Iraq said on Saturday that its military officials were engaged in intelligence and security cooperation in Baghdad with Russia, Iran and Syria to counter the threat from the Islamic State militant group, a pact that could raise concerns in Washington.
A statement from the Iraqi military's joint operations command said the cooperation had come "with increased Russian concern about the presence of thousands of terrorists from Russia undertaking criminal acts with Daesh (Islamic State)."
The move could give Moscow more sway in the Middle East. It has stepped up its military involvement in Syria in recent weeks while pressing for Damascus to be included in international efforts to fight Islamic State, a demand Washington rejects.
COMMENTARY: News of this was first indicated by an anonymous American official last Friday. The next day, Iraqi Joint Forces Command issued statement confirming Russian, Iranian, Syrian and Iraqi military cooperation against ISIL.
From an objective military standpoint, such cooperation is logical. It's also possible maintaining of the logistical air bridge over Iraq to Syria was discussed.
An advantage of the Russians and Iranians in the war against Al-Qaeda and ISIL is possession of a reliable partner inside Syria. That reliable partner is the Syrian Arab Republic, a sovereign state recognized by the United Nations. Unfortunately, the United States lacks a reliable partner at anywhere near such a level inside Syria, with attempts to compose one so far rendering unsatisfactory results.
This move comes not only at a time where Russia has landed a significant military force into Syria, but also at a time where Baghdad is experiencing political crisis and military stalemate.
The move further enhances Russia and Iran's peace process for Syria, which will be the subject of discussion on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly session now in progress.
It is even being said the Iranians may be included in discussions aimed at resolving the conflict in Yemen, a development a number of European high ranking officials recently advocated while visiting Tehran, seeking post-JCPOA economic ties.
Luiz Alberto Figueiredo Machado, the foreign minister of the Federative Republic of Brazil, arrived in Tehran on Saturday afternoon.
The purpose of the trip is to strengthen the friendly ties between the two countries, enhance political dialogue and exchange views on regional and global issues of mutual interest, an announcement by the Brazilian Foreign Ministry said.
Vieira will hold meetings with President Hassan Rouhani, Foreign Minister Mohammad Zarif, and the Secretary of the Supreme National Security Council Ali Shamkhani.
Elsewhere in the report, the [Brazilian] embassy said partially due to international sanctions against Iran, the value of trade ties between the two countries shrank from $ 2,367 billion in 2012 to S$ 1,444 billion in 2014.
“It is expected that new opportunities for increasing trade and for investment will arise from the implementation of the agreement.”
COMMENTARY: In 2010 the Obama administration green-lighted a diplomatic push by Brazil (and Turkey) aimed at resolving the nuclear issue with Iran. The Obama administration believed the Iranians would not accept their pre-approved terms put forward by the Brazilians. When the Iranians did indeed accept the terms, the Obama admininistration reacted by rejecting the agreement and immediately slapping another round of UNSC sanctions on Iran. The Brazilians expressed both a sense of betrayal and disappointment.
Brazilian Foreign Minister Luiz Alberto Figueiredo Machado with Iranian President Hassan Rouhani, on 13SEP15 at Sa'dabad Palace in Tehran.
Brazilian Foreign Minister Luiz Alberto Figueiredo Machado with Iran Navy Rear Admiral Ali Shamkhani, secretary of the Supreme National Security Council of Iran, on 13SEP15 in Tehran.
COMMENTARY: The Brazilians have a recent history of expressing an inclusive approach towards attempting to resolve the Syrian conflict.
While Western media typically depicts the government of the Syrian Arab Republic and its President Assad as diplomatically isolated and supported solely by Iran and Russia, it has to be conceded that during the 2014 presidential election in Syria, more than 30 countries sent observers to that war-torn country and subsequently issued a statement in support of the "transparent and free" elections, among those was Brazil.
Iraqi Parliament Speaker Salim al-Jabouri with Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif, on 12SEP15 in Tehran
Iraqi Parliament Speaker Salim al-Jabouri with Iran Navy Rear Admiral Ali Shamkhani, secretary of the Supreme National Security Council of Iran, on 12SEP15 in Tehran.
Secretary of Iran’s Supreme National Security Council (SNSC) Ali Shamkhani says the campaign against the ISIL terrorists in Iraq is Baghdad’s top priority.
Shamkhani made the remarks in a meeting with Iraqi Parliament Speaker Salim al-Jabouri in the Iranian capital, Tehran, on Saturday.
“Countering organized efforts by Iraq’s enemies, who are using religious extremists and remnants of the Baath regime to cause political and religious split, requires vigilance of the country’s political leaders,” Shamkhani said as quoted by the Press TV.
The Iraqi parliament speaker, for his part, commended Iran’s constant support for his country and called for the expansion of bilateral relations.
Jabouri said Iran plays a key role in establishing security and stability in the region, adding that Baghdad seeks to reinforce stability in the region and boost national economic development by improving cooperation with Tehran.
COMMENTARY: Salim al-Jabouri is an ethnic Sunni, elected Speaker of the Iraqi Parliament on 15 July 2014.
There appears to be a complex interplay between clerical, military and political cross-factions in Iraq and Iran, that in ways might even be described in terms expected of a single national entity, rather than two.
South Korean Deputy Foreign Minister Kim Hong-kyun with Iranian Deputy Foreign Minister Morteza Sarmadi, on 12SEP15 in Tehran.
Iranian Deputy FM Sarmadi received his S Korean counterpart Kim Hong-kyun in Tehran on Saturday.
As Seoul steps up efforts to bolster bilateral ties after the landmark Vienna agreement of July 14, South Korea’s Deputy Foreign Minister Kim Hong-kyun arrived in Tehran on Friday to hold high-level policy consultation meetings.
Visiting Kim Hong-kyun Deputy Minister for Political Affairs met with Iranian First Deputy Foreign Minister Morteza Sarmadi on Saturday.
The Korean official voiced hope for opening of a new chapter in bilateral ties with Iran in areas of politics, economy and culture.
After the implementation of the US-led anti-Tehran sanctions, bilateral trade and exchanges decreased sharply, triggering concerns among businessmen that South Korea could lose the market with a population of 80 million. Two-way trade volume, which stood at around $17.4 billion in 2011, had dipped to $8.6 billion last year.
Photos: Mahmood Hosseini, Mohammad Hassanzadeh and Hamed Malekpour at Tasnim News Agency, and Islamic Republic News Agency
Ashaq Alawsat reported Monday that Grand
Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani had sent a message to Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah
Ali Khamenei criticizing Quds Force Commander Gen. Qasem Soleimani’s role in
Iraqi politics. The report said Sistani questioned Khamenei “whether
(Soleimani’s interventions in Iraqi politics) had happened under Khamenei’s
instruction or through Soleimani’s own independent actions.” (Ashaq Alawsat/Now,
7 September)
In late
August, Gen. Soleimani appeared at a meeting of Iraqi National Alliance
parliamentary coalition of Shia parties, reportedly criticizing Prime Minister
Haidar al-Abadi’s proposed reforms, especially Abadi’s plans to sack former PM
Nouri al-Maliki. The meeting ended with an acrimonious exchange between Soleimani
and Abadi. Ashaq Alawsat had reported
on 26 August that Abadi “objected strongly” when Soleimani criticized the
reforms he was pushing through parliament.
Sistani’s
frustration over Soleimani’s role in Iraq manifests differences between Najaf
clerical establishment and the Islamic Republic. Sistani has forcefully
defended Abadi’s reform proposals and Soleimani’s public criticism of the
reforms, in a meeting attended by the prime minister and over 70 Shia MPs, has
broken protocols of public deference to Sistani, Iraqi Shia spiritual leader,
which could affect Najaf’s historic role.
Among
recent differences between Sistani and the Iranians is Sistani’s insistence
that fighting corruption is a religious and legal duty of all Shias, including
the trial of Maliki if needed. Soleimani's, and probably Khamenei's, approach to
Abadi’s reform focuses on the political dimensions of the issue, thinking
holding to account of corrupt figures, i.e. Maliki, would undermine Shia power
in the country.
After a
report by the Iraqi parliament on 17 August blamed Maliki and top commanders
for the fall of Mosul to ISIL last year, Iran extended Maliki a show of
support, hosting him for a visit to Tehran on 19 August, two days after the
parliamentary report. During his visit, Maliki met with Khamenei, with photos
of the event widely published by the media.
Photo
credit: Portrait of Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, Iraq’s Shia spiritual leader (Ahmad
al-Rubaya/AFP)
Ammar al-Hakim (left), President of Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq (ISCI) meets with Iran Navy Rear Admiral Ali Shamkhani (right), secretary of the Supreme National Security Council of Iran (SNSC) on 18AUG15 in Tehran.
Iran media provided familiar talking points of Shamkhani, in alleging "Washington uses terrorism as an instrument to achieve its own objectives"; in this instance further alleging U.S.-trained "Division 30 announced their refusal to fight al-Qaeda-linked al-Nusra Front, following a series of abductions by the terrorist group." [source: PressTV]
Iranian media characterized Hakim's public statement as "Iraq would strongly resist foreign plots, which are all aimed at fueling differences". [source: PressTV]
COMMENTARY: Reforms and charges made by current Iraqi Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi have generated a power struggle in Baghdad, among the Shia power centers that include Islamic Dawa Party, Maliki and Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF). There is little doubt such was a prime topic of discussion between Shamkhani and Hakim, in addition to the war against ISIL.
Prior to his meeting with Rear Admiral Shamkhani, Hakim met with Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif. Roughly two weeks ago these figures had met in Baghdad during Zarif's visits to Gulf Arab states and Iraq.
From Tehran, former Iraqi Prime Minister on 18AUG15 provided a defense against charges being leveled against him with respect to the fall of Mosul in 2014. According to Reuters:
Maliki, who had previously accused unnamed countries, commanders and rival politicians of plotting the city's fall, on Tuesday blamed Turkish and Iraqi Kurdish leaders.
"What happened in Mosul was a conspiracy planned in Ankara, then the conspiracy moved to Erbil," he said in a second Facebook post, referring to the capitals of neighboring Turkey and the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG), a semi-autonomous region in northern Iraq whose forces have taken a leading role in battling Islamic State.
COMMENTARY: The Reuters report is somewhat disingenuous. This is what was claimed on 13JUN14 by a Maliki aide, as reported in the New York Times:
The [Maliki aide] said that the Iraqi government was not to blame alone for the success of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria’s advance through the north of the country. He blamed Turkey, because it was angry over Iraqi support for the regime of President Bashar al-Assad of Syria, and the Kurds, who wanted to profit from Iraqi weakness in the north, which on Thursday helped them to take Kirkuk, an oil rich prize long shared between the Arabs and the Kurds in an uneasy truce.
“So yes there are cases where the Iraqi army disappeared but you have to take the locality in context,” the adviser said. “The 2nd Division of the Iraqi Army is 80 percent Kurds and 20 percent locals, the Kurds withdrew to the Kurdish areas and this started a panic.”
“Turkey wanted to unseat Bashar al Assad and now they see the Iraqis helping him and this is payback,” the senior official said. “This is part of that, I really believe that.”
COMMENTARY: There is little doubt the Maliki aide was sharing his boss Maliki's perspective at the time, as reported by the New York Times.
Former Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, recently withdrawn from his vice-presidential post, appearing 15AUG15 at the 8th Summit of IRTVU in Tehran.
Reforms by current Iraqi Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi have generated a power struggle in Baghdad, among the Shia power centers that include Islamic Dawa Party, Maliki and Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF).
An Iraqi parliamentary panel called on 16AUG15 for former Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki and dozens of other top officials to stand trial over the fall of the northern city of Mosul to Islamic State last year.
Iran’s First Vice President Es’haq Jahangiri met with Maliki on 17AUG15 in Tehran, with both figures seizing on recent comments made by Raymond Odierno, outgoing U.S. Army chief of staff, which Iranian media characterized as “dividing up Iraq is the only solution to settle crisis in the country.”
Former Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki (right) with Ali Akbar Velayati (middle), a top adviser to Leader of the Islamic Revolution Ayatollah Seyyed Ali Khamenei, appearing 15AUG15 at the 8th Summit of IRTVU in Tehran.
Sheikh Naim Qassem (right), Lebanese Hezbollah's deputy secretary-general, and Palestinian Ambassador Salah Zewail (left) on 15AUG15 at the 8th Summit of IRTVU in Tehran.
Ammar al-Hakim (middle), President of Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq (ISCI) at the 8th Summit of IRTVU on 16AUG15 in Tehran.
Leader of the Islamic Revolution Ayatollah Seyyed Ali Khamenei addressing the 8th Summit of IRTVU on 16AUG15 in Tehran.
Photos: Islamic Republic News Agency, Leader.ir and Mohammad Ali Marizad at Tasnim News Agency
Brief perspectives on Iraqi political reform offered by Iranian Maj. Gen. Hassan Firouzabadi at Sepah News, and Iraqi Shia Militias as surveyed by Institute for the Study of War (ISW). Very brief commentary provided at end of post.
[T]he Basij commander, Maj. Gen. Hassan Firouzabadi, Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces explained in an interview: “evaluations of Iraq’ central government [show] that it has operated very well; by obtaining important achievements in stabilizing Iraq’s sovereignty and protecting its territorial integrity and independence, [the government] has been successful against the enemies of the nation of Iraq.”
[Firouzabadi] pointed to the formation of some mischievous activities in the country… “calling for street protests by stimulating specific and sometimes non-Muslim groups, and the blowing up of Iran-Iraq power lines and other vandalism.”
Chief of General Staff of the Armed Forces said that each successful revolution has seen such noise and obstructions against itself… The revolutionary people of Iraq should show self-restraint more than ever, and must help the central government on the path of progress and overcoming the enemies.”
-------------------------
According to Theodore Bell, Patrick Martin, Jessica Lewis McFate, and Kimberly Kagan at ISW:
Iranian-backed Badr Organization endorsed the peaceful protests on August 6, prior to Ayatollah Sistani’s sermon, but did not declare its intent to participate and warned against losing focus on the anti-ISIS fight. Badr issued a brief statement following the sermon in support of Sistani’s call for reform, without providing any additional details on either the sermon or the demonstrations. Amiri stated that he “added his voice” to the demonstrators, but that he could not participate because he was “busy” with the fight against ISIS, in line with Badr’s ongoing political agenda to promote itself as a capable national military force that will liberate tracts of ISIS-occupied Iraq. Kata’ib Hizbollah (KH), another Iranian-backed militia, did not issue a statement on the subject at all, despite having stated its interest on July 18 in interrogating the Electricity Minister, seeking to punish corruption, and ending the electricity crisis. The Nujaba Movement (NM), another Iranian proxy militia, had stated its intent to participate in the Friday protests but there was little indication of significant Iranian proxy participation in the largely-peaceful protests on Friday. The Iranian proxy groups’ limited public responses to the unfolding political developments are likely due their inability to rally direct opposition to Ayatollah Sistani as well as their preoccupation with anti-ISIS operations.
While AAH did not overtly participate in the demonstrations, AAH leader Qais al-Khazali, in a speech delivered on August 7, asserted that PM Abadi faced “a major historic responsibility” and that the PM should submit his resignation if he is unable to address the need for reforms. Khazali also used the speech to repeat AAH’s call for the transition to a presidential system, an initiative championed by AAH and widely regarded as a method by which to empower VP Maliki, whose relationship with AAH is well-established. In this context, Ayatollah Sistani’s sermon may be seen as an effort to empower PM Abadi against the political designs of AAH, its patrons in Qom and Tehran, and VP Maliki. AAH’s rhetoric therefore indicates the group’s political divergence from the majority of Iraq’s major Shi’a political actors and point to AAH’s intention to leverage the protests against PM Abadi to obstruct political reform by calling for the PM’s resignation and a transition to a presidential system, an initiative VP Maliki himself advocates. It will therefore remain important to monitor the development of protests in southern Iraq, where VP Maliki’s SLA is dominant, given that VP Maliki and AAH may seek to leverage the localized demonstrations against the national government.
COMMENTARY: With current military efforts directed at Ramadi and Fallujah by ISF and PMF, it has to be conceded that popular unrest against the Iraqi government is viewed favorably as a potential lifeline by ISIL.
Political instability at a time when the country is occupied to such an extent by enemy forces would present a further challenge to all parties involved in military activities, aiming to defeat ISIL.
[Updated to include FM Zarif's visit to Baghdad, 07:54 on 28JUL15]
During the last stage of his post-JCPOA Gulf diplomacy tour, Iran Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif and his diplomatic delegation arrive evening of 26JUL15 at Najaf International Airport in Iraq.
Zarif's aircraft is Islamic Republic of Iran Government Boeing 737-286/Adv, reg. EP-AGA (cn 21317/483). First open-source photo of this VIP aircraft in service since very recent D-check by Iran Air and repainting in new style of government livery [see HERE].
Zarif's itinerary includes visits to the Shia holy cities of Najaf and Karbala, and shrines of Imam Ali and Imam Hussein, and meeting with "Big Four" Grand Ayatollahs Sistani, Hakim, Fayyadh and Basheer Najafi (see below).
Iran Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif on 26JUL15 at the Imam Ali Mosque in Najaf, Iraq
Iran Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif on 26JUL15 praying at the Imam Ali shrine in Najaf, Iraq
Iran Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif with Sayyed Hashem Nizar, Secretary General of the upper threshold of the sacred at Imam Ali shrine
Iran Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif with Grand Ayatollah Sayyid Muhammad Sa'id al-Tabataba'i al-Hakim. The Grand Ayatollah's second cousin, Sayyed Ammar al-Hakim leads the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq, one of the largest Shia political parties in Iraq.
Iran Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif with Grand Ayatollah Mohammad Ishaq al-Fayyadh. Born in a village in Ghazni Province, Afghanistan to Hazara parents, this Grand Ayatollah holds Iranian and Afghani citizenships
Iran Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif with Grand Ayatollah Sheikh Basheer Hussain Najafi
Iran Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif and diplomatic delegation arriving 27JUL15 at Baghdad International Airport
Iran Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif with Iraq Foreign Minister Ibrahim al-Jaafari, on 27JUL15 in Baghdad
Iran Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif with Iraq Prime Minister Haider Jawad Kadhim Al-Abadi, on 27JUL15 in Baghdad
Iran Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif with Iraq President Muhammad Fuad Masum, on 27JUL15 in Baghdad
Iran Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif with Seyed Ammar al-Hakim, President of Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq, on 27JUL15 in Baghdad.
Photo appearing this week on social media depicting IRGC-QF Commander Qasem Soleimaini, in Baghdad, with Popular Mobilization Force Commander Abu Mahdi al Muhandis and combat leaders from Iran-backed Kata'ib Jund al-Imam. Note in background flags of Kurdistan and Patriotic Union of Kurdistan. Location possibly Sulaymaniyah.
Photos: Mehr News Agency, Islamic Republic News Agency
Sixty video stills from two YouTube videos posted 11JUN15 and 12JUN15, depicting fighting advance of an Iran-backed Badr combat force in the vicinity of Saqlawiyah, the objective being military investiture of Fallujah.
Video Part 1:
U.S. supplied M1A1M main battle tank attached to Iran-backed Badr combat force, fitted with sectarian flag featuring likeness of Imam Hussein.
Formerly U.S. supplied to ISF, HMMWV seen modified with top-mounted turret fitted with ZU-23-2 autocannon and operated by Iran-backed Badr combat force.
Formerly U.S. supplied to ISF, HMMWV seen modified with top-modified turret fitted with what appears to be KPV type 14.5 heavy machine gun, operated by Iran-backed Badr combat force.
View of turret for above HMMWV, with Iran-backed Badr military wing markings clearly visible
Formerly U.S.-supplied to ISF, HMMWV seen modified with addition of steel plate attached to front of vehicle, operated by Iran-backed Badr combat force.
Wheel loader improvised into ACEV. Note Badr paramilitary in foreground equipped with U.S.-supplied AT-4 anti-tank weapon.
Badr paramilitary fighters armed with what appear to be U.S.-supplied M16 type assault rifles
Badr paramilitary fighter equipped with U.S.-supplied AT4 anti-tank weapon
Turkish-origin Otokar APV operated within Iran-backed Badr combat force
T-72 type main battle tank seen in IRGC-GF camouflage scheme, alongside Iran-backed Badr paramilitary fighter equipped with what may be a U.S.-supplied M16 type assault rifle.
Formerly U.S.-supplied to ISF, up-armored HMMWV fitted with 9M133 Kornet ATGM and operated by PMF
Badr combat operation depicting PKM gunner firing behind stacked cinder-block cover, while T-72 type MBT in IRGC-GF camouflage scheme provides direct fire support.
Iran-backed Badr paramilitary advance toward what appear to be prepared ISIL positions withdrawn or neutralized
ISIL-operated VBIED successfully hit and destroyed by Iran-backed Badr paramilitary equipped with AT4 anti-tank weapon.
Hostile position, identified with ISIL flag
Position captured from ISIL by Iran-backed combat force, hoisting of Badr and Iraqi national flags
Captured ISIL-held position, with knocked out DShK heavy machine gun
Jubilant Iran-backed Badr paramilitary fighters, amid previously U.S.-supplied to Iraqi Army M113A2 armored personnel carriers.
Iran-supplied Safir ("Ambassador") tactical vehicle equipped with M40 type recoilless gun, operated by Badr combat force.
Indirect fire by IRAM, during Iran-backed Badr combat operation in the vicinity of Saqlawiyah
Uniform adornment with image of Grand Ayatollah Sistani, in the style of adornment used by Iranian forces for Ayatollah Khomeini during the Iran-Iraq War three decades ago.
Formerly U.S.-supplied to Iraqi Army M113A2 armored personnel carrier, accompanied by Iran-backed Badr combat infantry force
Iran-backed Badr fighter firing PKM type machine gun, beside Badr-modified HMMWV equipped with top-mounted, turreted ZU-23-2 autocannon.
Iran-backed Badr ZU-23-2 gunner's view, within above HMMWV open-top turret
PKM type machine gun firing port, within Iran-backed Badr fighting vehicle
Reloading of armament for Iran-backed Badr fighting vehicle. Note Badr sleeve uniform patch on foreground figure.
Iran-backed Badr sapper, in action during combat operation in the vicinity of Saqlawiyah
IqAAC lieutenant colonel and major, coordinating helicopter support for Iran-backed Badr combat force
Iran-backed Badr paramilitary combat force leader
HMMWV and MBT festooned with Badr military identification
Firing of main armament, Badr-attached M1A1M main battle tank
Badr paramilitary advance behind T-72 type main battle tank
Firing of main armament, Badr-attached T-72 type main battle tank
T-72 type main battle tank in IRGC-GF style camouflage scheme, U.S.-supplied Guardian Armored Security Vehicle and U.S.-supplied M113A2 armored personnel carriers.
Halted advance of Iran-backed Badr AFVs
U.S.-supplied Caiman MRAP, brought to the forefront of road-bound Badr vehicle convoy
Iran-backed Badr paramilitary fighters advancing towards neutralized ISIL fortified position
ISIL fortified position neutralized by Iran-backed Badr paramilitary combat force
Iran-backed Badr military commanders, outfitted in khaki and keffiyeh
Iran-backed Badr paramilitary, noteworthy for wearing a helmet
ISIL position neutralized by Iran-backed Badr paramilitary combat force
ISIL fortified position neutralized by Iran-backed Badr paramilitary combat force
Badr paramilitary firing PKM type machine gun behind T-72 type main battle tank
T-72 type main battle tank, traversing to position frontal armor in direction of incoming hostile fire
Iran-supplied T-72 main battle tank attached to Badr paramilitary combat force
Iran-backed Badr IRAM launcher, providing indirect fire against ISIL position
