Showing posts with label Pyruz. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Pyruz. Show all posts

Wednesday, November 28, 2012

Iran Navy vessel launches and shipbuilding at Bandar Abbas

SRNX "Tondar" hovercraft (modified SR.N6)

SRNX "Tondar" hovercraft, rear section

SRNX "Tondar" hovercraft, frontal section

SRNX "Tondar" hovercraft mfg. markings

BH.7 Mk5 hovercraft, presumed reconditioned

Ghadir class midget submarine variants

Coastal patrol vessel types

Background: IRINS Alborz (72)(ex-Zaal) alongside sister-ship frigate

IRINS Sahand (Mowj-5 build) frigate and Sina-7 build missile boat under construction

Left to right: Rear Admiral Sayyari and commodores of the Iran Navy 

Photos: Majid Jamshidi and Ebrahim Noroozi at Fars News Agency 
IRINN frame captures by nelsa at IMF

Wednesday, November 14, 2012

Defenders of Velayat Skies IV - IRIADF (2)

Mersad Air Defense System test

MIM-23B I-HAWK type ("Shalamcheh") SAM battery

I-HAWK type ("Shalamcheh") missile launch

I-HAWK type ("Shalamcheh") missile in flight

Karrar UAV target drone launch

Karrar target drone in flight

AN/MPQ-50 type "Kavosh" Pulse Acquisition Radar (PAR)

"Jouiya" Continuous Wave Acquisition Radar (CWAR)

Iran military and IRI government observers

Jubilation over presumed success of SAM hit

Photos:
Majid Asgaripour  at Mehr News Agency
Mehdi Ghasemi at Fars News Agency
Islamic Republic News Agency

Defenders of Velayat Skies IV - IRIADF (1)

Updated Mersad Air Defense System

MIM-23B I-HAWKs type ("Shahin" or "Shalamcheh") 
with XM501 missile loader-transporter

AN/MPQ-50 type "Kavosh" Pulse Acquisition Radar (PAR)

AN/MPQ-46 type High Power Illuminating Radar (HPIR)

HPIR detail

I-Hawk type ("Shahin" or "Shalamcheh") launch

Skyguard Air Defense System

Oerlikon GDF-002 type "Samavat" 35 mm autocannon with generator unit

Skyguard Fire Control Radar

AAA and Personnel

Zu-23-2 23 mm anti-aircraft twin-barreled autocannon

IRIADF officers

Photos: 
Mehdi Ghasemi at Fars News Agency
Islamic Republic News Agency

Sunday, June 17, 2012

Egyptian Field Marshal Abdul-Halim Abu Ghazalah on the Combat Tactics and Strategy of the Iran-Iraq War (Part 3)

A response to a book review penned by Youssef Aboul-Enein, Andrew Bertrand and Dorothy Corley at SWJ 


by Mark Pyruz 

The following is a response to part 3 of a book review on Egyptian Field Marshal Abdul-Halim Abu Ghazalah's "Combat Tactics and Strategy of the Iran-Iraq War" put forward by Youssef Aboul-Enein, Andrew Bertrand and Dorothy Corley, recently published in three parts by Small Wars Journal. (See HERE, HERE and HERE.) This writer's response to Part 1 can be found HERE and Part 2 found HERE. Let us proceed with Part 3 (reviewers passages in blue, this writer's responses in black).

"The vicious cycle of Iranian wave assaults continued after February 1983, but not to the level of Operation Fajr al-Nasr, or of the massive Iranian assaults of 1982. At this stage Iraqi weapon imports were three times higher than those of Iran, and Baghdad fielded an upgraded Soviet T-72 tank. Iraq’s most important acquisition during this period was the French Dassault F-1 Mirage fighter, equipped with the Exocet air-to-surface missiles and air-to-air missiles. Iraq also acquired French Aerospatiale Super Frelon attack helicopters, enabling it to far surpass the Iranian Soviet fighters. This air capability enabled Iraq to initiate the infamous tanker wars." 

"By this stage of the war, the Iranian air force had lost 80 warplanes, while the Iraqi air force had lost 55 warplanes; some of the losses were due to poor maintenance and pilots inexperienced at navigating to target. To replace these losses Iraq, beginning in 1983, acquired over 300 fixed wing warplanes to include: 


09 TU-2
08 Illyushin bombers 
70 Sukhoi-7, 17 and 20 fighter-bombers
12 British Hunter-Hawkers
14 MIG-25 fighters
40 MIG-19 fighters
70 MIG-21 fighters
30 French Mirage F-1 fighters"

"The above list shows the impact access to arms and credit, as well as grants from Arab Gulf States, had in resupplying Iraq with quantity and quality arms compared to Iran. Of the 400 operational military aircraft Iran possessed under the Shah until the 1979 revolution, only 70 remained operational by 1983. Due to lack of access to arms, funding, and replacement parts, to name a few, Iranian tactics were limited to mass offensives, including those known as the Fee Fajr (At Dawn) offensives."

This writer believes the reviewers are referring to the five Super Etendards equipped with AM 39 Exocet missiles, leased to Iraq and not the Dassault F-1 Mirage fighter. Also, "Iranian Soviet fighters" appears to be a typo for which a correction can not be offered. During this time, Islamic Republic of Iran Air Force (IRIAF) American made F-14s and F-4 were operating and remained superior to Iraq Air Force (IrAF) fighters, as well as previously acquired American training providing a superior level of combat skill. Also, during this general time period, the IRIAF was able to provide 100+ missions a day, with the aid of clandestine American and Israeli parts deliveries. However, attrition was taking its toll, particularly with IRIAF F-4s and F-5s. Iraq losses were far higher than 55 airplanes. The above list also contains another typo, and should read "TU-22". It should also include the Super Etendards previously mentioned.

"Before 1983 closed, the Iranians began to entertain the option of abandoning human wave attacks on defended Iraqi positions. Iran considered splitting the mass formations of human wave attacks into smaller units to insert behind Iraqi lines. However, these Iranian harassing units were unable to create a breach for a main Iranian assault force to exploit, due to an almost complete absence of command and control. Even if they had, the reaction time of the main Iranian assault force was so slow that they still likely could not have exploited a breach. This inability to react allowed the Iraqis to conduct air strikes and annihilate the Iranian assault force. However, Iraq could never envelope the Iranians and considered their mission accomplished once the Iranians had retreated. Iran possessed only a third of what was required to equip 600,000 regular troops. For instance, this force had only 1,000 armored personnel carriers (APC) and 340 Soviet and North Korean tanks to support it." 

A word on Iranian "human wave attacks", per Farzad Bishop:

"The Iranian 'human wave' strategy was different from WWI times in that attempts were made to incorporate at least one element of surprise in every offensive. If that element of surprise (often either in tactics or in geography) had held on (which didn't happen often), it meant the offensive was successful at least in gaining and keeping a bridgehead, and in limiting the casualties. If it didn't, it usually ended up in catastrophe. If we use the 'human wave' term for frontal assaults by lightly armed infantry units against a heavily armed, dogged in and fortified enemy, this was exactly what happened in many cases. [A] great deal of effort was made to make the first wave as surprising as possible - by staging flanking manoeuvres, diversionary assaults, the use of deception, pinning down artillery fire, frogmen, landing troops behind enemy lines by helicopters (Kheibar), etc. Some of these tactics were ingenious, and others [overly] ambitious and short-sighted. "

"After the Fee Fajr series of operations, Iraq decided to widen the war by attacking oil tankers originating from and bound for Iran." 

Iraq's tanker war against Iran generally lacked effectiveness until such times where the United States Navy provided targeting information to the IrAF. There were other times in the conflict where the U.S. military assisted Iraq, such as very early in the conflict where detailed mapping of the American supplied IRIAF SAM network, which encompassed the American built I-HAWK, were furnished to Iraq. Later, the USN became an active belligerent in the conflict, downing an Iran civilian airliner and knocking out the Iran Navy merchant convoy escort fleet in 1988. For unknown reasons, the reviewers have omitted U.S. military involvement in the conflict, as well as clandestine U.S. and Israeli weapon transfers to Iran during the war.

"Throughout February 1984, Iranians reconnoitered the southern rivers and developed a series of combined helo and river operations called Fatima al-Zahra (after Prophet Muhammad’s daughter and mother of Hussein). Regiments of the 3rd Iraqi Army Corps were isolated from the main body, which allowed Iran to strengthen its hold of Majnoon Island and capture Baida Island. In response, the Iraqis ran live electric cables throughout the marshes to electrocute Iranian forces, and subsequently displayed the Iranian corpses on Iraqi television."

Sources have identified the "electrocution tactics" story as Iraqi wartime propaganda.  The Iranians enjoyed limited success in areas where Iraqi superiority in armor and CAS could not be utilized, particularly in marshland but also in mountainous terrain.

"Throughout 1984 and 1985, the Iranian General Staff attempted to develop alternate tactics to the direct offensive assault, and focused on ways to take the war into an attritional phase. Arguments ensued between the generals and clergy on the need for better training and organization. Iranian combat leaders disputed the folly of holding symbolic ground in Iran and Iraq with no strategic value, and that holding such territory drained the main offensive efforts by siphoning off needed manpower and materiel." 

It should be pointed out that unlike Iraq, Iran never committed itself to a total war against Iraq. More on this later.

"In November 1985, cease-fire talks between Iraq and the Kurds collapsed, which provided Iran with an opening to further exploit the Kurds as a proxy army." 

This writer believes the use of the term "proxy army" to be inaccurate. For example, nowhere does the term apply to historical studies of Montagnard forces allied with the United States military in Vietnam, or Yugoslav armed elements allied with the British during World War II. A better classification would be "allies" in countering Baathist-Iraq.

"Operation Fee Fajr 8 was an attempt to capture the Faw Peninsula, and to deprive Iraq access to the Persian Gulf. From this peninsula, Iran could develop a northerly attack towards Basra, spark and nurture Shiite uprisings in the south, and strike a blow to Iraqi oil production." 

Like Iraq during the initial offensive, where Saddam was expecting the Arab minority to rise up against Iran in Khuzestan, so too the Iranian leadership expected the Shia underclass in Basra to ride up against the Baathist regime with the onset of Iranian forces approaching the city with the intent of capture. It didn't happen. Different circumstances during OIF and a more indirect, clandestine approach by the Iranians ultimately provided Iran with its intended results which had been frustrated during the Iran-Iraq war. More on this later.

"Iran did gain 200 square kilometers of Iraqi territory, kept its pontoon bridge over the Shatt al-Arab Waterway, and was able to shuttle supplies and troops into the Faw Peninsula via regular watercraft." 

For some reason the extensive Iranian engineering efforts at this point are omitted by the reviewers. According to Iraqi Lt. Gen. Al-Hamdani, in his memoirs and interviews, these Iranian efforts greatly impressed Iraqi and foreign military observers, alike.

"In April 1986, Ayatollah Khomeini issued a fatwa calling for victory by the Islamic New Year (late March 1987). Plans were crafted to recruit 500 battalions of 1,000 men each. It was during this declaration that policy disagreements erupted between Ayatollah Khomeini and Ayatollah Rasfanjani, as well as between those in the regular armed forces and the IRGC. The regular army wanted to develop more intelligent combat techniques, while the IRGC wanted to continue to employ human wave attacks." 

There was friction and disagreement between the Atresh (regular armed forces) and IRGC, but simply referring to the IRGC position as insisting on "human wave" tactics is misleading.

"Iraq launched air assaults on Tabriz/Lafan Petroleum Plant, Kharj Island Oil Terminal, and Larak Island Oil Terminal." 

The IrAF was able to achieve some success with these raids, due in large part to USN targeting assistance. But they suffered heavy losses in the process.

"Iraq concentrated artillery fire, heavy machine gunfire and airstrikes, resulting in 60,000 Iranian casualties compared to 9,500 Iraqi casualties."

Iraqi casualties were much higher (but not as high as Iranian losses), as candidly admitted by Iraqi Army Lt. Gen. Hamdani.

"Karbala-5 and 6 was a renewed attempt at enveloping Basra and isolating the city from the rest of Iraq. It was believed that the city could be transformed into an independent Shiite capital to compete with Baghdad."

It's interesting that during periods of the U.S. and British military occupation in Iraq, during OIF, the Iranians actually succeeded with a modification of this strategy in Basra; establishing it as Shia-Iraqi/Iranian bastion, in assisting with the ultimate Shia conquest of Baghdad which continues to this day.

"This shook Iranian confidence concerning the safety of their oil imports in southern installations near the Hormuz Strait. Iran reacted by firing Type-72 Chinese missiles at several Iraqi cities. In 1986, nineteen of these Iranian missiles were fired, and one year later the number was increased to eighty-one, and in 1988 one hundred and four missiles were directed at Iraqi cities." 

This narrative is incorrect. Iran "absorbed" Iraqi missile attacks against its population centers until such time where retaliation could no longer be held back. As with the so-called "Tanker War," Iran ultimately was forced to retaliate in kind, firing Scud-B and Hwasong-5 type SSMs. Interestingly enough, due to the personal intervention of Imam Khomeini, the Iranians did not resort to retaliating in kind to Iraqi chemical weapon attacks, which became truly massive during the final stages of the conflict. This may have a current analog with Leader Khamenei's moral repudiation against nuclear weapons.

"The question of who won the war was contingent on outside interference and support, as Iraq craved advanced weapons that could deliver higher kill rates, while Iran desired weapons that could capitalize on their advantage in human resources." 

This is misleading. The Iranians had nowhere near the access to weapon imports that were being afforded to Iraq, as well as the massive financial backing being provided which was instrumental in establishing Saddam's Republican Guard force. For some reason, the significance of the Republican Guard is not referred to by reviewers Youssef Aboul-Enein, Andrew Bertrand and Dorothy Corley.

"Even Saddam underestimated the revolutionary fervor of the Iranian regime and their use of Shiite ideology to create one of the largest and most tragic and tactically pointless human wave assaults in the history of warfare." 

Here in the West, this is a popular simplification and misconception of Iran's war from 1980-1988. Even Iraqi Lt. Gen. Hamdani candidly points to the successful use of Iranian infiltration tactics and strategies of multiple axes of attack on alternating fronts.

"In the introduction to Iran, Iraq, and the Legacies of War, Lawrence G Potter and Gary G. Sick observe that, “the Persian Gulf states, and indeed the entire Middle East, were profoundly affected by the Iran-Iraq War…and its sequels, the Gulf War of 1990-91 and the war against Iraq in 2003'." 

The 1991 Gulf War was a direct consequence of the Iran-Iraq war. Saddam's Iraq had sustained massive losses, and was suffering from social and economic woes. Two factors in particular entered Saddam's calculations  in invading Iraq:

1) Iraq's inability to repay billon of dollars in loans afforded by Arab Gulf states, while the country was now in debt to the tune of $80 billion. The economic situation was dire, with reconstruction estimates placed at $230 billion.

2) Iraq possessed a massive military machine that had been built up with Western and Soviet assistance, to which a partial demobilization had backfired as the shaky Iraqi economy proved unable to absorb the huge numbers of young men pouring into the labor market (see The Iran-Iraq War by Efraim Karsh, pg. 87).

Following these direct consequences of the Iran-Iraq War, Saddam misinterpreted the mild response of the U.S. Ambassador to Iraq, April Gilepsie, to his threats of invading Iraq, and attacked Iraq on August 2, 1990.

For it's part, Iran did not commit to a total war in the conflict and had relied primarily on highly motivated volunteers for its war fighting. Thus it did not encounter the dire situation experienced in Iraq, with Saddam's regime survival greatly under threat.

The incomplete Coalition victory of the ensuing Gulf War against Iraq led to the eventual confict known as OIF. It is interesting to note that as a direct consequence of the American led invasion of Iraq in 2003 and its troubled military occupation, the Iranians were able to realize their highest war aims of the Iran-Iraq War, such as the removal of Saddam and the Baathist state from power, the generating of a Shia dominant regime in Iraq, access to the holy cities in Iraq and the creation of extremely close if not tied relations between the two countries. It can be argued that these latent developments rendered Iran the ultimate victor of the Iran-Iraq war.

"Field Marshal Abdel-Halim Abu Ghazalah’s book is regarded as the most thorough and accurate Arab account of the Iran-Iraq war, and can provide interesting insights and contrasts when compared with English works on the subject."

This writer believes Iraqi Lt. Gen Hamdani and Brig. Gen Sadik to be better references (admittedly estimating Ghazalah solely as depicted by reviewers Youssef Aboul-Enein, Andrew Bertrand and Dorothy Corley).

"When evaluating the possible consequences of preemptive military action against Iran, it is crucial that U.S. military personnel reflect on Iran’s past military confrontations, such as the Iran-Iraq War." 

This writer believes the most poignant lessons to be gleaned from the Iran-Iraq war are:

1) Iran's ability to garner huge numbers of highly motivated human resources to fight a war it perceives as just. Furthermore, these resources appear resilient for the most part of an extended conflict, against seemingly overwhelming odds.

2) The Iranians are masters of improvisation, in both technical terms and tactics intended to offset their disadvantages in war material.

However, this writer believes the actual tactics and strategies employed by Iran's military during the Iran-Iraq war to be dated. The Iranian military of today, particularly the IRGC force, is different than it was from 1980-88. It is more powerful, better organized and better trained. More useful to U.S. military planners would be to study the tactics of Hezbollah during the 33-Day War in Lebanon, and apply these lessons to Iran's current military capabilities and its Mosaic doctrine. Emphasis should be placed on the economic effects of a rocket artillery campaign (applying them to Iran's SSMs), the use of AShMs, as well as the determination and resiliency of defenders under attack or occupation. It must be understood that Iran's military planners have surely gleaned much from the 33-Day war, as well as the successes of the Iraqi insurgency against American forces during OIF.

Tuesday, May 29, 2012

Egyptian Field Marshal Abdul-Halim Abu Ghazalah on the Combat Tactics and Strategy of the Iran-Iraq War (Part 1)

A response to a book review penned by Youssef Aboul-Enein, Andrew Bertrand and Dorothy Corley at Small Wars Journal

by Mark Pyruz

A book review on Egyptian Field Marshal Abdul-Halim Abu Ghazalah's "Combat Tactics and Strategy of the Iran-Iraq War" by Youssef Aboul-Enein, Andrew Bertrand and Dorothy Corley has recently been ublished in three parts by Small Wars Journal. See HERE, HERE and HERE. The views put forward in the review of Ghazalah's work by Youssef Aboul-Enein et al rely on, for the most part, externally derived and out of date interpretations of the war. A freshly interpreted survey essay on the Iran-Iraq War is really called for, using newer research containing primary sources from both sides of the conflict, similar to the efforts of USA Colonel Glanz (Ret.) and his work on the "myths and realities" of the Russo-German War, 1941-1945. However, what follows here, in order, are a number of responses to the perspectives and claims made by the field marshal, as described by the reviewers. It should be pointed out this author has not had access to the actual work by Ghazalah and is relying on the reviewers for the book's content. Reviewers' passages in blue; this author's responses in black. Let us proceed with Part 1 of 3:

"For centuries, Iran has remained a strategic concern for Arab states, and in more recent times, a concern for the United States as well. The divisions between Arabs and Iranians include religious differences between Sunni and Shiite, ethnic differences between Arab and Persian, linguistic differences between Semitic Arabic and Indo-Aryan Farsi, and more recently, growing global concern over Iran’s revolutionary influences in the region." 

This view is largely that of a pan-Arab nationalist, fof which we can assume the field marshal shares sympathies. Where Iraq is concerned, there are shared senses of culture with Iran and vice-versa, particularly among the Shia populations. Today this is most visible in the cross-border pilgrimages that now exist, in both directions, involving millions of ordinary Iranian and Iraqi persons. In certain respects, this shared sense of culture transcends even religion. The very name "Baghdad" is in fact a Persian word. (For an interesting lecture on this subject given by a recent speaker at Stanford University, see HERE.)

"In 1971, Iran, under the Shah, annexed three strategic islands: the Greater and Lesser Tunbs and Abu Musa from the United Arab Emirates."

This requires clarification. The three islands were part of a deal between the UK and Iran, with Iran withdrawing its historical claim to Bahrain (recognized at least in an Iranian historical sense as its fourteenth province). Much of the Shia majority underclass of Bahrain, some with elements of Persianate lineage, with their recent addition to the unfurling "Arab Spring," are a product of this compromise.

"A few years later, Iraq was battling the Kurds in the Second Kurdish War, from 1974 to 1975. Kenneth M. Pollack, of the Council on Foreign Relations and the Brooking Institute, in his volume titled Arabs at War (University of Nebraska Press, 2002), underscores that Iran’s support of the Kurdish Peshmerga during the Second Kurdish War curtailed Iraqi momentum and “finally stalemated the war in the spring of 1975”. Saddam Hussein (then Iraq’s Foreign Minister) negotiated the subsequent cease-fire agreement known as the Algiers Accord, as described by Pollack. Although Iraq conceded territory to Iran, in return the Shah terminated support to Iraqi Kurds, which enabled Iraq to effectively quell the Kurdish revolt shortly after the Accord was signed on 6 March 1975." 

A very specific narrative provided by CDR Aboul-Enein et al on the Algiers Accord. In fact, the Accord represented much more than that, and was finely worked out by both Iranian and Iraqi diplomatic teams. However the institution of terms of the agreement was continuously stalled by the Baath regime headed by Saddam Hussein. For an overview of the Accord, see "Iraqi Attitudes and Interpretation of the 1975 Agreement" by Ibrahim Anvari Tehrani (chapter two of "The Iran-Iraq War: The Politics of Aggression" by Farhang Rejaee).

"The Revolution of 1979 toppled the Shah of Iran, and ushered in the abrupt and dramatic rise of Ayatollah Khomeini’s Islamist regime. Other Arab regimes began to reevaluate prior agreements with Iran following the events of 1979. Abu Ghazalah’s book opens during this tumultuous period, and he cites the reasons for war between Iran and Iraq as fear of Shiite Islamic fervor and agitation throughout the Arab world, and Iraq seeing a potential opportunity to replace Iran as the regional policeman of the Persian Gulf."

From the Iraqi Baathist perspective, there was more to it. Iraq's Shia majority underclass was suppressed by the Baathist regime. It began to rise up and was encouraged by the Iranian example, and was assisted in certain respects by Iran. There were forced evictions of Iranian-Iraqis from Iraq. In addition to seeking the position of "regional policeman," Saddam sought not only to nip in the bud the Iraqi Shia struggle against the Baathist minority elite that held power, but more than that to actualize imperial gains, eastward, aimed at the dismemberment of Iran and capture of oil rich Khuzestan; that is to say, to establish a new regional geopolitical order in Iraq's favor at the expense of Iran, by means of a war of aggression.

"Saddam’s generals observed Iran with interest and received briefs from anti-Khomeini Iranian exiles. The briefs documented the ideological interference of the Iranian Armed Forces and the purging of experienced commanders with a new religious-based class of officers with little tactical experience."

Figuring into Iraq's calculations on their upcoming air war (as well as Western intelligence assessments) was the aftermath of the failed "Nojeh coup" involving the CIA and certain Iran Air Force officers against the popularly elected IRI government. These intelligence estimates had practically written off the Islamic Republic of Iran Air Force (IRIAF) as an effective fighting force, following the failed coup and Iran's security crackdown upon these air force officer elements. The Iraqis were to be woefully surprised during the opening phase of the conflict by a spectacular airstrike campaign conducted by the IRIAF.

Before Saddam began the war with Iran, Iraq was transitioning from bulk Eastern weapons systems to Western equipment."

This wasn't so with regards to AFVs, combat aircraft, etc.

"Photoreconnaissance existed but was extremely elementary."

It should be pointed out that in the weeks prior to the actual Iraqi invasion, Iraq Air Force (IrAF) recce sorties had taken place but had sustained heavy losses from IRIAF F-14 and F-4 intercepts (see "Arab MiG-19 & MiG-21 Units in Combat" by David Nicolle and Tom Cooper, pages 79-80.)

"Iraq’s aerial early warning systems were in a developmental stage, and in 1979 they possessed command and control for air force and air defense units, but they lacked the ability to coordinate these two aerial defense arms. Training on this equipment was marginal, and this would come to be painfully obvious in 1981, when Israel launched an air strike and destroyed the OSIRAK nuclear reactor."

It was already painfully obvious to the IrAF/ADC following Iran's immediate air counterattack, consisting from the beginning on no less than a 140-fighter strong raid into Iraq. In fact, by the end of September 1980, the IRIAF had already exhausted its main target list, with the Iraqis having to pull back its transport and bomber aircraft, as well as its reserve fighters and other high value assets to its western airbases (see "Iranian F-4 Phantom II Units in Action" by Tom Cooper and Farzad Bishop, pgs 17-31).

"Abu Ghazalah spends a chapter discussing the economics of the Iran-Iraq War. He writes that the total Iranian and Iraqi weapons imports for the war reached a peak of $55 billion and represented approximately 1/3 of the Gross Domestic Product of all developing nations combined."

Interestingly enough, for the majority of ordinary Iranians in unoccupied territories, the economic effects of the Iran-Iraq war were not as pronounced as those experienced following the onset of the British-Soviet invasion of 1941 and the ensuing American occupation of the early 1940s, for which the Ahmadinejad administration is currently seeking reparations.

"Although Iraq’s manpower problems were in some ways similar to Iran’s, the Iranians’ inability to train in combined arms was more pronounced. Iran’s training was limited almost exclusively to light infantry tactics because of Iran’s penchant for conducting human wave attacks." 

To a certain extent, the "human wave" tactics were more of a practical solution than that of mere "penchant". More on this later in part 2 and 3.

"Iraq’s political-military objectives at the onset of the war with Iran included: Return of the Shatt al-Arab Waterway (known in Iran as the Arvand Rud) as an integral part of Iraq; Destruction of Iranian units along the border with Iraq; Securing of oil fields in Iranian Khuzestan; Toppling of or dictating terms to Ayatollah Khomeini’s revolutionary leaders and marginalizing Iraq’s source of ideological influence in the region (Arab nationalism). It is worthwhile to highlight Kenneth Pollack’s observation that the key ingredient in Iraqi’s ability to achieve the preceding objectives was the seizure of the Khuzestan province."

This was Saddam's first war of aggression in the region, and his main goal was very similar to his second war of aggression against Kuwait: a land grab won in a very short war, identified for its oil treasure and improved geographical positioning with which to manage and protect such additional resources.

"It is worth noting that there is an intriguing difference in the number of divisions listed in Abu Ghazalah’s preceding description of deployed forces when compared with Pollack’s. Abu Ghazalah’s account lists eleven divisions, whereas Pollack’s account claims Iraq initiated the war with Iran with nine divisions. Both list three infantry divisions, but Abu Ghazalah’s account includes one additional mechanized division and one additional armored division." 

Here is a more recently derived and detailed OB for the Iraq Army (IrA) at the onset of the Iran-Iraq war (Source: ACIG.org):

I Army Corps (sector between Rawanduz and Marivan)
- 7th Infantry Division (HQ Soleimaniyah)
- 11th Infantry Division (HQ Soleimaniyah; including 113IB, parts of which were detached to III Army Corps)

II Army Corps (sector between Qassre-Shirin, Ilam, and Mehran, armor deployed between Mehran and Dezful) -
- 6th Armored Division (HQ Baqubah)
- 9th Armored Division (HQ Samavah; 35AB, 43AB, 14MB)
- 10th Armored Division (HQ Baghdad, 17AB, 42AB, 24MB)
- 2nd Infantry Division (HQ Kirkuk)
- 4th Infantry Division (HQ Mawsil)
- 6th Infantry Division (HQ Baqubah)
- 8th Infantry Division (HQ Arbil)

III Army Corps (HQ al-Qurnah, sector between Dezful and Abadan)
- 3rd Armored Division (HQ Tikrit; 6AB, 12AB, 8MB)
- 10th Armored Division (HQ Baghdad; 10AB)
- 12th Armored Division (HQ Dahuoq; held in reserve)
- 1st Mechanized Division (HQ Divaniyeh; 1MB, 27MB, 34AB)
- 5th Mechanized Division (HQ Basrah; 26AB, 15MB, 20MB)
- 10th Independent AB
- 31st Independent Special Forces Brigade (minus two battalions: one was attached to 5th Mechanized Division, another to 3rd Armored Division),
- 33rd Independent Special Forces Brigade - 113 Infantry Brigade (detachments)
There were also two independent armored brigades, the 10th and the 12th, dislocations of which are as of yet unclear.

"The opening hours of the war saw Iran drained of divisional and corps level military leadership. All strategic decisions were in the hands of mullahs and revolutionary councils. The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps was newly established and did not command the respect of regular forces. It reduced its regular forces by half and many U.S. weapons contracts had been previously cancelled due to the hostage crisis in 1979. Iran’s strategy was framed as a war of ideology against imperialism, communism and Zionism and the preservation of Khomeini’s Islamic Revolution." 

In general, the units of the Islamic Republic of Iran Army were in very poor condition. Most were down to only 50% of their strenght (some even less) and under command of lower-ranking officers, as all the generals of the former Imperial Iranian Army were removed from their posts after the revolution in 1979. During the early days of the war there was considerable chaos within the chain of command, which led to a situation in which most of the larger units were scattered into small battle-groups that fought in cooperation with local militias and without a coherent overall command. (Source: ACIG.org); which is a somewhat different situation than that of "all strategic decisions [being] in the hands of mullahs and revolutionary councils."  In terms of Iran's ideological framing of the war, it was certainly stronger than the weaker ideology framed by the Baathist state, and this showed in their corresponding states of motivation and morale on the battlefield.

End of Part 1.

Monday, May 7, 2012

Iran Naval Forces pennant list


[Amended 5/7/12]

Submarines

901          Tareq (ex-B 175) (SSK)
902          Noor (ex-B 224) (SSK)
903          Yunes (ex-B 220) (SSK)
xxx          Qaem (SS)
xxx          Fateh (SS)
xxx          Nahang (SSM)
xxx          Ghadir (SSM)
xxx          Ghadir xxx (SSM)
xxx          Ghadir xxx (SSM)
945          Ghadir 945 (SSM)
946          Ghadir 946 (SSM)
947          Ghadir 947 (SSM)
948          Ghadir 948 (SSM)
949          Ghadir 949 (SSM)
950          Ghadir 950 (SSM)
951          Ghadir 951 (SSM)
952          Ghadir 952 (SSM)
953          Ghadir 953 (SSM)
954          Ghadir 954 (SSM)
955          Ghadir 955 (SSM)
956          Ghadir 956 (SSM)
957          Ghadir 957 (SSM)
958          Ghadir 958 (SSM)
959          Ghadir 959 (SSM)
960          Ghadir 960 (SSM)

Destroyers (non-operational)

D5           Damavand (ex-Artemiz, ex-HMS Sluys) (DD)
D7           Babr (ex-USS Zellars) (DD)
D9           Palang (ex-USS Stormes) (DD)

Frigates

71            Alvand (ex-Saam) (FFG)
72            Alborz (ex-Zaal) (FFG)
73            Sabalan (ex-Rostam) (FFG)
76            Jamaran (FFGH)
77            Velayat (bldg) (FFGH)

Corvettes

81            Bayandor (ex-US PF 103) (FS)
82            Admiral Naghdi (ex-US PF 104) (FS)

Patrol Forces

201          Kayvan (ex-61) (PB)
202          Tiran (ex-63) (PB)
204          Mahan (ex-64) (PB)
211          Parvin (ex-PGM 103) (PC)
212          Bahram (ex-PGM 112) (PC)
213          Nahid (ex-PGM 122) (PC)
P 221       Kaman (PGGF)
P 222       Zoubin (PGGF)
P 223       Khadeng (PGGF)
P 224       Peykan (PGGF)
P 225       Joshan (PGGF)
P 226       Falakhon (PGGF)
P 227       Shamshir (PGGF)
P 228       Gorz (PGGF)
P 229       Gardouneh (PGGF)
P 230       Khanjar (PGGF)
P 231       Neyzeh (PGGF)
P 232       Tabarzin (PGGF)
P 233       Derefsh (PGGF)
P 234       Kalat (PGGF)
P 313-1    Shahid Mehdavi (ex-Fath) (PTFG)
P 313-2    Shahid Kord (ex-Nasr) (PTFG)
P 313-3    Shahid Shafihi (ex-Saf) (PTFG)
P 313-4    Shahid Towsali (ex-Ra'ad) (PTFG)
P 313-5    Shahid Hejat Zadeh (ex-Fajr) (PTFG)
P 313-6    Shahid Dara (ex-Shams) (PTFG)
P 313-7    Shahid Absalan (ex-Me'raj) (PTFG)
P 313-8    Shahid Rahisi Raisi (ex-Falaq) (PTFG)
P 313-9    Shahid Golzam (ex-Hadid) (PTFG)
P 313-10  Shahid Sahrabi (ex-Qadr) (PTFG)

Mine Warfare Forces

301           Hamzeh (ex-Sahrokh, ex-MSC 2706) (YDT)
312           Riazi (ex-MSI 14) (MS)

Amphibious Warfare Forces and Auxiliaries

21             Hejaz (LST)
22             Karbala (LST)
24             Farsi (LST)
25             Sardasht (LST)
26             Sab Sahei (LST)
xx             Iran Asr (ex-Arya Akian) (LST)
xx             Iran Ghadr (ex-Arya Dakht) (LST)
101           Fouque (LSL)
102           xxx (LSL)
103           xxx (LSL)
400           Dolphin (ex-US ARD 29, ex-FD 4) (YFDB)
411           Kangan (AWT)
412           Taheri (AWT)
xxx           Shahid Marjani (AWT)
xxx           Amir (AWT)
421           Bandar Abbas (AORLH)
422           Busher (AORLH)
424           Daylam (AWT)
431           Kharg (AORH)
441           Chah Bahar (ex-Amphion, AR 13) (AR)
471           Delvar (AEL)
472           Sirjan (AEL)
481           Charak (AKL)
482           Chiroo (AKL)
483           Soroo (AKL)
xxx           Silim (AWT)
xxx           Dayer (AWT)
511           Hengam (LSLH)
512           Larak (LSLH)
513           Tonb (LSLH)
514           Lavan (LSLH)
802           Hamzah (ex-Shahsavar) (AGG)
xxx           Abnegar (ex-Glimmer) (YGS)
1401         Hendijan (PBO)
1402         Sirik (PBO)
1403         Konorak (PBO)
1404         Gavatar (PBO)
1405         Moqam (PBO)
1406         Bahregan (ex-Geno) (PBO)
1407         Kalat (PBO)
1408         Genaveh (PBO)
1409         Rostami (PBO)
1410         Nayband (PBO)
15xx         Ghiam 1 (Pilot Craft)
1701         xxx (Water Barge) (YWN)
1702         xxx (Water Barge) (YWN)
1703         xxx (Kaew-class Fuel Lighter) (YO)
1704         xxx (Kaew-class Fuel Lighter) (YO)
1712         xxx (Garbage Disposal Lighter) (YG)
xxxx         Iran Parak (YO)
xxxx         Iran Shalak (YO)
xxxx         Iran Youshat (YO)
xxxx         Macham (PBO)
xxxx         Koramshahr (PBO)
--              Haamoon (YTB)
--              Hirmand (YTB)
--              Menab (YTB)
--              Hari-Rud (YTB)
--              Aras (YTM)
--              Alban (YT)
--              Sefid-Rud (YTB)
--              Atrak (YTM)
--              Abad (YT)
--              Aslam (YT)
--              Dehloran (YT)
--              Ilam (YT)
--              Hangam (YT)
--              Daryavand II (YT)
--              Khandag (YT)
--              Arvand (YT)
--              Karkeh (YT)

Type abbreviations:

SS          Submarine, general
SSK        Patrol submarine with ASW capability
SSM       Submarine, midget
DD         Destroyer
FFG       Guided missile frigate
FFGH     Guided missile frigate, helicopter
FS          Corvette
PB          Coastal patrol vessel under 45 m w/o heavy armament
PBO       Offshore patrol vessel between 45 and 60 m
PC          Patrol force vessel 35-55 m primarily for ASW role
PGGF     Patrol force vessel 35-55 m equipped with at least 76 mm gun, force guided missile system, speed in excess of 35 kt
PTFG     Attack boat, speed in excess of 35 kt, equipped with guided missile system
YDT       Diving tender
LST        Landing ship tank with bow doors and/or landing ramp
LSL        Landing ship logistic
LSLH      Landing ship logistic, helicopter
MS          Minesweeper
AEL        Ammunition ship capable of underway replenishment, small
AKL        Cargo ship, light
AWT       Water tanker
AORLH   Replenishment oiler, small, helicopter
AORH     Replenishment oiler, helicopter
AGG       Auxiliary misc., with force guided missile system
AR          Repair ship
YDT        Diving tender
YFDB      Floating dry dock, large
YG          Garbage lighter
YGS        Survey launch
YO          Fuel lighter
YTB        Harbor tug, large
YTM       Harbor tug, medium
YT          Harbor tug (unspecified)
YWN       Water barge

Monday, December 26, 2011

Iran's offer of military cooperation with Iraq

Opportunities and challenges for a region in flux

By Mark Pyruz

Left: Iraq Lt. Gen. Zebari. Right: Iran Maj. Gen. Firouzabadi.

According to Xinhua News Agency:

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff of Iran's Armed Forces Major General Hassan Firouzabadi said that the Islamic republic is ready to expand its military and security cooperation with Iraq, the local satellite Press TV reported on Monday.

In two separate messages to Iraqi Army's Chief of Staff Lieutenant General Babakir Zebari and Iraqi Acting Defense Minister Sadun al-Dulaymi on Sunday, Firouzabadi expressed his country's satisfaction with the withdrawal of U.S. forces from Iraq.

He said that the withdrawal of foreign troops from Iraq was the result of determination and resistance of the Iraqi nation and government.

"We hope the United States has learned a lesson from its nine- year occupation and humiliating defeat in Iraq and never thinks about attacking another country," he was quoted as saying.

According to the report, during a meeting with Iran's Islamic Revolution Guards Corps (IRGC) Ground Forces commander Brigadier General Mohammad Pakpour on Nov. 13 in Tehran, Zebari called for more Tehran-Baghdad military cooperation.

Iraq is facing some security challenges and needs to exchange views with Iran, which is strong in many areas including security, said Zebari.

Iran has said that the only path to the establishment of peace and security in the region is the cooperation of regional countries, without foreigners' intervention.

There is a false narrative circulated amongst certain elements of the U.S. military, punditry and media that USA General Petraeus and the so-called "surge" led to the significant reduction of violence in Iraq in the late 00s. In reality it was largely the work of an Iranian General: IRGC-QF Commander Maj. Gen. Qassem Suleimani. It was Suleimani that helped enable the Shia conquest of Baghdad (occurring to a large extent before the introduction of the U.S. military reinforcement) and it was Suleimani that brokered the truce between the Iraq Army and Shia militias.

IRGC-QF Commander Maj. Gen. Suleimani

It has been speculated by objective Middle East regional observers that without the soft power capabilities of the Islamic Republic of Iran, the government of Iraq would have more resembled that of the Palestinian Authority and the pliable leadership of Abu Mazen (Mahmoud Abbas). Instead, the Iraqis could rely on the offsetting leverage provided by Iran, which was key to Iraq successfully ejecting the U.S. military from its territory. Seen in this light, Maj. Gen. Firouzabadi's remarks can be interpreted as something of a verbal "victory lap" for the Iranians.

It's interesting that Iraq Army Chief of Staff Lieutenant General Babakir Zebari had previously in 2010 voiced concern that his military was not ready for the security challenges posed by a U.S. military withdrawal. It appears Iraq's civilian leadership may be directing him to more closely cooperate with the military-security establishment of Iran. This is likely all the more significant as Iraq Prime Minister Maliki engages in efforts to rollback Sunni political power, such as it is, currently manifesting itself in the arrest warrant of Vice President Tareq al-Hashemi.

The removal of U.S. military forces in Iraq and Iran's pivotal relationship with Iraq now afford Iran with the opportunity of a direct, overland line of communication extending clear across to the Mediterranean Sea, something not fully realized since Sassanid times. Within this context, it is easy to see why NATO is currently engaged in efforts to dislodge President Assad in Syria, not the least reason being to block Iran's greater projection toward this western direction.

Perhaps the American neoconservatives were partly right after all, when during the run-up to the Iraq War they declared "the road to Jerusalem runs through Baghdad." The part they may have gotten wrong, however, is the effective course of that road's direction.

Thursday, September 22, 2011

A response to Michael Eisenstadt's 'The Strategic Culture of the Islamic Republic of Iran' (Part 4)

by Mark Pyruz

We continue with Part 4 of our response to Michael Eisenstadt's monograph published by the Middle East Studies at Marine Corps University. [Part 1: click HERE, Part 2: click HERE, Part 3: click HERE]

Mr. Eisenstadt's text in red:

"The Psychological, Moral, and Spiritual. The experience of the past thirty years shows that the IRI places great importance on the psychological dimensions of statecraft and strategy, and emphasizes the primacy of the moral and spiritual dimensions of war over the physical and technological. Thus, the IRI’s diplomacy and strategy emphasize achieving moral effects over physical effects, while the IRI sees the informational line of operation as the decisive one in war. Whereas the United States undertakes information operations to support its military activities, Iran frequently undertakes military activities (i.e., exercises, shows of force, and proxy operations) to support its information operations."

To a greater extent, Iran's lessor emphasis placed on the the physical and technological aspect of this Cold War is due to Iran's relative disadvantges in such fields compared to the United States, as well as its unwillingness to spend exorbitant sums on defense which characterizes the American approach to defense.

"The IRI’s historical experience supports this approach. In the Shah’s Iran, clandestinely distributed tape recordings of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini’s sermons contributed to the success of the Islamic Revolution and the rise of Khomeini as its leader, while skillful propaganda spurred mass defections from the Shah’s armed forces and discouraged many still loyal to the old order."

It's amusing Mr. Eisenstadt includes this reference, as it compares so well with revolutionary usage of pamphlets during the American War of Independence.

"The doctrine of resistance (moqavemat) as practiced by the IRI (as well as Hizballah, Hamas, and Syria) in their struggle with Israel and the United States, assigns primary importance to the accomplishment of psychological effects. It assumes that victory is achieved by demoralizing the enemy—through terrorizing its civilians, bleeding its armies, and denying it battlefield victories. Furthermore, it assumes that conflicts are zero sum games and that compromise is a sign of weakness that will be exploited by the enemy."

There are contradictions to this all-encompassing view of Iran's approach (as well as Syria's). One glaring contradiction occurred when Iran assisted the United States during OEF at the onset of the war in Afghanistan. Iran went to great lengths in assisting the U.S. effort against the Taliban and Al-Qaida, going so far as to heavily influence the Afghan United Front into accepting U.S. terms of alliance. Of course, Iran was "rewarded" for this assistance by subsequently being branded a member of the "Axis of Evil" by President Bush, thereby throwing away any chance of a lasting detente and reinvigorating the Cold War that exists to this day.

"Since the late-1980s, the approach embodied by the principle of the expediency of the regime has prevailed, though this could eventually change, as a result of the perceived successes of the resistance doctrine in Lebanon and Gaza, the failure of the international community to halt Iran’s nuclear program, and the growing strength of the Mahdist (mahdaviyat) current in Iranian politics since the 2005 election of President Ahmadinejad."

It should be pointed out that the "international community" represented by the 120-member Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) supports Iran's right to a peaceful nuclear program, including the right of nuclear fuel production.

"...the IRGC may be the only force in the region with regime protection duties that does not always get the newest and most capable systems—perhaps due to residual skepticism on its part regarding the importance of technology."

Apparently Mr. Eisenstadt is unaware of the fact the IRGC controls Iran's higher-tech strategic forces, such its MRBM force (IRGC/ASF) and Cyber warfare command.

"The IRI prefers to avoid decisive engagements and head-on confrontations, and has repeatedly demonstrated a preference for “Fabian” strategies of delay, indirection, and attrition."

As detailed previously, this narrative runs contrary to Iran's experience following the 2003 Paris Agreement, involving negotiations over its nuclear program.

"Intimidated, demoralized, and worn down the domestic opposition by holding show trials of opposition leaders, conducting mass arrests, and torturing and maltreating detainees"

Even this contention can be sen through the context of Cold War. Consider American responses to the Cold War against the USSR and PRC, where American opposition elements were put through show trials (such as the Chicago Eight trials in 1969), and where numerous arrests and incidents of lethal fire were applied against protesters during the late 1960s and early 70s. click HERE.

"The IRI has repeatedly demonstrated a tendency to be too clever by half and to overplay its hand in its diplomacy, business dealings, and military activities. For instance, Tehran’s: behavior unnecessarily prolonged and complicated negotiations with the United States over the
freeing of the embassy hostages, contributing to the deep distrust that to this day characterizes relations between the two countries"


The Iranian perspective is different, in that the prolonged hostage negotiations ultimately intended to humiliate the seated U.S. president and influence the outcome of the 1980 election, to which it succeeded.

"Part of the reason that Iranian officials often find it difficult to close a deal or end a dispute, is their zero sum approach to conflicts, which precludes compromise, and the fear that in a political system characterized by extreme factionalism, rivals will claim that they could have done better. (Thus, the decision to end the Iran- Iraq War in 1988 and to temporarily suspend the enrichment of uranium in 2003, remain contentious issues in Iranian politics.) There is little sense of the utility of achieving a mutually beneficial compromise or of reaching a deal. The emphasis is on getting all one can, and of avoiding concessions."

For reasons preciously stated (Iran's perspective in its war aim against Saddam, as well as Iranian assistance toward the U.S. at the onset of OEF in Afghanistan), this view contains historical contradictions.

"Conclusions: Countering Soft Power. Washington tends to focus on the Tehran’s hard power assets, at the expense of its soft power capabilities. The IRI’s soft power, however, may be a more effective means of projecting Iranian influence in the Middle East and may constitute the greater long-term threat to U.S. interests in the region. The United States needs to focus more attention and devote greater resources to countering Iran’s soft power."

Easier said then done, as Iran is a regionally positioned player (as opposed to the U.S., which is an extra-regional player), with longstanding historical, cultural and social ties to the region as a whole.

"Propaganda and Psychological Warfare. U.S. policy makers tend to underestimate the value of the informational instrument of national power. By contrast, policy makers in the IRI consider information activities as their decisive line of operations. As a result, the U.S. has not exploited Tehran’s extraordinary vulnerabilities in this arena, or reaped the benefits that aggressive information activities might yield."

For decades now, there have been so many US and privately funded propaganda efforts directed at the Islamic Republic of Iran, it is incredible that Mr. Eisenstadt advocates even greater resources be employed. At some point a diminishing return becomes evident, and that point was reached years ago.

"Piercing the Veil of Ambiguity. The United States has not been effective at preventing Tehran from exploiting the ambiguity that shrouds many of its policies, whether proxy operations or its nuclear program."

It can be argued that the U.S. has been very effective in piercing the "veil of ambiguity" concerning Iran's nuclear program. Consider Juan Cole's argument that:

1. The U.S. entices defectors from the nuclear program and debrief them. Some come out of with documents. No weapons program.

2. The U.S. has world-beating signals intelligence capabilities. Telephone calls made by military and nuclear program officials are under surveillance. No evidence from signals of a weapons program. In fact in 2007 a call was intercepted by an angry IRGC commander complaining bitterly about the decision not to weaponize.

3. IAEA inspectors certify that no uranium has been diverted to military purposes– i.e. the seals are unbroken.

4. Inspectors find no signature of highly enriched uranium or plutonium

5. Enriching to 95% would be power and water intensive and any such facility could be detected by satellite and other intelligence.

The concern is not that there is a weapons program, it is that the civilian enrichment program might be made a platform at some point in the future for a crash high-enrichment program, using the stock of low enriched uranium already at hand. That is what is meant by a two-year window once a decision to weaponize has been made. But the intelligence estimates are that no such decision has been made, and likely none will be. Moreover, the two-year window has been repeatedly alleged of such programs, and was with regard to Iraq, and in the latter case it was a fantasy.

Missiles are irrelevant and a red herring.


"Deterring Adventurism. How does one deal with a political system run by politicians who thrive on isolation and conflict with the outside world, or deter decision makers who—inspired by the IRI’s resistance narrative or by mahdist ideology—might, under certain circumstances, welcome conflict?"

Facts do not support Mr. Eisenstadt's contention that Iran "thrive[s] on isolation and conflict with the outside world. Consider Iran's more recent conference on terrorism in 2011, where high-ranking delegates from the United Nations, the Organization of the Islamic Conference, the Asia Cooperation Dialogue, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, the Economic Cooperation Organization, the African Union and Interpol attended. Then consider the recent "Tehran International Conference on Disarmament and Non-Proliferation, 2010" where experts and officials from some 70 countries attended.

"Countering Iran’s “Fabian” Strategy. Iran’s strategies of indirection, delay, and attrition are predicated on the assumption that time works in its favor."

A response to this assertion has already been provided.

An alternate to Mr. Eisenstadt's advocacy of a perpetuating policy of Cold War directed by the U.S. toward the Islamic Republic of Iran is best put forward by U.S. policy advocates Flynt and Hillary Mann Leverett, where they state:

"The absence of US-Iranian rapprochement will perpetuate the new Middle Eastern Cold War, imposing costs on the United States, Iran and other regional and international players. However, in strategic terms, the heaviest costs of continued US-Iranian estrangement are likely to be borne by the United States. In particular, lack of productive relations with Tehran will contribute significantly to Washington’s failure to achieve important policy objectives in the Middle East, thereby conditioning further erosion of America’s regional standing and influence."

"As the new regional Cold War plays out, analysts suggest different scenarios for how the ongoing strategic competition between the United States and Iran will evolve. Some, like former Germany Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer, see this competition as a struggle for regional hegemony in the Middle East comparable to that in late nineteenth century Europe following German unification; from this perspective, Fischer warns that, without careful handling, tensions between the United States and the Islamic Republic could ultimately erupt in a large-scale military confrontation. Others, like Fareed Zakaria, believe that the United States and its regional and international partners will move inexorably toward a posture of containing and deterring the Islamic Republic and its allies, in a manner reminiscent of the West’s Cold War posture toward the Soviet Union.”

“Against the backdrop of these scenarios, we argue that the United States and the Islamic Republic of Iran should transcend the prospects for hegemonial war of strategic standoff and seek a fundamental realignment of their relations, in a manner similar to the realignment in relations between the United States and the People’s Republic of China during Richard Nixon’s tenure in the White House. We further argue that such a fundamental realignment of US-Iranian relations can only be achieved through a comprehensive rapprochement between Washington and Tehran.”

"As the new regional Cold War plays out, analysts suggest different scenarios for how the ongoing strategic competition between the United States and Iran will evolve. Some, like former Germany Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer, see this competition as a struggle for regional hegemony in the Middle East comparable to that in late nineteenth century Europe following German unification; from this perspective, Fischer warns that, without careful handling, tensions between the United States and the Islamic Republic could ultimately erupt in a large-scale military confrontation. Others, like Fareed Zakaria, believe that the United States and its regional and international partners will move inexorably toward a posture of containing and deterring the Islamic Republic and its allies, in a manner reminiscent of the West’s Cold War posture toward the Soviet Union.”

“Against the backdrop of these scenarios, we argue that the United States and the Islamic Republic of Iran should transcend the prospects for hegemonial war of strategic standoff and seek a fundamental realignment of their relations, in a manner similar to the realignment in relations between the United States and the People’s Republic of China during Richard Nixon’s tenure in the White House. We further argue that such a fundamental realignment of US-Iranian relations can only be achieved through a comprehensive rapprochement between Washington and Tehran.”


For a fuller explanation of the Leveretts' U.S. policy advocacy towards the Islamic Republic of Iran, click HERE: