Amended 4/13/10
Kyrgyzstan's opposition forces appear to have gained the upper hand over security forces, where Iran's law enforcement have met similar pressures but persevered. Of the few photos available from Kyrgyzstan's current civil unrest, we'll point out just a few detectable differences.
Above: A Kyrgyzstan law enforcement firing line, equipped with AKS-74U "Krinkov" short assault rifles. In contrast, post-June civil unrest, the IRIPF has not distributed battle rifles, assault rifles or SMGs (or most any firearms loaded with lethal rounds) to its antiriot forces. It must be noted this claim is disputed. However there are no photos available to this writer's knowledge of IRIPF firing lines equipped with assault weaponry, using lethal force against rioters. (Excluding the defense of a Basij base in Tehran, where an AK-47 type assault rifle was utilized from a rooftop position.)
Above: Kyrgyzstan law enforcement on the run. Abandoned by their own leadership, they are in headlong retreat. Even during the height of Asura rioting, Iran's leadership carried on, resolutely. In Kyrgyzstan's case, the leadership finds itself heavily swayed and manipulated by external foreign powers, whereas the Islamic Republic of Iran remains fiercely independent. This is the fundamental difference between the two cases of civil unrest, and naturally it corresponds to the level of effectiveness between the two countries success or lack of success in combating cvil unrest.
A footnote: Ironic that Kyrgyzstan's government recently attempted to dispute Iran's rendering of its dramatic Rigi capture operation- by changing its own previous reporting- only to now find itself apparently out of power only a few weeks later.
Kyrgyzstan's opposition forces appear to have gained the upper hand over security forces, where Iran's law enforcement have met similar pressures but persevered. Of the few photos available from Kyrgyzstan's current civil unrest, we'll point out just a few detectable differences.
(click all photos to enlarge)
Above: Well equipped Kyrgyzstan antiriot forces
on the brink of disarray.
Above: A Kyrgyzstan law enforcement firing line, equipped with AKS-74U "Krinkov" short assault rifles. In contrast, post-June civil unrest, the IRIPF has not distributed battle rifles, assault rifles or SMGs (or most any firearms loaded with lethal rounds) to its antiriot forces. It must be noted this claim is disputed. However there are no photos available to this writer's knowledge of IRIPF firing lines equipped with assault weaponry, using lethal force against rioters. (Excluding the defense of a Basij base in Tehran, where an AK-47 type assault rifle was utilized from a rooftop position.)
Above: Kyrgyzstan law enforcement on the run. Abandoned by their own leadership, they are in headlong retreat. Even during the height of Asura rioting, Iran's leadership carried on, resolutely. In Kyrgyzstan's case, the leadership finds itself heavily swayed and manipulated by external foreign powers, whereas the Islamic Republic of Iran remains fiercely independent. This is the fundamental difference between the two cases of civil unrest, and naturally it corresponds to the level of effectiveness between the two countries success or lack of success in combating cvil unrest.A footnote: Ironic that Kyrgyzstan's government recently attempted to dispute Iran's rendering of its dramatic Rigi capture operation- by changing its own previous reporting- only to now find itself apparently out of power only a few weeks later.
