Another way to assess Iran's support of Assad

by Paul Iddon

Many detractors of former U.S. President Jimmy Carter lambaste him for leaving a former ally of the United States, the last Shah of Iran Mohammed Reza Pahlavi, fly around the world in exile without a country in which to take refuge. As Ronald Reagan put it during the 1980 presidential campaign, the Shah was a “stalwart ally” of the United States in that region and did its “bidding” there. Not assisting him or giving him refuge when he went into exile Reagan believed was “a blot” on America's record.

When the Shah died in 1981 former U.S. President Richard Nixon, a friend of the Shah, attended his funeral in Cairo wherein he called the Shah's treatment by the U.S. in exile as “shameful”, since it had “turned its back on one of its friends.” He too believed it had been a mistake not to assist that former American ally. After all, the Shah was an autocrat who he had helped elevate to be become a major regional power during his presidency as part of his administration's Nixon Doctrine.

Both these now deceased former American presidents voiced their view that even after the Shah had fallen the U.S. should not of snubbed him after he having had, in Reagan's words, “carried our load” for so long in the region they believed it was only right that they stand by their friend and ally until the end.

I'm often reminded of that episode of history when I see the lengths to which the current regime in Iran is going to prop-up the regime in Syria of President Bashar al-Assad. Yes, Assad is a strategically important ally and his fall would undermine Iran's strategic interests in the region vis-a-vis Hezbollah in Lebanon. But at the same time there is a much more personal component to the support Damascus has been receiving from Tehran given the fact that it was the Assad regime in Syria which had given decisive assistance to Iran during its brutal eight-year war with Saddam Hussein's Iraq.

The fostering of the Tehran-Damascus alliance came at a time when the help Iran got from the outside world during that war was extremely limited. Even after Iraq began to use chemical weapons on the battlefield. Many in the Iranian regimes Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) paramilitary still remember the help Syria gave them at a crucial and critical time for them shortly after their inception and see their support of the Assad regime today as one way to repay that support. Which is one reason why IRGC forces are also being sent to Syria to ensure Damascus and the remaining parts of the country Assad still retains remain under his control -- and possibly even to help him undertake an offensive aimed at retaking Idlib Province.

As the Shah had held the fort for Washington for so long in the Persian Gulf region so too did Assad for Iran in the Levant. And many in the establishment in Iran feel that another reason Assad should be supported when his rule is being directly threatened.

The comparison is obviously highly imperfect in many respects. After all, there have been weeks in Syria in the last four years whereby the Assad regime killed and tortured to death more people than the last Shah did during the entirety of his lengthy 38-year reign. Additionally, the last Shah did not authorize the bombing of his own country's cities like Assad did. And while the primary reason Tehran has sacrificed blood and treasure in keeping Assad in power is indeed strategic there is also that more personal component to this support which shouldn't be readily forgotten. Assad may well be a mass-murdering bastard, but it's worth remembering that from Tehran's point-of-view he is – as was Somoza to Washington once-upon-a-time – their bastard. 

"Degrading and defeating" ISIS will require "boots on the ground"

 by Paul Iddon

A recently proposed strategy published by the 'Institute for the Study of War' offers what is bound to be a controversial solution to the threat posed by Islamic State (IS, referred to herein as 'ISIS') which insists that any feasible military solution will indeed require the deployment of American ground forces in Iraq and Syria.

Written by Kim and Fred Kagan and Jessica Lewis 'A Strategy to Defeat The Islamic State' proposes many potential steps the United States can take to address ISIS. Fred Kagan is of course one of the chief intellectuals involved in devising the troop surge implemented in Iraq which did help bring some semblance of stability to that country before the U.S. withdrawal in late 2011. That fact in and of itself makes this strategy well worth understanding, evaluating and of course critiquing.

From the get-go the authors make it clear that their proposed strategy for defeating ISIS will require an insertion of ground forces. As many as 25,000 in fact which they envision being made up of “special forces and special mission units.”

In essence they inform their readers that,

'The activities recommended in this paper will likely require the deployment of not more than 25,000 ground forces supported by numerous air and naval assets. The bulk of those forces will likely be comprised of various kinds of units supporting a much more limited number of special forces and other assets deployed in small groups with tribes, opposition forces, and Iraqi security forces. This plan does not envisage U.S. combat units conducting unilateral operations (apart from targeted attacks against individual enemy leaders and small groups) or leading clearing operations. It requires some combat units in the support and quick reaction force (QRF) roles.'

As for Syria broadly speaking their solution is quite straightforward. The United States should seek to take on the al-Qaeda affiliated Jabhat al-Nusra (JN), ISIS and the Assad regime. They summarize this view when they write,

'The problem in Syria is relatively easy to state, but extremely difficult to solve. The Assad regime has lost control of the majority of the territory of the Syrian state. It has violated international law on many occasions and lost its legitimacy as a member of the international community. Assad himself is the icon of atrocities, regime brutality, and sectarianism to Sunni populations in Syria and throughout the region. His actions have fueled the rise of violent Islamists, particularly ISIS and JN. U.S. strategy must ensure that none of these three actors control all or part of Syria while supporting the development of an alternative, inclusive Syrian state over time.'

A consistent theme throughout their paper is the fundamental necessity of a political solution in both Iraq and Syria coupled with a military one. Again on Syria they insist,

'The U.S. must also engage much more vigorously in efforts to develop an inclusive government-in-waiting in Syria. We must do more than trying to unify what is left of the moderate opposition. We must also reach out to the ‘Alawite community and to Syria’s other minority groups in search of potential leaders who could join forces with moderate Sunni leaders to oppose extremists on all sides.'

From the get go we're informed by the authors that their strategy may prove impossible to implement given circumstances which range from whether or not potentially friendly elements in both Iraq or Syria will cooperate with them to whether or not the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) can be effectively reformed when they inform us that,

'Even then, this strategy suffers from the high risk of failure and the near-certainty that the U.S. will suffer casualties, including at the hands of supposedly friendly forces. American troops dispersed among the Sunni population are at risk of being kidnapped. The significant anti-aircraft capabilities of ISIS put American helicopters at risk. It may turn out that the Sunni Arabs cannot or will not fight with us, finally, and that the overall strategy proposed here is infeasible. In that case, it will be necessary to abandon this strategy and reconsider our options.'

Nevertheless,

'The U.S. should adopt this strategy despite these risks. The consequences of inaction or inadequate action are evident: ISIS will retain control of much of the territory it holds, sectarian war will escalate, more foreign fighters including Americans and Europeans will cycle through the battlefield and get both trained and further radicalized, and al-Qaeda will benefit from the largest and richest safe-haven it has ever known. It is worth accepting the risks of this strategy to avoid this outcome.'

To date the authors tell us that Obama's record hasn't at all been a good one due to the fact that,

'He celebrated the regional and international partnerships that will join in the U.S.-led plan. This plan is largely a continuation of the failed counterterrorism strategy that the administration has pursued for years, and in which the threat of the Islamic State arose. The plan to lead other regional and indigenous forces in conducting an air-ground campaign to degrade and destroy ISIS in Iraq assumes conditions in the region that are no longer present. These conditions will likely cause the U.S. strategy to fail.'

Furthermore, to degrade and ultimately destroy ISIS the authors argue that the United States cannot adopt an Iraq-first, Syria-second strategy. It must engage ISIS in both countries simultaneously,

'Only military formations that cross sectarian lines will be able to challenge ISIS. This is an exceptional battlefield condition that cannot be assumed in either Iraq or Syria. Furthermore, the involvement of regional actors such as Iran, Qatar, and Saudi Arabia in the Syrian war has only increased the sectarian nature of the conflict over the last two years; their involvement in Iraq at this point may have the same effect.'

The authors continuously stress that United States policy in confronting ISIS must see to an atmosphere permeate whereby Sunnis feel empowered and are able to take a decisive stand and reject the Islamic State which has been forcibly established around them. The authors also argue that,

'Air strikes alone – which may be perceived as U.S. support to Iranian-backed Shi'a governments trying to oppress the Sunni Arabs – will not allow the U.S. to evaluate this variable and may well reduce the willingness of Sunni Arabs to join with us and, more importantly, to rejoin Iraqi and Syria. Developing a strategy that has a chance of success requires identifying the center of gravity of the overarching regional problem — the struggle within the Sunni Arab community itself amidst the collapse of state structures in the Middle East.'

Futhermore they reiterate their advocacy of U.S. approach which aims to remove Assad, JN and ISIS from the picture in Syria. The following paragraph aptly sums up why this is the position they take,

'ISIS must be defeated in Syria, and Assad must be removed from power. But a strategy that delivers Syria into the hands of Jabhat al-Nusra would be disastrous for the U.S. and its regional allies. JN is a loyal al-Qaeda affiliate and would establish an al-Qaeda state in Syria that would support the global jihadi movement. Any successful strategy for dealing with ISIS in Syria must also separate JN from the bulk of the opposition, marginalize it, and ultimately defeat it as well, while setting conditions for an inclusive post-Assad government that can prevent any al-Qaeda affiliate from re-establishing itself in Syria. This recovery of the opposition requires the removal of Assad as a necessary pre-condition for ending the Syrian war.'

Working closely with the Sunni communities they insist is essential for defeating such forces due to the fact that,

'Al-Qaeda and like-minded groups such as ISIS can only flourish in distressed Sunni communities. They attack every other religion and sect, but their bases must be in Sunni lands because their ideology is an extreme, exclusionary interpretation of Sunni Islam. Doing anything to al-Qaeda — defeating, disrupting, degrading, destroying, anything else — requires working with the overwhelming majority of the Sunni communities within which it lives and operates. Those communities have shown their distaste for the ideology and the groups that espouse it, rising up against them in Iraq, Afghanistan, Syria, Yemen, Somalia, Egypt, and almost everywhere else they have appeared, except Pakistan.'

While the Iranian dimension in all of this is not on the top of their proposed agenda it is nevertheless featured throughout. The authors repeatedly denounce the prospect of Iranian "hegemony" in the region and denounce its role of stoking "sectarian polarization."

They scathingly critique Iran's role in the region throughout the text. The following paragraph very aptly sums up their many contentions with Tehran's policies,

'Iran is the principal regional symbol of sectarianism, preferentially supports extremist Shi’a groups, and is integrating national security forces into an international structure that includes its own forces and terrorist groups. Working with Iran will have the same effect on Sunni perception as working with Assad. It may also drive our Gulf Arab allies away in the belief that the U.S. has made a permanent shift of alliances in the Middle East. Iran’s leaders and military commanders, finally, have consistently and loudly repudiated any notion of cooperating with the U.S. in Iraq.'

They also denounce the idea of coordinating with Iran in any way insisting that,

'Doing so legitimizes the presence of Iranian troops in Iraq, a principle to which the U.S. cannot accede. It would also effectively require a level of intelligence-sharing and mutual confidence that would place U.S. troops too much at the mercy of the IRGC. Lack of coordination with Iranian assets, however, can lead to accidental exchanges of fire between U.S. and Iranian troops. Such exchanges could in turn lead to escalating conflict with Iran.'

Regarding Iran's proxies and allies in Iraq the authors contend that,

'The U.S. must use the expanding leverage increased military support will give it in Baghdad to continue to shape the emerging Iraqi government to be as inclusive and non-sectarian as possible. Well-known sectarian actors and Iranian agents such as Hadi al-Amiri (Badr corps commander), Qais al-Khazali (Asa’ib Ahl al-haq leader), and Qassim al-Araji (Badr corps deputy) cannot have leading positions in the security ministries or security services if there is to be any hope of persuading Iraq’s Sunni Arabs that they are safe in the hands of the new government. Reported U.S. pressure to keep Hadi al-Amiri from getting a ministry was an important step. Continued pressure must be exerted to keep him and others like him from getting ministerial posts or otherwise obtaining de jure control over Iraq’s security services. If such individuals are given inappropriate portfolios, the U.S. should continue to exert leverage — including refusing to work with forces over which they have been given command or influence — to secure their removal.'

They also recommend the following regarding regional powers who have funded, directly and indirectly, terror groups operating in Syria,

'The U.S. should exert all possible pressure on states that are currently supporting extremists in Syria either to reorient that support to moderate forces or simply to cut it off. If prominent supporters of extremists such as Qatar refuse to change their behaviour, the U.S. should act in concert with international partners to interdict that support and consider sanctioning the offenders.'

The authors also make clear that the United States has and will likely continue to have little sway over the Hezbollah,

'Hezbollah’s deployment of thousands of troops to Syria — the first major external military expedition in its four-decade history — initially strained its support in Lebanon. The expansion of sectarian conflict and the increase in Sunni extremist operations and attacks in Lebanon, however, have rallied support around Hezbollah once again. Strengthening the Lebanese government and armed forces independent of Hezbollah — to the limited extent to which that is possible — could threaten the organization’s control sufficiently to distract it from Syria somewhat. It might even weaken Hezbollah’s position in Lebanon more fundamentally, although that prospect remains dim.'

More risk are acknowledged when they discuss the prospect of JN and ISIS working together when collectively targeted by the U.S. Again inaction is deemed worse since it,

'… would allow ISIS and JN to build up their forces independently and offers no assurance that they will not ultimately recombine in any event. The ongoing jihadi competition caused in part by the ISIS-al Qaeda rivalry, moreover, has already increased the likelihood of attempts by other al-Qaeda affiliates to attack the U.S. homeland and U.S. interests abroad. The additional spur such efforts might receive from an American intervention in Syria and Iraq would be more than balanced by depriving two of the most lethal affiliates — JN and ISIS — of large territorial sanctuaries.'

As for Iran's potential reaction to such operations,

'Iran may perceive intervention as a re-invasion to position U.S. forces to attack Iran in the event of the failure of nuclear negotiations and may respond with regional attacks. The geographic focus of U.S. efforts may provide Tehran some reassurance, since they will be focused in northern and western Iraq away from the Iranian border. But the U.S. should also consider supplying its Gulf allies with additional defensive capabilities to deter any such Iranian response or render it ineffective if deterrence fails.'

Arguing for "additional defensive capabilities" for the Gulf states may be considered heavy-handed when one takes into account the fact that these Gulf Cooperation Council members have already been sold billions-of-dollars in arms and sophisticated military hardware in the last five years alone – the 2010 arms deal to supply Saudi Arabia with fighter jets was the biggest in both America and Britain's history. 

 

All-in-all in both Iraq and Syria the authors determine that there is no wholly military solution nor a wholly political one. Any solution will have to be a delicate combination of the two, in their conclusion they state,

'A strategy that does not describe how Iraq will win Mosul back and how a legitimate government will regain control of Syria’s northern cities is not a strategy to defeat or destroy ISIS. ISIS can control those areas now in part because the populations violently oppose the Assad regime and the government in Baghdad. The formation of a new government in Iraq does not solve this problem by itself. It may superficially bandage sectarian wounds, but it may also exacerbate them, particularly if the leaders of sectarian militias receive security portfolios. There is no meaningful political discourse in Syria at the moment. And even if political accords were reached in Damascus and Baghdad, ISIS retains the ability to control subject populations through brutal terror. There is no purely political solution to these problems.'

Obviously there is no clear-cut simple solution when it comes to addressing such a complex set of problems. For the good of a detailed, open and informed debate the ideas proposed in this paper should be rigorously evaluated when it comes to determining what should be done about ISIS and what broader role, if any, the United States should play in the Middle East region in relation to this present ongoing crisis. 

Al Qaeda linked to Iran or America, both or neither?

by Mark Pyruz

Recent Canadian allegations of a terror plot by al Qaeda linked to Iran are best put forward by Bill Roggio at the Long War Journal. Bill has well established links with the United States military and does a good job of presenting our military's perspectives on Iranian moves in the Middle Eastern region and beyond. To quote Bill Roggio:

"Iran's ties to al Qaeda are well documented. In recent years, the US government has added several Iran-based al Qaeda leaders and operatives to its list of specially designated global terrorists, and even noted a "secret deal" between the Iranian government and al Qaeda." 

To read the rest of Bill's narrative (which conforms to the official U.S. narrative), click HERE.

It must be pointed out, however, objective observers have a hard time swallowing this narrative. It seems highly unlikely that the Islamic Republic of Iran would link itself with al Qaeda, an entity that is generating so much discord inside Iraq in the form of terror attacks, while at the same time arguably representing the most effective fighting force combating the Assad regime inside Syria, both countries being Iran's closest allies in the region and the world.

Furthermore, the same or similar supposed "well documented ties" between Iran and al Qaeda were also put forward in previous claims of Iran harboring Osoma bin Laden. As is well known now, Osama bin Laden was actually hiding out in Pakistan, America's security client in the GWOT, a virtual stone's throw from a Pakistani military academy. Here's President Ahmadinejad responding previously to charges put forward by George Stephanopoulos that Iran was harboring Osama bin Laden [6:30]:



Amusing when looking back on that moment, right? And the same way Ahmadinejad thought such charges a joke (even going so far as to point out by implication past "well documented" U.S. associations with what would become al Qaeda, as well as the Taliban), Iran's current foreign minister Salehi responded in similar fashion to charges that Iran is allied with al Qaeda in a recent foiled terror plot in Canada.

For their part, the Iranians also maintain a somewhat analog position toward 9/11 and official U.S. complicity in that heinous attack, in the form of putting forward their acceptance of a conspiracy theory alleging a linkage between the Bush administration and al Qaeda (no matter how that may offend our own American sensibilities on the subject, which may or may not be the intended effect). Here's Ahmadinejad making the case that 9/11 was "an inside job" at the UN:



For objective observers such as this writer, when it comes to charges and counter-charges of linkages with al Qaeda by Iran, the United States or even Canada, experience dictates that such claims be critically examined.

Deployment Hype

By Paul Iddon

The Iranian vow to deploy naval units off US shores should be ignored rather than dignified.



While discussing the deployment of additional US Navy forces to the Persian Gulf some time ago a friend of mine quipped, “imagine the media hype if say the Iranian Navy decided to deploy its warships off the San Francisco bay area!” Retrospectively he had a point, which is why I found the recent vow by Iran to send naval units to form a “powerful presence” in the Gulf of Mexico to be particularly intriguing, yet not consistent with the material and logistical realities within the Iranian Navy.

This CNN report does a good job in debunking the proselytizing hype prominent in certain reactionary circles in the US that warn of the “imminent danger” this deployment will pose to the United States. Take this article from Front Page Mag which is the epitome of the said hype (and among other things opts for a CGI rendition of a warship rather than an actual photograph of an Iranian navy ship) as it inextricably ties in this current development with other instances of the Islamic Republic “aggressively building a presence in the Western Hemisphere”, examples cited are Hezbollah setting up operations in Cuba (in light of the fact that Castro endorsed the Russian Orthodox church three years ago I wouldn't be surprised to see him now following up his new found religious indulgences by welcoming in the 'Party of God') and other Iranian proxy forces collaborating with Mexican drug lords. As well as alluding to the fact Iranian missiles may be placed in Venezuela and that there may even be the potentiality of Iranian proxy forces being capable of launching a crippling EMP strike on North America. (The whole imminent 'ticking clock' danger hysteria reminds one of an episode of 24 or a Tom Clancy plot line rather than the present geopolitical realities on the ground.)

Following these pronouncements we heard of a serious allegation made by the Obama administration that the Quds Force were complicit in a plot to assassinate a Saudi envoy on US soil in collaboration with Mexican drugs gangs. Whilst this allegation has been seriously questioned with regards to the nature of the operation one finds it difficult to give the Iranian regime any benefit of the doubt when one does reconsider the regimes past complicity in the murders of Kurdish exiles in Germany and Israeli diplomats and Argentine civilians in Argentina in the early 1990's.

More reactionary circles across the American political spectrum pronounced that this alleged plot constituted the casus belli for war with Iran. One does not think it would be wise to respond with dangerous sabre rattling, but rather to treat this as a criminal investigation with the intent of prosecuting the conspirators to such an act of terrorism on US soil. Only when the full extent of the plot in question is revealed would be the right time to reach the most obvious conclusions and respond accordingly and decisively.

Also one doesn't think it wise to make a lot of noise about Iran forging alliances with other countries. In particular this perceived Caracas-Tehran axis is in general much too over hyped, as is Hugo Chavez overly demonized. On one hand he has been hailed and praised by many for his work in redistributing substantial amounts of Venezuela's oil wealth to the poor of the country. On the other hand his rabid opposition to his conspiratorial perception of American imperialism has evidently garnered him with some questionable bed fellows. Even though Venezuela has bought a substantial amount of hi-tech military hardware from Russia it doesn't exactly pose any military threat to the United States. The reason it is vilified is because under Chavez Venezuela has given US corporate interests in the region a major headache.

Furthermore one sincerely doubts we will ever be seeing anything like a Venezuelan Missile Crisis (as was implied in that article), let alone seeing one any time soon. However we will probably see Mr. Chavez forging diplomatic alliances with some questionable “opponents” of US imperialism, and continuing to adopt a policy which I will dub the 'Chavez doctrine', that being a doctrine of aligning Venezuela with other states led in most cases by autocrats and dictators that are actively pitting themselves against western (predominately American) influence, and in some cases the spread of democracy. This doctrine has seen Chavez recently opting to be a mediator between Colonel Gaddafi and the rebels (even though he personally favoured Gaddafi) as well as ingratiating himself with the present regime in Tehran.

These Iranian statements (the said vow to deploy naval deployment to the Gulf of Mexico) and (in the case of the US allegation of the conspiratorial Iranian assassination plot) actions clearly show that the Islamic regime pursues achieving the status of an international power. One which seems to crave the ability to project power far beyond its borders in a manner similar to its perception of a loathsome US superpower.

Personally I don't have any qualms with the Iranian leadership sending frigates to bob around in the North Atlantic. Even if such an operation does manifest it will more than likely be nothing more than a rather meaningless and futile gesture of power projection. I felt the same about the hysteria a few months ago with regards to Iranian warships steaming through the Suez Canal for the first time since the revolution. Even if they were to do something over the top like attempt some kind of an assault on the Israeli coastline they would most likely share a similar fate to that of the Sahand in the Iran Iraq War or of the Egyptian Ibrahim el Awal in the Suez Crisis.

Dignifying and trying to instil fear over such actions by the Iranian regime plays into their hands and is in my opinion very counterproductive. As it focuses all attention on over emphasizing the actuality of the threat that Iran poses and in turn over shadows the internal struggle of the various Iranian democrats which in turn plays into the ever more dangerous 'us' verses 'them' mentality that demonizes the majority of countries population and in turn gives the present leadership the aura of representing the country as a whole.

So to conclude, it is my firm held opinion and belief that this deployment vow should be seen as nothing more than a lame attempt by the festering regime in Tehran to divert attention away from its heinous treatment of the people it presides over as well as its consistent and persistent squandering of the countries international status to that of an untrustworthy and capricious pariah state.

Edit: Three instances of the word 'pledge' have been subsequently replaced with 'vow'.

Editor’s Note: Paul Iddon is one of the authors of Uskowi on Iran. His weekly column 'Broadened Vistas' appears here on Wednesdays.

Israel 'plots Iran raid'

From a report out of Gulf Daily News:

MANAMA: Israel is massing warplanes in the Caucasus for an attack on Iran, it was revealed yesterday.
Preparations are underway to launch the military attack from Azerbaijan and Georgia, reports our sister paper Akhbar Al Khaleej, quoting military sources.

Israel was, in fact, training pilots in Turkey to launch the strike and was smuggling planes into Georgia using Turkish airspace, they said.

However, Turkey was unaware of Israel's intention of transferring the planes to Georgia, the sources said.

The unexpected crisis between Israel and Turkey following an Israeli commando raid on an aid flotilla bound for Gaza Strip hit Israeli calculations.

Azerbaijan-based intelligence units, working under the cover of technicians, trainers and consultants, have helped with the preparations, the sources said.

Military equipment, mostly supplied by the US, was transported to a Georgian port via the Black Sea.

Georgian coastguard and Israeli controllers are co-operating to hide the operations from Russian vessels, said the sources.

They point out that according to Israel, it will not be in a position to launch a strike on Iran without using bases in Georgia and Azerbaijan due to the limited capabilities of its nuclear submarines stationed near the Iranian coast.

Meanwhile, Iran's Press TV reported that a very large contingent of US ground forces had massed in Azerbaijan, near the Iranian border. The independent Azerbaijani news website Trend confirmed the report.

Those reports came just days after the Pentagon confirmed that an unusually large fleet of US warships had indeed passed through Egypt's Suez Canal en route to the Gulf. At least one Israeli warship reportedly joined the American armada.

Press TV also quoted Iranian Revolutionary Guard Brigadier General Mehdi Moini as saying that the country's forces are mobilized and ready to face Israeli and American "misadventures" near its borders.

This is quite a piece of intrigue. Striking Iran from Azerbaijan would shorten the distance, but would leave Azerbaijan bases particularly vulnerable to even SRBM counter-strikes. And if the US were serious about a strike against Iran, it has the forces already in place to do so, effectively. There's an element of PSYOP to this story. A further corroboration is required.

Recent US speculations over an attack on Iran

Last week one of America's top uniformed officers General James Cartwright in front of the Senate came to the conclusion that the United States would not be able to stop Iran permanently from developing nuclear weapons unless it was willing to occupy the country.

Senator Jack Reed a democrat from Rhode Island then went on to ask if the only way to end any potential Iranian nuclear weapon development "was to physically occupy their country and disestablish their nuclear facilities?"

Cartwright responded by stating that: "Absent some other unknown calculus that would go on, that's a fair conclusion."

Such speculation and 'hype' over a US attack on Iran has raised from leaked memo from Secretary of Defense Robert Gates which details what actions to take against Iran's nuclear programme if it proceeds regardless of the international sanctions.

On an interview on Fox News over the weekend Senator and former Republican presidential nominee John McCain stated "We [the United States] have not done anything that would in any way be viewed effective. I didn't need a secret memo from Mr Gates to ascertain that."

McCain has further asserted that:

"We keep pointing the gun, we haven't pulled a single trigger yet, and it's about time that we did."

However with all of the media hype Admiral Mike Mullen the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff has stated a military strike would be 'his last option' and has warned of the unintended consequences of such a strike.

But he also agreed that the UN sanctions would not be tough enough to have a serious impact on Tehran.

Iran's current level of enriched uranium is 3.5%, 90% and over is the amount used in nuclear weapons, the government in Tehran continues to assert it's nuclear enrichment program is for peaceful purposes and that they are not seeking to build a nuclear bomb.