issue is understandable as in 1990 the supreme leader Khamenei did reaffirm his predecessor, Khomaini's, Fatwa to kill Salman Rushdie, the author of satanic versus. To come out in support of Charlie Hebdo now would be at odds with their general principle of condoning and advocating other killings for violators of blasphemy laws, such as the case with Salman Rushdie. Even when Khatami, Iranian president in 1998 sought to distance Iran from the $2.5 million bounty on the authors head, in order to normalize relations with the UK and Europe, the parliament, and others close to the supreme leader, managed to say the exact opposite to please their hardliners on the inside. 

Original farsi text of Khomeini Fatwa to kill Rushdie in 1989

Incidentally, a hardline daily, the 'Ya-Lesart-al-Hussein', celebrated the murder of the French journalist by publishing a poem on their front page celebrating, according to the paper, the sending of those who insulted the prophet to hell. No word on whether or not the Tehran prosecutor intends to shut down that newspaper for supporting terrorist acts. There was also no mention of the French Muslim policeman, Ahmed Merabet, who was also killed during the terrorist attack. I guess it didn't fit the narrative of "infidels killed to avenge the prophet". 

http://www.yalasarat.com/vdcdkj0n.yt0ns6a22y.html

Another reason for Iran's reluctance to support freedom of speech for the French journalists, is its own suppression of freedom of speech. More than two hundred Iranian journalists are languishing in prison today, and at least four journalist were killed in the past decade or so. 

There were journalist in jail during the tenure of every Iranian president, including the "reformist" president  Khatami, as the internal security apparatus is under the control of the supreme leader and the IRGC, and they are not subject to elections, not even rigged elections.

On the bright side, Iran is off the hook, somewhat, as it is being eclipsed by the Saudis this week, who managed to send their representatives to march in Paris in solidarity with freedom of speech and Charlie Hebdo, and at the same time flogged the Saudi blogger Raif Badawi for "insulting Islam", Saudi euphemism for "Insulting the government". The blogger received 50 lashes last week, which are to be repeated every Friday for 20 weeks, for a total of 1000 lashes. The Saudis, despite their expertise in flogging and torture, have underestimated the time it takes for their victim's wounds to heal, so they are postponing this week's flogging on doctors orders. A humane gesture, by Saudi standards, in a barbaric affair.

Photo source: TV footage WP, Patheos.com

Does religion need protection, and from whom?

I am guessing that if God and Mohammad had a choice between "protection by fundamentalists" or "protection from fundamentalists" they would chose the later. The Catholic Church learned the hard way to stop complaining about Charlie Hebdo, and simply accept their right to poke fun of them and criticize their religious figures, including Jesus. They limited the damage from any critical cartoons by not complaining about them.

Here are a couple of consequences of the unwanted aid from fundamentalists and terrorists in defense of Mohammad and God.

-Charlie Hebdo sold more than 3 million copies this week instead of their usual 60K.  

-The latest Charlie Hebdo cartoon appeared normal and mainstream to many, even to many Muslims, given the sympathy generated by the terrorist attack. I personally found it sympathetic to Muslims, as the title of the cartoon was "all is forgiven", a gesture of reconciliation and tolerance I thought.

-Many Muslim journalists and newspapers expressed sympathy with the cartoonists accused of insulting their religion. That is an important milestone for the Middle East and the Islamic world, which still has blasphemy laws similar to those of the dark ages in Europe.

-Salman Rushdie made millions of dollars and sold more copies of his book, thanks to the 1989 Khomeini Fatwa. He went on to become "sir" Salman Rushdie, and enjoyed a life of fame and fortune. His obscure critique of Islam became mainstream even as many still ban his book. 

If the violent silencing of critics of religion and religious figures is bad for Islam and Muslims, then why would governments in Islamic countries hesitate in condemning it?

Imagine if people in Iran and Saudi Arabia, the two theocracies in the Middle East, were allowed to insult God and the prophet. 

If one could freely insult the religion or "God", then what argument would the government have to silence critics of the king or the supreme leader? None what so ever. They are not above God or the prophet, and so they would be fair game. 

Ironically, God and the prophet shouldn't need protection, but kings and dictators do need protection from the power of the pen and the word.

The blasphemy laws simply set the bar of what is not allowed then the dictators can decide on how far to draw the line to protect themselves. 

A word about images of Mohammad:

Recent events brought to the surface the fact that images of Mohammad were actually produced by Muslim artists throughout history and some are on display in bazaars today. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/jan/10/drawing-prophet-islam-muhammad-images

www.rohama.org/en/news/3947/iran-unveils-largest-islamic-teahouse-painting-photo

There is not a single reference or prohibition in the Quran when it comes to images of Mohammad, and even if there was, the world is under no obligation to comply with any religious text. There is only one principle that some fanatics draw from, and that is the avoidance of idol worship. 

In case of Iran, not only are images of Mohammad ok, one could also find images of Imam Ali and Imam Hussein in every Shiite religious establishment or hussaineyeh. Even Shiite mosques are full of such images.  Speaking of Idol worship, have you ever seen an Islamic republic event without pictures of Khomeini and Khamenei on display? 

Artist unknown

Artists unknown

The Charlie Hebdo cartoons often use the image of Mohammad as a symbol for the religious establishment, as they do with the pope as symbol for the Catholic Church. So most criticism conveyed in cartoons is actually directed at the establishment, not the person, or the people. Whether we would all find them to be in good taste, that's for every person to decide, hence the notion of democracy and free will.

The norms in the United States, for example, would make the publication of cartoons similar to those of Charlie Hebdo unlikely, as David Brooks wrote in his recent op-ed in the NY Times. http://www.nytimes.com/2015/01/09/opinion/david-brooks-i-am-not-charlie-hebdo.html

Not in my name:

It is time for average Muslims to say "not in my name". We can't expect religious figures to speak for us or our culture, or even our religion. Even the pope, who is considered nice by many, would like to see modest blasphemy constraints in place, as implied by his most recent statement. Muslim religious leaders represent the most religious in most cases, not the average Muslims who are most affected by the images of violence done in their name and without their consent or approval.

If moderate Muslims don't reclaim their religion from the fanatic cults and opportunistic political Islam then we will be left with the wrong people representing us. Like those depicted here:

The least reported Muslim reaction to Charlie Hebdo:  

Non-Iranian cartoonists in the Middle East did manage to produce some reaction to the Killing of the Charlie Hebdo journalist in the hands of terrorists. Here are a few examples of their work. It is important to make mention of these images to counter the message conveyed by the "Muslim" terrorists.http://rt.com/news/223459-arab-cartoons-charlie-response/

Caption in Arabic: Jailed Middle Eastern Journalists (freedom), Jailor (Je Suis Charlie), Road sign (paris)

Caption: Muslim world: Journalism is not a crime, and I'm not Charlie

The Omani Conduit

by Paul Iddon

It is no surprise that U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry is meeting Iran's Foreign Minister Javad Zarif in the Sultanate of Oman. Oman after all has had quite a cordial relationship with Iran since 1979.

Sultan Qaboos and Ayatollah Khamenei.

“If asked … if our help is asked, we will give it. And this is what we are doing in Muscat and Oman. But we are fighting … terrorists. Some people call them army of liberation. But what are they? Just savages in the mountains, living like goats, and acting like terrorists.”

That was the last Shah of Iran in 1974 answering a question regarding the deployment of Iranian forces beyond Iran's own territory. The Shah took up the opportunity to rather haughtily dismiss the communist insurgency, which he was assisting the Sultan of Oman (Sultan Qaboo's) to put down. That effort consisted of some 1,200 Iranian Army forces decisively backing Qaboo's forces and helped him to overcome the threat to his rule. Saudi Arabia had supported the rudiments of that revolt against Oman some years earlier. Its relations with Oman weren't very cordial considering their prior clashing over who owned the Buraimi Oasis.

In relation to Iran-Oman relations 1974 was a very important year given the fact it was that year that both countries mutually defined their territorial waters and also agreed to allow each other to police the others territorial waters, given their proximity to the strategically important Strait of Hormuz waterway. More recently there has even been talk about directly connecting Iran and Oman via a “high bridge over the Strait of Hormuz.”

After the Shah's fall in 1979 and the ascendance of the present regime both countries still retained relatively cordial ties. Throughout the Iran-Iraq War while Oman wasn't particularly happy with Iran mining the Persian Gulf, it never joined other Gulf Cooperation Council member states who supported the brutal Saddam Hussein regime against the Iranians. In fact it retained diplomatic relations with both parties in that war and even hosted ceasefire talks between the two sides on its soil. While they didn't bear fruit they did nevertheless serve as another example of the role Oman has often played as a mediator between Iran and its rivals.

Qaboos himself has visited Iran in recent years and there are plans to construct a $1 billion natural-gas pipeline between it and Iran. Another clear sign that Oman isn't following suit with Saudi-led efforts to bind together the Arab states of the Persian Gulf against the threat they perceive Iran to pose. The present U.S. administration, it shouldn't be forgotten, has even gone as far as to urge the GCC to set aside internal disputes, such as the diplomatic rift with member-state Qatar this year, by collectively uniting militarily against Iran.

An Emirati academic was quoted by Bloomberg earlier this year aptly illustrating the unique nature of Oman. He maintains that, “Oman isn't enthusiastic about integration and cooperation and I don't think it ever will be. The Sultan has always maintained a sense of mysteriousness about Oman, and they think of themselves as somewhat different from the rest of the GCC.”

Furthermore, in the past when the Clinton administration made failed overtures to the Iranians it did so through the Omanis. However, those overtures didn't bear fruit, largely due to suspicions and allegations within the U.S. intelligence community that Iran had a hand in the Khobar Towers bombing of 1996. A bombing it was suspected was carried out by the Saudi Hezbollah group. The Saudis were hesitant about disclosing any evidence they had about the group in apparent fear it would add credence to any justification of a U.S. campaign. While exploring his options at that time for such a campaign Clinton went as far as declaring that he didn't “want any pissant half-measures.”

Though the Omani channel was subsequently closed it once again signified the importance of Oman as a conduit between the U.S. and Iran. Also, the mistakes the United States seemed to have since learned from their conduct back then was their sole reliance on Iran's president as opposed to the ruling establishment and its Supreme Leader as a whole.

Now ahead of what could very well be deemed a historic deal over Iran's nuclear program U.S. Secretary of State Kerry is set to meet Iran's Foreign Minister Zarif later this month – November 9 and 10 – in order to discuss the negotiations ahead of the set deadline, on November 24, for a final agreement. Again for aforementioned reasons it is no coincidence that Oman is where this meeting will transpire. And it won't be surprising if that country continues to serve such a unique role in relation to such issues for the foreseeable future.

Abadi goes to Tehran

by Paul Iddon

Iraqi premier Haider al-Abadi.

Iraq's new Prime Minister Haidar al-Abadi is set to visit Iran this week to talk, amongst other things, about regional issues such as the threat of the Islamic State (IS) group and ties between Iraq and Iran, which have been quite cordial and warm in recent years. Former Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad made his last state visit to Iraq last year and was told by former Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki that Iranian companies were welcome to invest in Iraq and help the country rebuild itself after years of turmoil and war. Ahead of his upcoming visit Abadi also plans to broaden economic and business cooperation between the two countries.

Iran has of course been assisting Iraq to combat the IS since that group launched its onslaught against Northern Iraq last June. As part of his visit to an important regional neighbour Abadi seeks “to unite the efforts of the region and the world to help Iraq in its war against the terrorist group.”

Obviously a neighbour like Iran has vested interests in seeing a stable Iraq that is able to protect itself against Islamist groups like IS given the fact that Iran itself has had problems with such groups. It also has an interest in seeing its interests and political allies in Iraq promoted and protected as well as the opportunity to invest in and trade with a neighbouring developing country.

There is an interesting history regarding the current Iranian regimes past and present attempts to incorporate itself more into the regional order of the Middle East and the Persian Gulf region. Put into historical perspective the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) for instance. This economic and military body between the Sunni Arab monarchies of the Persian Gulf was established not long after the Iran-Iraq War was initiated by Saddam Hussein's Iraq. GCC members played a key role in propping up Saddam's regime with billions of dollars as a bulwark against Tehran throughout the 1980's – the leaders of some of these Sunni monarchies, particularly Saudi Arabia, have since sought to contain Iran and in Iraq have been alarmed by the ascension of the Shia majority to political power in the wake of the overthrow of the Saddam regime.

As you know Saddam the GCC countries found themselves facing Iraq following its August 1990 annexation of Kuwait. This happened to coincide with a relative thaw in cross-Gulf Tehran-Riyadh relations (another thaw as it happens is taking place as I write which is also worth following). Iran argued on that occasion that the GCC had proven ineffective when it came to defending Kuwait against the invading Iraqis and in turn proposed that Iran become a part of the GCC to make it a more effective cross-Gulf economic and military cooperative union. Of course, as you know, that offer never materialized.

The present administration in Washington has been quite open about its view of the GCC in essence being a military counterweight to Iran's regional ambitions. This has seen to that economic bloc become a lucrative marketplace for arms producers to the extent that the present U.S. Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel has even gone as far as to suggest that the GCC members states should collectively integrate all of their armed forces into one six-member military power to protect themselves from the threat many of them see Iran as posing to them and their broader regional interests. Hagel seemed to imply that this would also be the solution to intra-GCC political divisions. Which of course was an allusion to the fact that Bahrain, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates had earlier this year threatened to do their utmost to isolate and reprimand Qatar for having policies and interests in the region which clashed with their own.

This week Abadi is going to Tehran. The Iraqi leader is going to see a regional partner and likely exchange ideas about how that regional partner can effectively help Iraq overcome the immediate threat posed by IS as well as discuss bilateral business and trade relations. Tehran will doubtlessly seek to once again promote itself as a solution to the regions present woes as it has often done in the past. The overall outcome of this meeting and future relations and coordination between Iran and Iraq will surely be interesting whereby Iran's broader regional influence and stature is concerned.

Is Iran really reconsidering its support of Assad?

 Are Iran and its regional ally Hezbollah really seriously reconsidering their support for their long-term ally in Damascus?

by Paul Iddon

Pro-Assad billboard, Damascus 2006 / Bertil Videt

Iran has poured billions into Damascus in order to keep the Assad regime in power so it can effectively suppress and crush all opponents to its authoritarian rule. Its ally the Hezbollah has since 2013 even been sending many of its own fighters into Syria in order to engage fighters in the ragtag opposition alongside the Syrian Army. 

In the process of consolidating his control to his country's west Mr. Assad gave ISIS a freehand in targeting other opposition groups. It was as if an unspoken mutual agreement was adhered to by both sides. ISIS was allowed consolidate control over large swaths of territory in the east while Assad continued to direct state forces to crush opponents closer to home. It seems that the regime did not to calculate that ISIS would garner as much power and territory as it has.

At present the United States-led coalition is preparing to strike ISIS in strikes that may even well extend into Syrian territory. The United States refuses to recognize the Assad regime as the legitimate government of Syria due to the atrocities it has levelled against Syria's population. There is also a possibility that the Syrian regime may come under fire from a coalition intervening in Syria too.

In light of these circumstances a peculiar report has come to light. According to The Telegraph the regime in Iran is seriously reconsidering its stance towards its long-term ally in Damascus. The papers source claims that Iran is prepared to "burn" Assad if it means that country can reach an agreement with the western powers on its nuclear program which would see to an ease and eventual lifting of the sanctions imposed on Iran's economy. One diplomat referred to in the report said that the shift may have come due to the fact that Tehran has come to a realization that it "cannot win the Syrian conflict whilst Assad is in power." 

If true this would indeed be a fascinating development. But the report is one which clearly needs to be taken with a grain of salt. Unless Assad is unable to secure his rule, even if through continued coercion and brute violence, Tehran would hardly compromise such a close ally just like that. Surely such an agreement tied with negotiations on other matters would at least see to clemency given to Mr. Assad and other important members of his regime – possibly in order to get him to agree to step-down in favour of a provisional government which would mark the beginning of the post-Assad phase in Syria's arduous modern history.

And even when such an agreement is indeed brokered Iran would of course want to ensure that it could continue to logistically support the Hezbollah in Lebanon (a Syrian official quoted in the report claims that, "Much of the Syrian army is Sunni and they see Hezbollah as too sectarian. Some from the Syrian army won't work with Hezbollah. They don't want a militia involved") so it can maintain at least one very important component of its self-described "axis-of-resistance".

While one wouldn't dismiss out of hand the authenticity of this report one does remains highly skeptical. After all the prospect of a post-Assad Syria and what that will mean for the present Iranian regime is surely something which has been on its mind for some time now. And one would indeed be quite surprised if they aren't continuously contemplating how they can seek to make the eventual ushering in of a post-Assad age less painful for them.

"Degrading and defeating" ISIS will require "boots on the ground"

 by Paul Iddon

A recently proposed strategy published by the 'Institute for the Study of War' offers what is bound to be a controversial solution to the threat posed by Islamic State (IS, referred to herein as 'ISIS') which insists that any feasible military solution will indeed require the deployment of American ground forces in Iraq and Syria.

Written by Kim and Fred Kagan and Jessica Lewis 'A Strategy to Defeat The Islamic State' proposes many potential steps the United States can take to address ISIS. Fred Kagan is of course one of the chief intellectuals involved in devising the troop surge implemented in Iraq which did help bring some semblance of stability to that country before the U.S. withdrawal in late 2011. That fact in and of itself makes this strategy well worth understanding, evaluating and of course critiquing.

From the get-go the authors make it clear that their proposed strategy for defeating ISIS will require an insertion of ground forces. As many as 25,000 in fact which they envision being made up of “special forces and special mission units.”

In essence they inform their readers that,

'The activities recommended in this paper will likely require the deployment of not more than 25,000 ground forces supported by numerous air and naval assets. The bulk of those forces will likely be comprised of various kinds of units supporting a much more limited number of special forces and other assets deployed in small groups with tribes, opposition forces, and Iraqi security forces. This plan does not envisage U.S. combat units conducting unilateral operations (apart from targeted attacks against individual enemy leaders and small groups) or leading clearing operations. It requires some combat units in the support and quick reaction force (QRF) roles.'

As for Syria broadly speaking their solution is quite straightforward. The United States should seek to take on the al-Qaeda affiliated Jabhat al-Nusra (JN), ISIS and the Assad regime. They summarize this view when they write,

'The problem in Syria is relatively easy to state, but extremely difficult to solve. The Assad regime has lost control of the majority of the territory of the Syrian state. It has violated international law on many occasions and lost its legitimacy as a member of the international community. Assad himself is the icon of atrocities, regime brutality, and sectarianism to Sunni populations in Syria and throughout the region. His actions have fueled the rise of violent Islamists, particularly ISIS and JN. U.S. strategy must ensure that none of these three actors control all or part of Syria while supporting the development of an alternative, inclusive Syrian state over time.'

A consistent theme throughout their paper is the fundamental necessity of a political solution in both Iraq and Syria coupled with a military one. Again on Syria they insist,

'The U.S. must also engage much more vigorously in efforts to develop an inclusive government-in-waiting in Syria. We must do more than trying to unify what is left of the moderate opposition. We must also reach out to the ‘Alawite community and to Syria’s other minority groups in search of potential leaders who could join forces with moderate Sunni leaders to oppose extremists on all sides.'

From the get go we're informed by the authors that their strategy may prove impossible to implement given circumstances which range from whether or not potentially friendly elements in both Iraq or Syria will cooperate with them to whether or not the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) can be effectively reformed when they inform us that,

'Even then, this strategy suffers from the high risk of failure and the near-certainty that the U.S. will suffer casualties, including at the hands of supposedly friendly forces. American troops dispersed among the Sunni population are at risk of being kidnapped. The significant anti-aircraft capabilities of ISIS put American helicopters at risk. It may turn out that the Sunni Arabs cannot or will not fight with us, finally, and that the overall strategy proposed here is infeasible. In that case, it will be necessary to abandon this strategy and reconsider our options.'

Nevertheless,

'The U.S. should adopt this strategy despite these risks. The consequences of inaction or inadequate action are evident: ISIS will retain control of much of the territory it holds, sectarian war will escalate, more foreign fighters including Americans and Europeans will cycle through the battlefield and get both trained and further radicalized, and al-Qaeda will benefit from the largest and richest safe-haven it has ever known. It is worth accepting the risks of this strategy to avoid this outcome.'

To date the authors tell us that Obama's record hasn't at all been a good one due to the fact that,

'He celebrated the regional and international partnerships that will join in the U.S.-led plan. This plan is largely a continuation of the failed counterterrorism strategy that the administration has pursued for years, and in which the threat of the Islamic State arose. The plan to lead other regional and indigenous forces in conducting an air-ground campaign to degrade and destroy ISIS in Iraq assumes conditions in the region that are no longer present. These conditions will likely cause the U.S. strategy to fail.'

Furthermore, to degrade and ultimately destroy ISIS the authors argue that the United States cannot adopt an Iraq-first, Syria-second strategy. It must engage ISIS in both countries simultaneously,

'Only military formations that cross sectarian lines will be able to challenge ISIS. This is an exceptional battlefield condition that cannot be assumed in either Iraq or Syria. Furthermore, the involvement of regional actors such as Iran, Qatar, and Saudi Arabia in the Syrian war has only increased the sectarian nature of the conflict over the last two years; their involvement in Iraq at this point may have the same effect.'

The authors continuously stress that United States policy in confronting ISIS must see to an atmosphere permeate whereby Sunnis feel empowered and are able to take a decisive stand and reject the Islamic State which has been forcibly established around them. The authors also argue that,

'Air strikes alone – which may be perceived as U.S. support to Iranian-backed Shi'a governments trying to oppress the Sunni Arabs – will not allow the U.S. to evaluate this variable and may well reduce the willingness of Sunni Arabs to join with us and, more importantly, to rejoin Iraqi and Syria. Developing a strategy that has a chance of success requires identifying the center of gravity of the overarching regional problem — the struggle within the Sunni Arab community itself amidst the collapse of state structures in the Middle East.'

Futhermore they reiterate their advocacy of U.S. approach which aims to remove Assad, JN and ISIS from the picture in Syria. The following paragraph aptly sums up why this is the position they take,

'ISIS must be defeated in Syria, and Assad must be removed from power. But a strategy that delivers Syria into the hands of Jabhat al-Nusra would be disastrous for the U.S. and its regional allies. JN is a loyal al-Qaeda affiliate and would establish an al-Qaeda state in Syria that would support the global jihadi movement. Any successful strategy for dealing with ISIS in Syria must also separate JN from the bulk of the opposition, marginalize it, and ultimately defeat it as well, while setting conditions for an inclusive post-Assad government that can prevent any al-Qaeda affiliate from re-establishing itself in Syria. This recovery of the opposition requires the removal of Assad as a necessary pre-condition for ending the Syrian war.'

Working closely with the Sunni communities they insist is essential for defeating such forces due to the fact that,

'Al-Qaeda and like-minded groups such as ISIS can only flourish in distressed Sunni communities. They attack every other religion and sect, but their bases must be in Sunni lands because their ideology is an extreme, exclusionary interpretation of Sunni Islam. Doing anything to al-Qaeda — defeating, disrupting, degrading, destroying, anything else — requires working with the overwhelming majority of the Sunni communities within which it lives and operates. Those communities have shown their distaste for the ideology and the groups that espouse it, rising up against them in Iraq, Afghanistan, Syria, Yemen, Somalia, Egypt, and almost everywhere else they have appeared, except Pakistan.'

While the Iranian dimension in all of this is not on the top of their proposed agenda it is nevertheless featured throughout. The authors repeatedly denounce the prospect of Iranian "hegemony" in the region and denounce its role of stoking "sectarian polarization."

They scathingly critique Iran's role in the region throughout the text. The following paragraph very aptly sums up their many contentions with Tehran's policies,

'Iran is the principal regional symbol of sectarianism, preferentially supports extremist Shi’a groups, and is integrating national security forces into an international structure that includes its own forces and terrorist groups. Working with Iran will have the same effect on Sunni perception as working with Assad. It may also drive our Gulf Arab allies away in the belief that the U.S. has made a permanent shift of alliances in the Middle East. Iran’s leaders and military commanders, finally, have consistently and loudly repudiated any notion of cooperating with the U.S. in Iraq.'

They also denounce the idea of coordinating with Iran in any way insisting that,

'Doing so legitimizes the presence of Iranian troops in Iraq, a principle to which the U.S. cannot accede. It would also effectively require a level of intelligence-sharing and mutual confidence that would place U.S. troops too much at the mercy of the IRGC. Lack of coordination with Iranian assets, however, can lead to accidental exchanges of fire between U.S. and Iranian troops. Such exchanges could in turn lead to escalating conflict with Iran.'

Regarding Iran's proxies and allies in Iraq the authors contend that,

'The U.S. must use the expanding leverage increased military support will give it in Baghdad to continue to shape the emerging Iraqi government to be as inclusive and non-sectarian as possible. Well-known sectarian actors and Iranian agents such as Hadi al-Amiri (Badr corps commander), Qais al-Khazali (Asa’ib Ahl al-haq leader), and Qassim al-Araji (Badr corps deputy) cannot have leading positions in the security ministries or security services if there is to be any hope of persuading Iraq’s Sunni Arabs that they are safe in the hands of the new government. Reported U.S. pressure to keep Hadi al-Amiri from getting a ministry was an important step. Continued pressure must be exerted to keep him and others like him from getting ministerial posts or otherwise obtaining de jure control over Iraq’s security services. If such individuals are given inappropriate portfolios, the U.S. should continue to exert leverage — including refusing to work with forces over which they have been given command or influence — to secure their removal.'

They also recommend the following regarding regional powers who have funded, directly and indirectly, terror groups operating in Syria,

'The U.S. should exert all possible pressure on states that are currently supporting extremists in Syria either to reorient that support to moderate forces or simply to cut it off. If prominent supporters of extremists such as Qatar refuse to change their behaviour, the U.S. should act in concert with international partners to interdict that support and consider sanctioning the offenders.'

The authors also make clear that the United States has and will likely continue to have little sway over the Hezbollah,

'Hezbollah’s deployment of thousands of troops to Syria — the first major external military expedition in its four-decade history — initially strained its support in Lebanon. The expansion of sectarian conflict and the increase in Sunni extremist operations and attacks in Lebanon, however, have rallied support around Hezbollah once again. Strengthening the Lebanese government and armed forces independent of Hezbollah — to the limited extent to which that is possible — could threaten the organization’s control sufficiently to distract it from Syria somewhat. It might even weaken Hezbollah’s position in Lebanon more fundamentally, although that prospect remains dim.'

More risk are acknowledged when they discuss the prospect of JN and ISIS working together when collectively targeted by the U.S. Again inaction is deemed worse since it,

'… would allow ISIS and JN to build up their forces independently and offers no assurance that they will not ultimately recombine in any event. The ongoing jihadi competition caused in part by the ISIS-al Qaeda rivalry, moreover, has already increased the likelihood of attempts by other al-Qaeda affiliates to attack the U.S. homeland and U.S. interests abroad. The additional spur such efforts might receive from an American intervention in Syria and Iraq would be more than balanced by depriving two of the most lethal affiliates — JN and ISIS — of large territorial sanctuaries.'

As for Iran's potential reaction to such operations,

'Iran may perceive intervention as a re-invasion to position U.S. forces to attack Iran in the event of the failure of nuclear negotiations and may respond with regional attacks. The geographic focus of U.S. efforts may provide Tehran some reassurance, since they will be focused in northern and western Iraq away from the Iranian border. But the U.S. should also consider supplying its Gulf allies with additional defensive capabilities to deter any such Iranian response or render it ineffective if deterrence fails.'

Arguing for "additional defensive capabilities" for the Gulf states may be considered heavy-handed when one takes into account the fact that these Gulf Cooperation Council members have already been sold billions-of-dollars in arms and sophisticated military hardware in the last five years alone – the 2010 arms deal to supply Saudi Arabia with fighter jets was the biggest in both America and Britain's history. 

 

All-in-all in both Iraq and Syria the authors determine that there is no wholly military solution nor a wholly political one. Any solution will have to be a delicate combination of the two, in their conclusion they state,

'A strategy that does not describe how Iraq will win Mosul back and how a legitimate government will regain control of Syria’s northern cities is not a strategy to defeat or destroy ISIS. ISIS can control those areas now in part because the populations violently oppose the Assad regime and the government in Baghdad. The formation of a new government in Iraq does not solve this problem by itself. It may superficially bandage sectarian wounds, but it may also exacerbate them, particularly if the leaders of sectarian militias receive security portfolios. There is no meaningful political discourse in Syria at the moment. And even if political accords were reached in Damascus and Baghdad, ISIS retains the ability to control subject populations through brutal terror. There is no purely political solution to these problems.'

Obviously there is no clear-cut simple solution when it comes to addressing such a complex set of problems. For the good of a detailed, open and informed debate the ideas proposed in this paper should be rigorously evaluated when it comes to determining what should be done about ISIS and what broader role, if any, the United States should play in the Middle East region in relation to this present ongoing crisis.