Saddam’s tomb demolished during Battle of Tikrit

Above: Iraqi soldiers before rubble that was once Saddam Hussein's tomb

According to the Associated Press:

The tomb of Iraq's late dictator Saddam Hussein was virtually leveled in heavy clashes between militants from the Islamic State group and Iraqi forces in a fight for control of the city of Tikrit.

[…]

Poster-sized pictures of Saddam, which once covered the mausoleum, are now nowhere to be seen amid the mountains of concrete rubble. Instead, Shiite militia flags and photos of militia leaders mark the predominantly Sunni village, including that of Maj. Gen. Qassem Soleimani, the powerful Iranian general advising Iraqi Shiite militias on the battlefield.

[…]

"This is one of the areas where IS militants massed the most because Saddam's grave is here," said Captain Yasser Nu'ma, an official with the Shiite militias, formerly known as the Popular Mobilization Forces. "The IS militants' set an ambush for us by planting bombs around" the tomb.

[…]

The Islamic State group claimed in August that Saddam's tomb had been completely destroyed, but local officials said it was just ransacked and burned, but suffered only minor damage.

[…]

Iraqi media reported last year that Saddam's body was removed by loyalists amid fears that it would be disturbed in the fighting. The body's location is not known.

COMMENTARY: Photos of the demolished tomb are indicative of  ISIL's tactic of wiring structures with explosives, to serve as traps against assaulting infantry. Saddam's tomb could be considered within the category of a large booby-trap.

Depending upon the lengths to which ISIL has wired Tikrit with explosives, in ways such action can be compared in severity to the wartime demolition of Kiev by NKVD engineers in 1941.

Above: very recent image of IRGC-QF Commander Maj. Gen. Qassem Soleimani, amid Iraqi Army regulars, HMMWVs and in the distance possibly an Iraqi Army T-72 main battle tank.

A Long Bloody War

Review of 'The Iran-Iraq War: A Military and Strategic History' by Williamson Murray and William M. Woods.

by Paul Iddon

Saddam Hussein in the 1980's. / Public Domain.

In a post-war study to evaluate the eight-year war Iran fought with its neighbour Iraq the following was written in order to explain why the initial counter-offensive Iran mounted against Iraq in the summer of 1982, shortly after Iraq withdrew from Iranian territory, was a dismal failure,

“… the enemy [Iraq] was fighting in their own land and naturally they were familiar with the area … [T]he enemy, by retreating to its borders, in fact deepened and thickened its defensive line and reached a stronger defensive posture. In addition to this, they prepared themselves to fight against the invasion of infantry forces and to stop and control the invading waves.”

Another Iranian history written up around 1988 comes to similar conclusions and proclaims that,

“On the third and fourth year of the war, based on the lessons they [the Iraqis] had learned in the battlefield, the Iraqis decided to employ new tactics and reorganized their forces to meet the new method of [our] operations. For us, confronting the 'new' enemy required new planning and different tactics, if we were to preclude a stalemate.”

Yet another more recent history (Steven R. Ward's 'Immortal: A Military History of Iran and Its Armed Forces') sums up the failure of that disastrous period much more succinctly when it summed up Iran's strategy, or lack thereof, as being the equivalent of using “a hammer to destroy an anvil.”

All of the above is quoted in Williamson Murray and William M. Woods' new history of the Iran-Iraq War 'The Iran-Iraq War: A Military and Strategic History' which was recently published by Cambridge University Press. The book is one of three which explore in-depth the perspective from the former Saddam Hussein regime during the major conflicts it was engaged in throughout its tyrannical reign. What makes it unique as a history of the period is the fact that it is based almost entirely around Baghdad's point-of-view as revealed by the documents produced by the Iraqi regime at that time which were secured after the overthrow of the Saddam Hussein regime in 2003. While it doesn't reveal much new about the Iranian perspective during the war it is nonetheless an important addition to our understanding of that war.

In relation to that aforementioned pivotal moment in the course of the war, that point in mid-1982 when Iran went on the offensive against Iraq after its liberation of Khuzestan, the authors sum up very well the failure of the Khomeini regime to adequately prepare an efficient and thorough counter-offensive – which of course enabled the Iraqi regime to solidify its hold on power as well as kill thousands of young ill-trained and ill-equipped Iranian youths who were sent directly into the killing fields which were Iraq's well prepared defenses,

'Tehran came increasingly to rely on low-technological military, which resulted in a military force largely consisting of limited mobility infantry armed with light weapons, rather than on a combined-arms manoeuvre force. In the end, relying on human-wave attacks was of little use in a stand-up fight against Iraqi forces equipped with superior technology and heavy weapons and with some ability to coordinate combined arms. Thus, the direction Iranian mobilization ended up in minimizing the potential that the remnants of the Shah's army might have represented the mobilization of a new, and effective military.'

On the whole the book can be slow to move along at times. This isn't to say that the book is tediously written, it likely derives from the account being true to the nature of that lengthy war as opposed to the books narrative style. The Iran Iraq War was after all the longest conventional war in the twentieth century yet one of the most scantly documented ones. Which is what makes histories which encompass hitherto unrevealed sources like this one does important to our understanding and comprehension of that conflict.

Iraqi documents in general reveal that the Saddam Hussein regime was just as conspiratorial and warped as his public pronouncements indicated. Saddam's misjudgements were often severe and since those who knew better feared him many of Iraq's most important decisions were made according to his many simplistic whims. One document refers to his discussion of the situation in Iran in February 1979. On that occasion he proclaimed Iran to be, “a big country of five nations, bordered by the Soviet Union. [It] has oil and has built a lot of big facilities, but big only because there is a difference between something big in size and the quality of its size. I equate this, my comrades, to a hunter who shoots the wing of a rock-dove with one bullet. It is not the bullet that kills the [bird] but it is [its] fall on the ground that kills it; that is its weight that was its affliction in this situation.”

Noting the clear similarity to his mentality later when he defied the international community in 1990 by annexing Kuwait the authors quote Saddam discussing the reason that Iraq decided to withdraw from Iran in June 1982,

“We did not withdraw because of the enemy, but because we wanted to provide a psychological cover for our army. I swear to God, if the whole world wanted us to withdraw, we would never have withdrawn and would have stayed there and [fought] the enemy the same way, but because of some losses our army suffered we decided to withdraw.”

Ever mindful of the Israelis conspiring against them official Iraqi memorandums often forwarded very conspiratorial assessments. For instance in October 1981 when the Iranians launched an air raid on an oil facility in Kuwait the Iraqi regime officially speculated that this attack was carried out as a broader conspiracy in order to pressure the United States Congress to approve the then controversial sale of sophisticated AWACS planes to Saudi Arabia. While it is still not known precisely why the Iranians launched that strike (unclear mysteries like this make one yearn for a day when historians can have unfettered access to Iran's documentary records from this period) they speculate within reason that it was likely to warn off a then important financier of the Iraqi aggressor.

The authors don't discuss much the US aiding and abetting of the Iraqi regime during this time. In a footnote they speculate that while the support of Saddam clearly went against many of America's stated principles it was more likely than not grounded primarily in a Cold War realpolitik oriented worldview. They also refer to a document from the Iraqis which demonstrate just how unspecific the nature of the intelligence the Iraqis were receiving from US sources were. One handwritten note on a document which warned the Iraqis of a coming Iranian offensive against their forces in Iran in 1981 outlines that important data missing from the report include elementary things like, “the nature of the new [upcoming] military attack, the size, the location whether [it will take place in the] north, south, or the middle” of the 800-mile front both countries were fighting on.

In many accounts of the conflict the war in the air has often been overlooked. This book however discusses at considerable length the abject failure of the Iraqis to enact a Six Day War opening salvo to take out the Iranian Air Force in September 1980. The authors also refer to the fact that the Iranian Air Force played a prominent role in defending Iran and various Iranian assets during the war. I mention this for the simple reason that claims made by General Azarbarzin that Iran's F-14 fleet was briefly flown out of the country to have their AIM-54 Phoenix missiles dismounted has led many to conclude that Iranian F-14s only served as mini-AWACS units throughout the war. The work of authors Tom Cooper and Farzad Bishop however dispute that. They have referred to numerous cases of Iranian F-14s using their Phoenix missiles with resounding success against Iraqi planes throughout the course of the war. Their work is referenced in footnotes many times throughout this book when the aerial dimension of that war is discussed.

In 1981 when the Iranians attempted to disable the Iraqi Osirak reactor with their F-4 Phantom jets Iraq's air defense failed to react to their attack. Iraqi documents reveal that after the attack the Iraqis weren't even sure if the aircraft covering them were F-14s or F-16s – the latter of which would have likely signaled direct Israeli cooperation in that raid. The book recounts that one senior Iraqi military adviser suggested that the Iranians may possibly have misled Iraq's air defense by painting their planes with Iraqi air force markings. This led the minister of defense to remark, “Tell them … a MiG does not look like a Phantom.”

Interestingly during the wars “War of the Cities” phase the Iraqi Air Force attempted to target Iranian Scud launchers. The authors rightfully point out that such missions had no more success than the ones the American-led coalition would launch against Iraq's own Scud batteries during the course of the proceeding 1991 Persian Gulf War. Perversely enough the Iraqis inexplicably claimed around that time when the first Iranian missiles hit Baghdad that the explosions were in fact car bombs being set off by “Iranian terrorists”, a claim they would later retract due to the fact it brought into serious question Iraq's stability and internal security.

Another noteworthy memorandum referred to in the book is one which shows that when discussing where to fire their missiles the Iraqis took into account the populations of the areas they were targeting as well as their racial make-up. The memorandum they quote outlined how R-17 missiles should be fired at the following targets whose details were given as follows,

• Ahvaz (489,000) 90% Arab, 5% Persian, and 5% Lur.

• Khurram Abad (515,361) 90% Lur, 5% Kurd, 5% Persian

• Nahawind (119,255) 80% Persian, 10% Kurd, 10% Turk

• Masjid Sulayman (179,000) 85% Persian, 10% Arab, 5% Lur

• Khorramshahr (562,334) 90% Shi'a Kurd, 10% Persian

• Brujard (231,834) 90% Lur, 10% Turk

One quivers at the thought of what may have happened Iranian urban centers had Saddam Hussein acquired more sophisticated and destructive weapons to unleash upon Iran. Even early on in the war, 1981, he discussed casually the possibility of flooding Tehran by destroying the dams to its north. 

War aside the book gives us a good surmise of both Iraq and Iran's history in the run-up to the war. Even though the book is about the war purely from the Iraqi perspective the authors nevertheless demonstrate that they are quite knowledgeable when it comes to their understanding of Iran and its modern history. Writing about on the manner in which the Iranian heartland itself has been naturally shielded by mountainous terrain from invasions – in a manner not unlike how the vastness of Russia has seen to wanton conquerors perish and fail – over the years the authors quote the leader of an Indian Army division into Iran in 1941 named Lord Slim who noted amongst other things he experienced in Iran that,

“The road to Kermanshah which we must follow rose sharply into the mouth of the pass and, climbing in curves and loops, vanished among cliffs and gorges to emerge, three thousand feet higher … It looks as if a handful of men could hold it against an army many times the size of mine.”

Regarding recent history many of the documents reveal a lot about the Ba'athists preoccupation with eventually confronting Israel. However what the book is also worth reading for is the history it gives of the fallout between the Hussein regime and the Assad regime in Syria. In January 1981 Saddam Hussein discussed the prospect of Iraq and Syria forming a singular unified Baathist polity not unlike the failed Nasser-era "United Arab Republic" between Egypt and Syria. Saddam contended that the Arab nations collectively constituted a proverbial tent with Iraq representing the only "central post" and Saddam by extension the sole leader of the Arab nation as a whole. As he said himself late in 1979 as far as he was concerned with Syria's Hafez al-Assad "it is either collision or merger. There is no middle ground in this matter."

The Baath rivalry between the two Arab states is referenced a few times throughout in the book. On one noteworthy occasion Saddam's general disdain for the lack of action of other Arab countries saw the Iraqi dictator furiously respond to Syrian claims that they were merely waiting for Iraq to join them so they could go on and destroy the State of Israel together. Declaring the Assad regime to be little more than “liars, crooks and cowards and worriers” Saddam reiterated an old Iraqi proverb which says the Iraqis would “show up so fast that our heads would arrive before our feet” in response to any call to confront the Israelis.

Late in the war Hussein also asserted that,

“As far as the war, we do not need Hafez al-Assad … to fight with us. He cannot fight and he does not want to fight, and even if he is willing to fight, he is incapable of fighting, because this war only Iraqis will handle it. We do not need him for the war … I hope this day will never come, wherein I have to shake al-Assad's dirty hand, with the blood of Iraqis on it.”

The book briefly notes that King Hussein of Jordan attempted to reconcile the Baghdad and Damascus regimes in 1986 and even, with Soviet assistance, got Assad and Saddam to meeting in western Iraq in April the following year. However it was clear that heavy investment by Iran into Syria's economy ensured that alliance remained bought. As it essentially does to the present day.

What is more interesting however is what Saddam was more cautious about around that time. And that was the winds of change that were evident even then. The rise of a particular brand of Islamist politics saw Saddam take a more cooler and level-headed, by his standards, approach. Documents demonstrate that he saw an opportunity to utilize such fervor to his advantage since such a current was “not only directed against the Ba'ath … it is directed towards the prevalent circumstances in the Arab world, which no one is satisfied with.”

In short The Iran-Iraq War: A Military and Strategic History is a good addition to other books already available on the subject. However in and of itself it is not a thorough account of the entire war and wouldn't be an appropriate book on its own if one is seeking to garner a broad overview of the wars events and its numerous nuances and complexities – especially whereby ordinary people on both sides and their experiences are concerned. It is nevertheless a must-read for anyone who wants to understand the war in detail as it gives us a very valuable and unique insight into the inner-workings and machinations of one of the regimes engaged in that very bloody and very costly and lengthy war.

1998 report: Clinton administration had no problem with Iran intervening in Iraq

Al-Kadhimiya Mosque in 1998 (AP Photo/Murad Sezer)

Noteworthy in light of the speculation and analysis's regarding Iranian intervention in Iraq today is this November 20 1998 newspaper report which reminds us that back in 1998 the United States openly declared that it had no problem if Iran would intervene to assist the then oppressed Shiite majority there.

Of course today a considerable amount of the controversy in Iraq stems from the fact that many Sunnis feel marginalized in the political process under the present Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki. Nevertheless one mustn't readily forget those days when the Shia were marginalized by the Tikriti mafia clan which ruled Iraq for decades.

The 1998 Associated Press report quotes then State Department spokesman James P. Rubin outlining how, "We are not going to complain about any effort Iran makes to assist Shiites or others suffering under Saddam's rule. But we are not working with them [the Iranians] in any shape or form or soliciting their support."

Those comments were also made when there was a considerable thaw in post-1979 Iran-U.S. relations. While the report stresses the fact that the U.S. maintained Iran and Saddam's Iraq were sponsors of terrorism the Clinton administration was nevertheless interested in the potential prospects for change the considerably more moderate tone coming from Tehran under then President Khatami could present.

Similarly today we have a president in Tehran who promulgates a more moderate policy and says he seeks a more productive relationship between Tehran and Washington. Indeed it was this president who only yesterday suggested that Iran may intervene in Iraq in order to protect Shiite shrines there. A statement that can be interpreted as a possible plan for direct military intervention into Iraq against ISIS.

Contrary to the inaccurate statement frequently repeated by numerous media outlets reporting on the possibility of American/Iranian cooperation in Iraq today such cooperation in the post-1979 era would certainly not be "unprecedented", as the Herat campaign of November 2001 clearly proves.

Egyptian Field Marshal Abdul-Halim Abu Ghazalah on the Combat Tactics and Strategy of the Iran-Iraq War (Part 3)

A response to a book review penned by Youssef Aboul-Enein, Andrew Bertrand and Dorothy Corley at SWJ 


by Mark Pyruz 

The following is a response to part 3 of a book review on Egyptian Field Marshal Abdul-Halim Abu Ghazalah's "Combat Tactics and Strategy of the Iran-Iraq War" put forward by Youssef Aboul-Enein, Andrew Bertrand and Dorothy Corley, recently published in three parts by Small Wars Journal. (See HERE, HERE and HERE.) This writer's response to Part 1 can be found HERE and Part 2 found HERE. Let us proceed with Part 3 (reviewers passages in blue, this writer's responses in black).

"The vicious cycle of Iranian wave assaults continued after February 1983, but not to the level of Operation Fajr al-Nasr, or of the massive Iranian assaults of 1982. At this stage Iraqi weapon imports were three times higher than those of Iran, and Baghdad fielded an upgraded Soviet T-72 tank. Iraq’s most important acquisition during this period was the French Dassault F-1 Mirage fighter, equipped with the Exocet air-to-surface missiles and air-to-air missiles. Iraq also acquired French Aerospatiale Super Frelon attack helicopters, enabling it to far surpass the Iranian Soviet fighters. This air capability enabled Iraq to initiate the infamous tanker wars." 

"By this stage of the war, the Iranian air force had lost 80 warplanes, while the Iraqi air force had lost 55 warplanes; some of the losses were due to poor maintenance and pilots inexperienced at navigating to target. To replace these losses Iraq, beginning in 1983, acquired over 300 fixed wing warplanes to include: 


09 TU-2
08 Illyushin bombers 
70 Sukhoi-7, 17 and 20 fighter-bombers
12 British Hunter-Hawkers
14 MIG-25 fighters
40 MIG-19 fighters
70 MIG-21 fighters
30 French Mirage F-1 fighters"

"The above list shows the impact access to arms and credit, as well as grants from Arab Gulf States, had in resupplying Iraq with quantity and quality arms compared to Iran. Of the 400 operational military aircraft Iran possessed under the Shah until the 1979 revolution, only 70 remained operational by 1983. Due to lack of access to arms, funding, and replacement parts, to name a few, Iranian tactics were limited to mass offensives, including those known as the Fee Fajr (At Dawn) offensives."

This writer believes the reviewers are referring to the five Super Etendards equipped with AM 39 Exocet missiles, leased to Iraq and not the Dassault F-1 Mirage fighter. Also, "Iranian Soviet fighters" appears to be a typo for which a correction can not be offered. During this time, Islamic Republic of Iran Air Force (IRIAF) American made F-14s and F-4 were operating and remained superior to Iraq Air Force (IrAF) fighters, as well as previously acquired American training providing a superior level of combat skill. Also, during this general time period, the IRIAF was able to provide 100+ missions a day, with the aid of clandestine American and Israeli parts deliveries. However, attrition was taking its toll, particularly with IRIAF F-4s and F-5s. Iraq losses were far higher than 55 airplanes. The above list also contains another typo, and should read "TU-22". It should also include the Super Etendards previously mentioned.

"Before 1983 closed, the Iranians began to entertain the option of abandoning human wave attacks on defended Iraqi positions. Iran considered splitting the mass formations of human wave attacks into smaller units to insert behind Iraqi lines. However, these Iranian harassing units were unable to create a breach for a main Iranian assault force to exploit, due to an almost complete absence of command and control. Even if they had, the reaction time of the main Iranian assault force was so slow that they still likely could not have exploited a breach. This inability to react allowed the Iraqis to conduct air strikes and annihilate the Iranian assault force. However, Iraq could never envelope the Iranians and considered their mission accomplished once the Iranians had retreated. Iran possessed only a third of what was required to equip 600,000 regular troops. For instance, this force had only 1,000 armored personnel carriers (APC) and 340 Soviet and North Korean tanks to support it." 

A word on Iranian "human wave attacks", per Farzad Bishop:

"The Iranian 'human wave' strategy was different from WWI times in that attempts were made to incorporate at least one element of surprise in every offensive. If that element of surprise (often either in tactics or in geography) had held on (which didn't happen often), it meant the offensive was successful at least in gaining and keeping a bridgehead, and in limiting the casualties. If it didn't, it usually ended up in catastrophe. If we use the 'human wave' term for frontal assaults by lightly armed infantry units against a heavily armed, dogged in and fortified enemy, this was exactly what happened in many cases. [A] great deal of effort was made to make the first wave as surprising as possible - by staging flanking manoeuvres, diversionary assaults, the use of deception, pinning down artillery fire, frogmen, landing troops behind enemy lines by helicopters (Kheibar), etc. Some of these tactics were ingenious, and others [overly] ambitious and short-sighted. "

"After the Fee Fajr series of operations, Iraq decided to widen the war by attacking oil tankers originating from and bound for Iran." 

Iraq's tanker war against Iran generally lacked effectiveness until such times where the United States Navy provided targeting information to the IrAF. There were other times in the conflict where the U.S. military assisted Iraq, such as very early in the conflict where detailed mapping of the American supplied IRIAF SAM network, which encompassed the American built I-HAWK, were furnished to Iraq. Later, the USN became an active belligerent in the conflict, downing an Iran civilian airliner and knocking out the Iran Navy merchant convoy escort fleet in 1988. For unknown reasons, the reviewers have omitted U.S. military involvement in the conflict, as well as clandestine U.S. and Israeli weapon transfers to Iran during the war.

"Throughout February 1984, Iranians reconnoitered the southern rivers and developed a series of combined helo and river operations called Fatima al-Zahra (after Prophet Muhammad’s daughter and mother of Hussein). Regiments of the 3rd Iraqi Army Corps were isolated from the main body, which allowed Iran to strengthen its hold of Majnoon Island and capture Baida Island. In response, the Iraqis ran live electric cables throughout the marshes to electrocute Iranian forces, and subsequently displayed the Iranian corpses on Iraqi television."

Sources have identified the "electrocution tactics" story as Iraqi wartime propaganda.  The Iranians enjoyed limited success in areas where Iraqi superiority in armor and CAS could not be utilized, particularly in marshland but also in mountainous terrain.

"Throughout 1984 and 1985, the Iranian General Staff attempted to develop alternate tactics to the direct offensive assault, and focused on ways to take the war into an attritional phase. Arguments ensued between the generals and clergy on the need for better training and organization. Iranian combat leaders disputed the folly of holding symbolic ground in Iran and Iraq with no strategic value, and that holding such territory drained the main offensive efforts by siphoning off needed manpower and materiel." 

It should be pointed out that unlike Iraq, Iran never committed itself to a total war against Iraq. More on this later.

"In November 1985, cease-fire talks between Iraq and the Kurds collapsed, which provided Iran with an opening to further exploit the Kurds as a proxy army." 

This writer believes the use of the term "proxy army" to be inaccurate. For example, nowhere does the term apply to historical studies of Montagnard forces allied with the United States military in Vietnam, or Yugoslav armed elements allied with the British during World War II. A better classification would be "allies" in countering Baathist-Iraq.

"Operation Fee Fajr 8 was an attempt to capture the Faw Peninsula, and to deprive Iraq access to the Persian Gulf. From this peninsula, Iran could develop a northerly attack towards Basra, spark and nurture Shiite uprisings in the south, and strike a blow to Iraqi oil production." 

Like Iraq during the initial offensive, where Saddam was expecting the Arab minority to rise up against Iran in Khuzestan, so too the Iranian leadership expected the Shia underclass in Basra to ride up against the Baathist regime with the onset of Iranian forces approaching the city with the intent of capture. It didn't happen. Different circumstances during OIF and a more indirect, clandestine approach by the Iranians ultimately provided Iran with its intended results which had been frustrated during the Iran-Iraq war. More on this later.

"Iran did gain 200 square kilometers of Iraqi territory, kept its pontoon bridge over the Shatt al-Arab Waterway, and was able to shuttle supplies and troops into the Faw Peninsula via regular watercraft." 

For some reason the extensive Iranian engineering efforts at this point are omitted by the reviewers. According to Iraqi Lt. Gen. Al-Hamdani, in his memoirs and interviews, these Iranian efforts greatly impressed Iraqi and foreign military observers, alike.

"In April 1986, Ayatollah Khomeini issued a fatwa calling for victory by the Islamic New Year (late March 1987). Plans were crafted to recruit 500 battalions of 1,000 men each. It was during this declaration that policy disagreements erupted between Ayatollah Khomeini and Ayatollah Rasfanjani, as well as between those in the regular armed forces and the IRGC. The regular army wanted to develop more intelligent combat techniques, while the IRGC wanted to continue to employ human wave attacks." 

There was friction and disagreement between the Atresh (regular armed forces) and IRGC, but simply referring to the IRGC position as insisting on "human wave" tactics is misleading.

"Iraq launched air assaults on Tabriz/Lafan Petroleum Plant, Kharj Island Oil Terminal, and Larak Island Oil Terminal." 

The IrAF was able to achieve some success with these raids, due in large part to USN targeting assistance. But they suffered heavy losses in the process.

"Iraq concentrated artillery fire, heavy machine gunfire and airstrikes, resulting in 60,000 Iranian casualties compared to 9,500 Iraqi casualties."

Iraqi casualties were much higher (but not as high as Iranian losses), as candidly admitted by Iraqi Army Lt. Gen. Hamdani.

"Karbala-5 and 6 was a renewed attempt at enveloping Basra and isolating the city from the rest of Iraq. It was believed that the city could be transformed into an independent Shiite capital to compete with Baghdad."

It's interesting that during periods of the U.S. and British military occupation in Iraq, during OIF, the Iranians actually succeeded with a modification of this strategy in Basra; establishing it as Shia-Iraqi/Iranian bastion, in assisting with the ultimate Shia conquest of Baghdad which continues to this day.

"This shook Iranian confidence concerning the safety of their oil imports in southern installations near the Hormuz Strait. Iran reacted by firing Type-72 Chinese missiles at several Iraqi cities. In 1986, nineteen of these Iranian missiles were fired, and one year later the number was increased to eighty-one, and in 1988 one hundred and four missiles were directed at Iraqi cities." 

This narrative is incorrect. Iran "absorbed" Iraqi missile attacks against its population centers until such time where retaliation could no longer be held back. As with the so-called "Tanker War," Iran ultimately was forced to retaliate in kind, firing Scud-B and Hwasong-5 type SSMs. Interestingly enough, due to the personal intervention of Imam Khomeini, the Iranians did not resort to retaliating in kind to Iraqi chemical weapon attacks, which became truly massive during the final stages of the conflict. This may have a current analog with Leader Khamenei's moral repudiation against nuclear weapons.

"The question of who won the war was contingent on outside interference and support, as Iraq craved advanced weapons that could deliver higher kill rates, while Iran desired weapons that could capitalize on their advantage in human resources." 

This is misleading. The Iranians had nowhere near the access to weapon imports that were being afforded to Iraq, as well as the massive financial backing being provided which was instrumental in establishing Saddam's Republican Guard force. For some reason, the significance of the Republican Guard is not referred to by reviewers Youssef Aboul-Enein, Andrew Bertrand and Dorothy Corley.

"Even Saddam underestimated the revolutionary fervor of the Iranian regime and their use of Shiite ideology to create one of the largest and most tragic and tactically pointless human wave assaults in the history of warfare." 

Here in the West, this is a popular simplification and misconception of Iran's war from 1980-1988. Even Iraqi Lt. Gen. Hamdani candidly points to the successful use of Iranian infiltration tactics and strategies of multiple axes of attack on alternating fronts.

"In the introduction to Iran, Iraq, and the Legacies of War, Lawrence G Potter and Gary G. Sick observe that, “the Persian Gulf states, and indeed the entire Middle East, were profoundly affected by the Iran-Iraq War…and its sequels, the Gulf War of 1990-91 and the war against Iraq in 2003'." 

The 1991 Gulf War was a direct consequence of the Iran-Iraq war. Saddam's Iraq had sustained massive losses, and was suffering from social and economic woes. Two factors in particular entered Saddam's calculations  in invading Iraq:

1) Iraq's inability to repay billon of dollars in loans afforded by Arab Gulf states, while the country was now in debt to the tune of $80 billion. The economic situation was dire, with reconstruction estimates placed at $230 billion.

2) Iraq possessed a massive military machine that had been built up with Western and Soviet assistance, to which a partial demobilization had backfired as the shaky Iraqi economy proved unable to absorb the huge numbers of young men pouring into the labor market (see The Iran-Iraq War by Efraim Karsh, pg. 87).

Following these direct consequences of the Iran-Iraq War, Saddam misinterpreted the mild response of the U.S. Ambassador to Iraq, April Gilepsie, to his threats of invading Iraq, and attacked Iraq on August 2, 1990.

For it's part, Iran did not commit to a total war in the conflict and had relied primarily on highly motivated volunteers for its war fighting. Thus it did not encounter the dire situation experienced in Iraq, with Saddam's regime survival greatly under threat.

The incomplete Coalition victory of the ensuing Gulf War against Iraq led to the eventual confict known as OIF. It is interesting to note that as a direct consequence of the American led invasion of Iraq in 2003 and its troubled military occupation, the Iranians were able to realize their highest war aims of the Iran-Iraq War, such as the removal of Saddam and the Baathist state from power, the generating of a Shia dominant regime in Iraq, access to the holy cities in Iraq and the creation of extremely close if not tied relations between the two countries. It can be argued that these latent developments rendered Iran the ultimate victor of the Iran-Iraq war.

"Field Marshal Abdel-Halim Abu Ghazalah’s book is regarded as the most thorough and accurate Arab account of the Iran-Iraq war, and can provide interesting insights and contrasts when compared with English works on the subject."

This writer believes Iraqi Lt. Gen Hamdani and Brig. Gen Sadik to be better references (admittedly estimating Ghazalah solely as depicted by reviewers Youssef Aboul-Enein, Andrew Bertrand and Dorothy Corley).

"When evaluating the possible consequences of preemptive military action against Iran, it is crucial that U.S. military personnel reflect on Iran’s past military confrontations, such as the Iran-Iraq War." 

This writer believes the most poignant lessons to be gleaned from the Iran-Iraq war are:

1) Iran's ability to garner huge numbers of highly motivated human resources to fight a war it perceives as just. Furthermore, these resources appear resilient for the most part of an extended conflict, against seemingly overwhelming odds.

2) The Iranians are masters of improvisation, in both technical terms and tactics intended to offset their disadvantages in war material.

However, this writer believes the actual tactics and strategies employed by Iran's military during the Iran-Iraq war to be dated. The Iranian military of today, particularly the IRGC force, is different than it was from 1980-88. It is more powerful, better organized and better trained. More useful to U.S. military planners would be to study the tactics of Hezbollah during the 33-Day War in Lebanon, and apply these lessons to Iran's current military capabilities and its Mosaic doctrine. Emphasis should be placed on the economic effects of a rocket artillery campaign (applying them to Iran's SSMs), the use of AShMs, as well as the determination and resiliency of defenders under attack or occupation. It must be understood that Iran's military planners have surely gleaned much from the 33-Day war, as well as the successes of the Iraqi insurgency against American forces during OIF.

Two Different Wars: Iran and Iraq Wars of 1980s

There has been certain curious terminology from both the Western world and Iran over the eight year war with Iraq back in the 1980's, the two most common terms relating to this war are the Imposed War (usually used by Iranians) and the Iran Iraq War (usually used by Westerners).

The Imposed War is more of a local name for the war since Iraq started it on September 22nd 1980 when the Iraqi Air Force bombed several targets deep within Iran including Mehrabad Airport in Tehran.



Saddam Hussein had many fears that his place in power would be jeopardized if the Ayatollah Khomeini exported his revolution to the oppressed Shi'ites majority of Iraq, so he launched nine divisions of the Iraqi Army into the oil fields of Southern Iran on September 22nd 1980.



He believing Iran was still weak and unorganized following the Islamic Revolution and had openly boasted his army would reach Tehran in three days, however the Iraqi Air Force had failed to wipe out the Iranian Air Force on the ground and the Iranians launched Operation Kaman 99 about a day later striking Baghdad.

Iraq's invasion solidified Iran's revolution and tens of thousands of volunteers rushed to the front lines to fight the Iraqis, RPG armed revolutionary guards halted the onslaught of Iraqi Armour and by 1982 after liberating Khorramshahr from the Iraqis an Iranian offensive against Iraq would soon be launched.



Not long afterwords Saddam decided to withdraw his army completely from Iran, and deployed them on the international border between Iran and Iraq, believing his army being demoralized after the war would still be able to hold a line of defense on the Iraqi side of the border.

Saddam suggested that Iran should stop the fighting and accept a ceasefire and instead send troops to fight with the Palestinians in Lebanon against the Israelis which had invaded the same year, this offer however through emotional purposes was rejected and Ayatollah Khomeini made plans to remove Saddam from power in Iraq seeing him as a threat.

The war which followed from 1982 towards 1988 would see Iran on the offensive, however it was forced to end the war in 1988 to which Ayatollah Khomeini famously compared to drinking a chalice of poison.

Saddam had called the war the Whirlwind War, in the US it is commonly referred to as the First Persian Gulf War.

However looking at it from a more open viewpoint there were clearly two wars that were fought.

1. The Imposed War/Iraq-Iran War (1980-1982)
This was the war that started on September 22nd 1980 when Iraq preemptively attacked and proceeded to invade Iran. An attack which the United Nations failed to condemn Iraq for.



2. The Iran Iraq War (1982-1988)
The Iranian counter offensive which saw the Iran pitted against the Iraq in violent trench wars and several human wave attacks against cities such as Basra.

Iran was forced to give up this war since it didn't have enough military hardware to keep the war going and to defeat the Iraqis, also a million men had been lost in eight years and Iran was forced to accept a ceasefire.

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Although from an Iranian viewpoint it has a lot to be bitter for, a million people were killed in the war many of them very young, and along with that was the fact that the United States, France and several other countries armed Iraq before the tide of war turned in 1982, even though the US briefly switched sides in 1985 in the infamous Iran Contra Affair.

The fact remains that for the damage caused on Iran by Iraq one would want to get revenge for the horrors inflicted!

However a broad and neutral view of the whole thing shows as I said two separate wars.