Showing posts with label USA. Show all posts
Showing posts with label USA. Show all posts

Saturday, March 2, 2013

"Going to Tehran" or Not!

By: Jabbar Fazeli, MD

LAURA SECOR wrote a book review of "Going to Tehran" titles "The Iran Syndrome" (1)
Published: March 1, 2013

Here a few excerpts from her review:

"There is much to be said for understanding how the Islamic Republic of Iran sees itself on the international stage. We make little sense of history, and less progress toward resolving our conflicts, when we demonize our adversary and ascribe to him dark motives and irrational thoughts. Flynt and Hillary Mann Leverett, veterans of the State Department and the National Security Council, might have written a book that made a powerful case for empathy in foreign policy. They would have devoted much of it to illuminating Iran’s strategic interests and its view of history. They might have done so while observing, as they have elsewhere, that American policy must not be blinded by sentimentality about Iranian human rights and democratic aspirations — concerns, they could suggest, that have no place in the cold calculus of global strategy. Whatever we think of the Islamic Republic, the Leveretts might argue, it is the policy maker’s job to understand it as it is, not as he would like it to be."

"They [the authors] accept the perspective of the Iranian government with regard to both its foreign policy and its internal affairs. Rather than delivering a corrective to the one-sided view from Washington, they deliver its mirror image."

"They assert (without evidence) that virtually all the Iranians who took to the streets in 2009 came from one rich, irrelevant area of Tehran. As for the young woman, Neda Agha Soltan, whose death by sniper fire was captured on a video seen around the world, the Leveretts give credence to the government line that she was actually shot by provocateurs in a deliberate effort to frame the Iranian security forces and fan rebellion."

"If the Leveretts were urging caution in assessing the true desires of a bitterly divided population whose opinions cannot be credibly studied on a large scale, it would be a point well taken. But that is not the Leveretts’ agenda. Rather, they purport to know how the Iranian people think. And it turns out that they think exactly like their government."

"On the basis of opinion polls taken under repressive conditions, the Leveretts write that most Iranians support their government’s crackdown on protesters after the 2009 election. They claim that Iranians overwhelmingly believe in the divine right of the clerics to rule, and happily accept the conservative clerics’ role in choosing the candidates who can stand for elections. As evidence of popular satisfaction with the political process, the Leveretts cite official election turnout statistics, including those from last year’s parliamentary election, which the state-controlled news media published the day before the vote. At one point the Leveretts cite, and quote at length, a personal e-mail from an unnamed 'defender of the system' explaining what 'the overwhelming majority of Iranians believe.' "

"The concluding pages of “Going to Tehran”argue that American policy makers cannot resolve their impasse with Iran’s government so long as they imagine they can isolate it, strangle it, bombard it, dislodge it or simply wait for it to fall. Rather, a visionary American administration should take the Islamic Republic seriously as a strategic partner and negotiate a comprehensive agreement covering all outstanding issues between the two nations."

"The Leveretts compare such a diplomatic enterprise with President Richard Nixon’s opening to China. They suggest that outreach would start with assurances that the United States will not seek to invade or topple the Islamic Republic; that Iran can enrich uranium on its own soil, but with international safeguards; and that the Arab-Israeli peace process will include the Iranians and take account of Iranian interests. The Leveretts are less clear on what they would require of the Iranians in exchange, other than 'a reciprocal Iranian commitment to resolve — or, where resolution is not possible, to manage — outstanding bilateral differences through diplomacy and negotiation.' "

“Going to Tehran” is too one-sided to illuminate much about the history of relations between the United States and Iran. For that, readers would be well advised to pick up 'Becoming Enemies,' a fascinating collection of declassified documents and expert and participant commentary from the time of the Iran-Iraq war, co-authored by six scholars."

"Its authors have bound a value judgment about the Islamic Republic to their own foreign policy prescription, which is for diplomatic engagement, and so they presume that their critics do likewise, marrying a critical perspective on the Islamic Republic’s domestic behavior to a call for war. In the end the Leveretts furnish a potent reminder — and example — of how political agendas have distorted our views of Iran and deepened our estrangement."

References:
(1) http://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/03/books/review/going-to-tehran-by-flynt-leverett-and-hillary-mann-leverett.html?pagewanted=1&_r=2&smid=tw-share

Photo source: Parsart.com

Thursday, February 21, 2013

Bulgarian Wrestler, Korbarov, Sends Gold Medal Back--IOC


By: Jabbar Fazeli, MD

The Bulgarian wrestler, Valentin Yordanov, sent his Olympic gold medal from the 1996 Atlanta Games back to the IOC to protest their decision to drop wrestling from the Olympic Games starting in 2020 (1).

The seven times world champion Yordanov's medal was sent along with a letter to the IOC president Jacques Rogge in which he wrote: "As a sign of protest I am returning my gold medal, won at the Olympic Games in Atlanta in 1996, to the headquarters of the International Olympic Committee in Lausanne,"

Referring to the president of the IOC, Mr. Yoranov said "He unreservedly united Russia, the United States and Iran for a single cause - saving the sport of wrestling, without which the Olympics will never be the same,"

Bulgaria is a wrestling powerhouse and its wrestlers have won 16 Olympic titles.

References:
(1) http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/02/20/us-olympics-wrestling-bulgaria-idUSBRE91J0S620130220

Photo source: MSNBC

Tuesday, February 12, 2013

Wrestling dropped from 2020 Olympics--IOC


By Jabbar Fazeli

The IOC announced today that they are dropping wrestling from the 2020 Olympics to make way for a new discipline to be added later this year. (1)

"Wrestling, which combines freestyle and Greco-Roman events, goes back to the inaugural modern Olympics in Athens in 1896."

The US and Iran are among the countries with competitive wrestling teams in past Olympics and many of the Iranian Olympic medals come from this discipline in sport. Iran's first silver medal in the Olympics was by Gholamreza Takhti in 1952 (2,3), and first Iranian gold medal was won by Emam-Ali Habibi in 1956 and was also in wrestling (3).

With Iran becoming a "light weight" in world politics and sports governing bodies it is unclear if the IR did anything to try to influence this decision by the IOC.

References:
(1) http://espn.go.com/olympics/wrestling/story/_/id/8939185/ioc-drops-wrestling-2020-olympics
(2) http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/tehranbureau/2012/01/profile-gholamreza-takhti-world-champion-wrestler-iranian-patriot.html
(3) http://www.iranchamber.com/sport/takhti/gholamreza_takhti.php

Photo source: PBS

Sunday, February 10, 2013

Iranian Medicine Shortage--Myths vs Facts

By: Jabbar Fazeli, MD


Medicine shortage is making headlines once again, everywhere except in Iran that is.

The headlines in Iran died out back on January 1st, 2013 when the supreme leader ended the discussion by saying "government officials should solve the medicine shortage issue" (see headline below). Apparently the Iranian media took that to mean that this issue is now off limit and the public does not need to read or hear anymore negative reporting on the subject.
Just before this unwritten gag order, the "Fars News" website posted an article titled "Medicine Languishing in Customs" (see photo below). In that article it was revealed that what little medicine that makes it to Iranian ports is not clearing customs because its been three months since the importers were given access to "hard currency" to pay for already imported medicine. That news article was published on December 29, 2012 (5, and photo below).
A couple of months ago, the health minister Marziyeh Vahid Dastjerdi, the only woman in Ahmadinejad's cabinet, was fired for being too outspoken in her criticism of the Government's lack of funding for medicine imports; She was never heard from again. Her last statement to the media was "I don't know what happened to the funds designated for the purchase of medicine". 

The now acting health minister was quoted on Jan 26 to say that "we have no shortage of medicine" (6, also see photo below)


It's been quiet in the Iranian media but the western media is picking this issue up as evidence of the unintentional ill effects of sanctions.

I would like to review a couple of reports currently making the rounds:

"Sanctions and Medical Supply Shortages in Iran" (1)
by Siamak Namazi, a Dubai based consultant and a former Public Policy Scholar at the Woodrow Wilson Center.

"There is no mistaking that the scarcity of medicine and medical equipment in Iran started with the tightening up of sanctions. Nearly every one of our interviewees—including senior officers of American and European companies that supply pharmaceutical and medical products to the country—attested to this fact."

The author assumes "cause and effect" based simply on the timing of the medicine shortage. The report does mention China and India as alternate sources of some drugs but claims that Iran has no way to purchase critical US and European made medicine from alternate sources.

Even if we erroneously assume that US and European made medicine can not be purchased in India or China using their local currency, a determined buyer would have considered alternate sources like Turkey and Iraq (as many individual Iranians do), both of whom have good commercial relations with Iran and would be more than happy to facilitate medicine purchases and make a commission in the process. 

Since medicine and medical supplies are officially off the sanction list, intermediaries in Turkey or Iraq would not face retaliations from the US or Europe for facilitating such transactions.

Most Iranians visiting Turkey know that one could walk into any pharmacy and obtain any drug without even a prescription, so long as you take your wallet along. I personally bought US made medicine in Istanbul and all I had to do is pay for it in Turkish liras. Incidentally, the cost was lower than what i would have paid in the USA.

There is no reason to believe that the Iranian government is not able to do what ordinary Iranians are already doing.

Iran has a significant Turkish lira account in Turkey as the Turks are paying Iran in local currency for their energy purchases. If the Iranian regime is as determined as it claims then there is nothing to stop it from using these funds to purchase US made medicine from Turkey. Instead, Iran has been converting its Turkish liras to Turkish Gold and taking it home (3,4) to use in lieu of hard currency within Iran to pay for its security forces and other more pressing budget items in order to stay in power and keep any future unrest in check.

This report goes on to point out that:
"Intuitive logic also supports the study’s findings. Remember, Iran had the same government and the same companies running the pharmaceutical and medical supplies business—all with the same deficiencies—prior to the ratcheting up of sanctions; yet Iranian patients did not lack in healthcare in the same way that they do today. Shortages began when the continuous tightening of sanctions eventually placed overwhelming obstacles in the way of humanitarian trade. There is no chicken and egg argument to be had in this instance since the timeline is clear."

This argument assumes that the Iranian officials are placing the same priority on medicine purchases as they did in the past. Available evidence indicates that they don't. They don't allocate enough funds for it, and when they do they are being caught red handed not providing the funds they promised to importers. Even Khamenei's last statement implies that the solution is in the hands of Iranian officials.

Iran maybe trying its best to overcome the sanctions in general, but it is clearly not trying hard enough when it comes to its humanitarian needs. I still believe that the IR of Iran is hoping to keep this humanitarian issue "alive" in order to better argue for easing of the sanctions, even if this inaction leads to the "death" of many Iranians.

A regime priding itself on managing to "almost" develop a "stealth jet" while under sanctions is surely capable of working around the obstacles involved in the purchasing of nonlethal items that are not subject to sanctions, like medicine.


Another interesting report in the news is the Reuters article of Feb 8, 2013 by Arshad Mohammed titled (2):
"U.S. pharmaceutical exports to Iran cut in half in 2012"

This article highlights the banking difficulties Iran is facing in paying for medicine purchased in the United States, despite treasury department assertions that medicine purchases are not restricted.

"Exports of U.S. pharmaceuticals to Iran were cut in half last year, according to data released on Friday, while overall U.S. exports to the Islamic republic rose about nine percent because of grain sales."

"Exports of pharmaceuticals fell to $14.8 million from $31.1 million in 2011, while sales of vitamins, medicinal and botanical drugs decreased to $4.9 million from $10.8 million."

"Exports of surgical appliances and supplies also declined to $2.4 million last year from $3.7 million the previous year."

"Sales of pulp mill products - which include the raw material for diapers - dropped to $26.3 million from $57.9 million, and exports of cattle fell to $5.3 million from $7.3 million."

Despite the title of this article, the data within is actually quite damning to the Iranian regime. Instead of purchasing hard to find chemotherapy and immunosuppressant agents the regime saw fit to spend $4.9 million on vitamins and botanical medicine, and $26.3 million on raw material for diapers. The well meaning anti-sanction camp should find it hard to justify such Iranian purchases in the US, while blaming the shortage of specialty medications on western sanctions. The Iranians could have bought their vitamins from India and China and used the millions of dollars in the USA to purchase harder to find medicine.

Make no mistake about, sanctions are no picnic for the Iranian public despite the intentions of the West to target the regime and not the people. 

Having said that, when it comes to the medicine shortage, it is becoming obvious that the regime is lacking the political will to resolve this humanitarian issue, and what little funds it allocates are falling victim to IR corruption or are being used to purchase US made diaper material.

References:
(1) http://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/sanctions_medical_supply_shortages_in_iran.pdf
(2) http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/02/08/us-iran-usa-exports-idUSBRE91713120130208
(3) http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887324352004578136973602198776.html
(4) http://www.cnn.com/2012/11/29/world/meast/turkey-iran-gold-for-oil
(5) http://www.farsnews.com/newstext.php?nn=13911009000915
(6) http://isna.ir/fa/news/91110704204/از-آزادسازی-ارز-دارو-اطلاع-ندارم-کمبود

Photo credit: press tv, gulfnews, panorama.com, press TV


Tuesday, October 9, 2012

A perfect time to attack


The irony of recent events vis-à-vis Iran and Israel is that if Israel was planning an attack this would be a perfect time for one. Before any readers jump into any conclusions, this statement doesn't mean that I am advocating, or am in favor of, an immediate attack, but it is merely an observation.

Here is why I think this might be the perfect time for an Israeli attack against Iran:

The Israeli prime minister publicly retreated from his prior aggressive positions, opting instead for a higher threshold of tolerance for uranium enrichment by Iran, per his UN speech. Mr. Natanyahu appeared to acknowledge, and accept, the reality that United States' only red line is the one they have devised for Israel, which is: "don't drag us into war without our consent". The Iranians could be forgiven for thinking that the danger has passed, at least for now. 

To add to the sense of normalcy, the Israeli prime minister called for early elections. Again, no one would expect an attack on Iran in the midst of Israeli elections, but the rub is that the same players are expected to win this election, so there is really no political uncertainty to preclude an attack against Iran.

If Israel wanted to regain the element of surprise, then the recent, Israeli made, events have given it that element back, and all the pieces seem to be in place if they were to chose to attack, even as there seem to be no doubt that an attack is no longer considered imminent.

Another element needed, other than surprise, is the pretext for military movements. To that end, Israel has planned maneuvers in the Negev desert under the pretext of preparing for events in Syria in case the chemical weapon stockpiles are moved by the Syrian regime.

On the US end, the Israelis maybe sensing some room to maneuver as the US election is now more tightly contested making it difficult for President Obama to speak out against any Israeli military action if it were to occur. In fact, as I had written in the past, President Obama might hate the notion of war with Iran but such war would almost guarantee his reelection, so it's a "win win scenario" for him.

So, if Israel was actually planning to attack Iran in the next few weeks, hypothetically speaking of course, what would we expect it to say or do in prelude to war?

One might expect the following:

- Hint to the world that they are backing down, perhaps by using a UN speech to convey that message.

- Create additional diversions, like calling for early elections which could have been easily done after the US election or post new year.

- Keep the strike force on alert with preplanned maneuvers like the one already planned in the Negev.

- Strike when no one expects it.


I could be wrong, and all this could just be a cluster of coincidents.



Monday, July 23, 2012

To attack or not to attack Iran?! The Cons and the Pros affecting the war decision

Photo source: US airforce (US government photos are not copy righted)

Since there isn't much being said about the imminent war with Iran, I thought I'd write something about this neglected issue and brake the monotony.

I invite you to consider the following Pros and Cons for war from the point of view of the three main countries involved, namely, Iran, Israel, and the United States of America.




Pros for Iran (in case of war):

. The Iranian regime, drawing on the experience of the 1980s Iraq-Iran war, can blame government inaptitude on the war. Currency free fall, economic collapse, the erosion of personal and political liberties, not to mention the draught, can all be blamed on the foreign imposed war.

. The revolutionary guard (IRGC) leadership could benefit financially from war profiteering and smuggling of goods, as all legal avenues of import and export would be shut down in the event of a full blown war, leaving organized smuggling as the only option.
Many here would agree that IRGC's involvement in smuggling is a well established fact in the blogosphere, and is one hidden camera investigative report away from being a mainstream media fact.

. The Iranian regime would have an opportunity to eliminate dissidents, wholesale, during the war, including the green movement activists and leaders currently in prison or under house arrest. It's much easier to execute spies at time of war, than it is to execute political dissidents in peace time.

. The regime may be hoping that war would result in increased support from religious nationalists and other core supporters. This can be more of a factor if there were to be high profile incidents with large civilian casualties, or a freak incident resulting in the destruction of a national or religious monument. Having said that, the chances of the US accidentally bombing shiite shrines or Azadi square are as slim as accidentally bombing Persepolis.

. Iran would get the opportunity to activate Iraqi shiite militias to destabilize Iraq, or even seize power by force if the opportunity presents itself. With the political parties divided, the Iraqi people might decide to passively watch an Iranian backed military take over without raising a fuss.
Iraq will probably not allow the use of its territory to attack Iran, but that won't stop Iran from using Iraq to retaliate against attacks against it, and use the war to accomplish its long term strategic objectives with open and unapologetic meddling in Iraqi affairs.

Cons for Iran (in case of war):

. War could become the straw that brakes the camel's back in terms of the general public's impatience with the Iranian regime and the economic hardships it is causing, especially if they were to conclude that all their suffering is due the Islamic republic political inaptitude and arrogance.

. In the ensuing chaos of war, the opposition groups in Iran might feel emboldened to take on the regime head on one final time. With weapons more abundant at time of war, some opposition groups might even take up arms against the security forces and retaliate for any future crackdown on peaceful protesters, a la Syria, or even a la Iran 1979.
(side note: Opposition groups aboard should be meeting now to discuss the future political process in Iran to stay ahead of events, and develop a transitional plan in case a future revolution in Iran does succeed, war or no war)

. Separatist groups in Iran might step up their military activities against the regime even if the west doesn't offer them direct support. The regime will be forced to station large number of elite loyal troops in areas where there is little strategic need, such as Azerbaijan or Baluchistan, aside from the usual hot spots of Kurdistan and Khuzestan.

. Opposition groups might get more breathing room in terms of the total media blackout by the regime, as government jamming capabilities get degraded secondary to targeted US attacks. Iranians may be able to get a minute by minute account of events on the streets from the BBC Farsi without being subjected to constant government jamming.
In addition, the US may target media installations, like it did in Iraq and Libya, and cripple the regime's own propaganda broadcasts. My guess is that many Iranians will find the benefits from the total shut down of the regime's media apparatus to far outweigh the downside of the tremendous loss of the entertainment value, which the Iranian TV and radio is famous for. I'm sure many of you have heard of mullah-wood, with it's 24/7 compulsory morality broadcasts.

. The West may, for the first time, openly target the Iranian leadership, including Khamenei, as part of the war effort. Even if these military decapitation efforts don't succeed, they would leave the regime elites fugitives in their own country. Once forced outside their secure zones in Tehran and elsewhere, the leadership will be vulnerable to domestic threats to their lives. They certainly accumulated enough intrinsic animosity in the past 30 plus years that they should be concerned for their lives as they become physically more accessible to the Iranian public.

. Iran oil exports would be near zero for a while, with infrastructure damage that might take years to repair. Even if the Iranian regime were to survive the war, it would be left with little oil revenue with which to bribe its core constituency in return for their continued support.

. The potential closing of Hormuz strait will probably only last a few weeks, but will represent a suicidal act on part of the Iranian navy forces and the Iranian coastal defenses. The mining of Hormuz will serve as legal justification for the west to control the entire northern shore of the Persian gulf to ensure free international shipping.
By the way, the three disputed island in the gulf will likely be one of the first strategic targets to be occupied by US forces, and may even be handed over to the UAE after the war.

. Having learned from the experience of Iraq and Afghanistan, the US is probably not going to be as predictable as the Iranian leaders might think, rendering any Iranian defensive plans outdated and ineffective. For example, the boots on the grounds will probably not be armored divisions with a large footprint and logistical gaps, but rather fast moving elite forces that would be there for the purpose of putting weapons, like missiles, beyond use then getting the hell out of dodge, before any organized resistance has time to emerge.

. Many Iranian military and civilian lives would be lost in any war with the USA. That should be the most important draw back, but i doubt it would give the regime in Iran any pause.
We should remember that it took Khomeini 500,000 Iranian lives before he decided to agree to end the Sadam initiated, but Khomeini sustained, Iran-Iraq war. Back then Khomeini thought that Iran can act like a world superpower and force the execution of, the then president, Sadam Hussein of Iraq, as a punishment for unjustly attacking Iran. Right or wrong, that demand was arrogant and unrealistic at the time, just like many of the current Iranian expectations might be considered unrealistic and costly.

Pros for Israel (in case of war):

. Israel many not have many other chances to attack Iran in the future if it misses this window of opportunity.
After years of raising the alarm about Iranian nuclear ambitions, Israel can not afford to not act, when it knows that it's efforts have now reached a crescendo.
Any inaction will be considered by the rest of the world as an israeli acceptance of the status quo, making any future return to the subject by Israel much less effective, as judged by western public opinion, and western political and military planners. Iran will become analogous to North Korea from that point on, a relatively harmless nuisance.

. The Israeli goal of regime change in Iran maybe achieved through war. One could argue that for Israel, an Iranian regime change is much more important than the goal of preventing Iran from attaining nuclear weapons. In that sense, attacking Iran is more likely to be successful and doesn't necessarily have to involve smart weapons.

. Israel doesn't really have to hit the Iranian nuclear sites accurately or effectively. In fact, all Israel has to do is hit anything of importance in Iran in order to ignite war. Everyone, including the Israelis, knows that the subsequent Iranian retaliation against the Americans (and the Israelis), and the more effective US attack that follows will take care of all the Iranian nuclear targets and then some. The Americans will likely resent having the Israelis impose war on America of course, but that will not stop us from attacking. Israel will however have to make an effort to appear to be hitting the nuclear targets directly and effectively in order to minimize the American resentment.

. Israel would have the opportunity to use the war with Iran to target more Hamas and Hezbollah leaders and personnel, to finish previously unfinished missions. Israel might even use any military posturing by Hezbollah in support of Iran, as a pretext to invade south Lebanon with a more effective push to destroy the Hezbollah stockpile of weapons this time around.
The planners in Israel know that with the Iranian and Syrian regimes gone or weakened, Hezbollah would not be able to restore their missile capabilities anytime soon. Without war, Israel will have to live with the possibility that Hezbollah will remain at its door step for at least another decade, with capabilities enough for at least one more war with Israel.

. Any missile attack by Iran against Israel would likely create sympathy for Israel in the west and improve their negotiating position with the Palestinians. Israel would feel more entitled to push for more concessions from the Palestinians.

. Any war with Iran would distract from local controversial issues in Israel, such as settlement expansions and the final status of east Jerusalem. Israel could easily move to expand their efforts in these two areas in the fog of war with iran. The west will be busy with the war and would pay much less attention to what Israel does domestically.

. If the dream of regime change in Iran were to materialize, Israel would feel less threatened by Hezbollah and Hamas, as these groups would be losing a major source of financial and logistical support in the region.

.War with Iran would serve to re-establish Israel as the dominant military force in the region, and reinforce the partially lost deterrence that Israel had enjoyed since their last war with the Arabs.

. Israel can never trust that the Iranian regime won't use nuclear weapons once they have them, despite the Iranian leadership claims that they would never consider using nuclear weapons based on moral and religious grounds.
In the Iran-Iraq war, Khomeini also claimed that bombing of civilian targets (cities) in Iraq would be un-Islamic and barred the Iranian forces from retaliating against Iraqi bombardment of Iranian cities. By the middle of the war when Iraq started targeting Tehran almost daily with rockets, Khomeini conveniently made an exemption to his religious edicts and ordered the Iranian forces to retaliate in kind. By the end of the war, the Iraqi city of Basra was almost totally destroyed by Iranian artillery and missiles.
Even if the Iranian regime doesn't use it's nuclear weapons, this regime is likely to threaten their use in every political crisis.

Cons for Israel (in case of war with Iran):

. Potential damage to Israeli nuclear and industrial/chemical sites in the Iranian retaliatory missile attack should be a concern for the Israeli military and civilians at large. The chances of Iran shrugging off a military attack by Israel and not retaliate are very slim, even though such inaction would be the logical thing to do to avoid total destruction. In a worst case scenario, we should expect the Iranian retaliation to be unrestrained and unrestricted, and involve nuclear (Dimona) and chemical complexes (in Haifa), not to mention major population centers such as tel aviv.

. The war with Iran will likely increase anti-Israeli sentiment in the region. Not a big issue in the short term, as it would go from horrible to slightly more horrible. It is, however, a concern in the long run as Israel would have to live with their Arab and Iranian neighbors for years to come, knowing that the west will eventually become disinterested in Israel (if not ten years from now, perhaps a hundred years from now).

. The war may result in long term damage to the American-Israeli relationship, as even the most enthusiastic US supporters of israel would potentially resent, or at least pause at the prospect of the USA being dragged into war by an ally without consenting to it in advance. This might mark a turning point, especially if some republicans conclude that sometime israeli interests contradict US interests, and that the US is being used to advance a policy that is not it's own. Of course, the mutual US-Israeli relationship will endure for decades to come, but such sentiment shift can prove costly to Israel many years from now.

Pros of the USA (in case of war with Iran):

. War before the 2012 presidential election would ironically serve president Obama's re-election campaign, even if, in principle, president Obama doesn't want to be dragged into America's third war in the middle east since 9/11. The president can draw sympathy from democrats and independents as he appears to have no choice but to react to the events on the ground. Republicans would find president Obama less objectionable in war time as he acts presidentially and decisively to use military force against a long time US foe.
This would be a war against the same people who violated the sovereignty of the US embassy in Tehran, and humiliated the US by parading US diplomats and marines in blindfolds. In general, Americans should, and probably would, rally around the president at a time of war, unless he is somehow caught with a Monica Lewinsky-like character in the oval office a week before the election.

. The US would finally get a chance to remove a thorn in its backside thats been there for the past 30 years, namely the regime of the Islamic republic of Iran. The US would have legal justification as it would only be reacting to Iranian attacks (most likely provoked by Israel).
A new regime in Iran would transform the Middle East; A US friendly Iran would also change the long term political situation in Afghanistan and Iraq. The US could look to future Iran for support against religious extremists in Afghanistan, instead of relying on Pakistan, which itself is full of religious extremists and can explode in our face at any time.

. A future, US friendly, regime in Iran would allow for a much safer logistical support of NATO troops in land locked Afghanistan through 2014 and beyond.

. A friendly Iran would be fertile ground for American companies to invest in projects to rebuild the country's infrastructure, including the languishing energy industry. Needless to say, such business opportunities would dwarf what was available in Iraq after the war; The first aircraft order alone should be worth billions for Boeing.

Cons for the USA (in case of war with Iran):

. The potential for the loss of American lives and treasure in yet another war should be a major Con. Americans are tired of war, or at least we should be by now.
Starting a war during a recession would seem reckless and unwarranted to many Americans.

. The president would have to deal with being pushed into war without wanting to, and still maintain the illusion that he is still in total control. I think Obama can do that though.

. The level of success of any Iranian retaliation and the relevance of the regime forces after the first wave of attacks is still highly unpredictable. If the Libyan and Syrian precedence holds true, then we might be surprised as to what length the Iranian regime is willing to go to self preserve. The regime may risk total distraction of the country's infra structure before throwing in the towel.
Luckily, this scenario is less likely than the best case scenario that takes into account that many Iranian have been contemplating getting ride of this regime for quite some time, and might chose not to miss the opportunity war provides. I know this sounds like vice president Cheney talking, but even crazy people can be right sometimes.

. The post war Iran may not stabilize as fast as everyone hopes. Instead, it may take years, especially if separatist wars ensue, or if there is a civil war between the remnants of the Islamic republic and the the new, west supported, government forces.

. Regional powers may want the threat of Iran removed but some would be against a good US-Iranian relationship. This situation would add more unpredictability to the post war situation given the potential behind the scenes political maneuvering by the Saudis and others.

In conclusion, the question is not, whether or not we can agree on which pros and cons are correct, but rather, whether or not we can agree that it takes only one spark from one the three countries (Iran, USA, Israel) to ignite war. Moreover, all it will take for the decision to go forward with war is for that one country to decide that the "pros" for war outweigh the "cons" and damn the consequences.

One spark, and we can have a war that most can't predict its outcome or side effects. We should hope that if war does come, the political and military pros are going to be prepared to make the best of the circumstances.