‘The Rise of ISIS’- PBS Frontline

 

Description from PBS video page for Frontline documentary “The Rise of ISIS,” first aired 28OCT14:

FRONTLINE investigates the miscalculations and mistakes behind the brutal rise of ISIS. Correspondent Martin Smith, who made "Truth, War & Consequences," "Beyond Baghdad," "Private Warriors" and "Gangs of Iraq," reports from Iraq on how the country began coming undone after the American withdrawal and what it means for the U.S. to be fighting there again.

“The Rise of ISIS,” Chapter 1

“The Rise of ISIS,” Chapter 2

“The Rise of ISIS,” Chapter 3

“The Rise of ISIS,” Chapter 4

“The Rise of ISIS,” Chapter 5

"Degrading and defeating" ISIS will require "boots on the ground"

 by Paul Iddon

A recently proposed strategy published by the 'Institute for the Study of War' offers what is bound to be a controversial solution to the threat posed by Islamic State (IS, referred to herein as 'ISIS') which insists that any feasible military solution will indeed require the deployment of American ground forces in Iraq and Syria.

Written by Kim and Fred Kagan and Jessica Lewis 'A Strategy to Defeat The Islamic State' proposes many potential steps the United States can take to address ISIS. Fred Kagan is of course one of the chief intellectuals involved in devising the troop surge implemented in Iraq which did help bring some semblance of stability to that country before the U.S. withdrawal in late 2011. That fact in and of itself makes this strategy well worth understanding, evaluating and of course critiquing.

From the get-go the authors make it clear that their proposed strategy for defeating ISIS will require an insertion of ground forces. As many as 25,000 in fact which they envision being made up of “special forces and special mission units.”

In essence they inform their readers that,

'The activities recommended in this paper will likely require the deployment of not more than 25,000 ground forces supported by numerous air and naval assets. The bulk of those forces will likely be comprised of various kinds of units supporting a much more limited number of special forces and other assets deployed in small groups with tribes, opposition forces, and Iraqi security forces. This plan does not envisage U.S. combat units conducting unilateral operations (apart from targeted attacks against individual enemy leaders and small groups) or leading clearing operations. It requires some combat units in the support and quick reaction force (QRF) roles.'

As for Syria broadly speaking their solution is quite straightforward. The United States should seek to take on the al-Qaeda affiliated Jabhat al-Nusra (JN), ISIS and the Assad regime. They summarize this view when they write,

'The problem in Syria is relatively easy to state, but extremely difficult to solve. The Assad regime has lost control of the majority of the territory of the Syrian state. It has violated international law on many occasions and lost its legitimacy as a member of the international community. Assad himself is the icon of atrocities, regime brutality, and sectarianism to Sunni populations in Syria and throughout the region. His actions have fueled the rise of violent Islamists, particularly ISIS and JN. U.S. strategy must ensure that none of these three actors control all or part of Syria while supporting the development of an alternative, inclusive Syrian state over time.'

A consistent theme throughout their paper is the fundamental necessity of a political solution in both Iraq and Syria coupled with a military one. Again on Syria they insist,

'The U.S. must also engage much more vigorously in efforts to develop an inclusive government-in-waiting in Syria. We must do more than trying to unify what is left of the moderate opposition. We must also reach out to the ‘Alawite community and to Syria’s other minority groups in search of potential leaders who could join forces with moderate Sunni leaders to oppose extremists on all sides.'

From the get go we're informed by the authors that their strategy may prove impossible to implement given circumstances which range from whether or not potentially friendly elements in both Iraq or Syria will cooperate with them to whether or not the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) can be effectively reformed when they inform us that,

'Even then, this strategy suffers from the high risk of failure and the near-certainty that the U.S. will suffer casualties, including at the hands of supposedly friendly forces. American troops dispersed among the Sunni population are at risk of being kidnapped. The significant anti-aircraft capabilities of ISIS put American helicopters at risk. It may turn out that the Sunni Arabs cannot or will not fight with us, finally, and that the overall strategy proposed here is infeasible. In that case, it will be necessary to abandon this strategy and reconsider our options.'

Nevertheless,

'The U.S. should adopt this strategy despite these risks. The consequences of inaction or inadequate action are evident: ISIS will retain control of much of the territory it holds, sectarian war will escalate, more foreign fighters including Americans and Europeans will cycle through the battlefield and get both trained and further radicalized, and al-Qaeda will benefit from the largest and richest safe-haven it has ever known. It is worth accepting the risks of this strategy to avoid this outcome.'

To date the authors tell us that Obama's record hasn't at all been a good one due to the fact that,

'He celebrated the regional and international partnerships that will join in the U.S.-led plan. This plan is largely a continuation of the failed counterterrorism strategy that the administration has pursued for years, and in which the threat of the Islamic State arose. The plan to lead other regional and indigenous forces in conducting an air-ground campaign to degrade and destroy ISIS in Iraq assumes conditions in the region that are no longer present. These conditions will likely cause the U.S. strategy to fail.'

Furthermore, to degrade and ultimately destroy ISIS the authors argue that the United States cannot adopt an Iraq-first, Syria-second strategy. It must engage ISIS in both countries simultaneously,

'Only military formations that cross sectarian lines will be able to challenge ISIS. This is an exceptional battlefield condition that cannot be assumed in either Iraq or Syria. Furthermore, the involvement of regional actors such as Iran, Qatar, and Saudi Arabia in the Syrian war has only increased the sectarian nature of the conflict over the last two years; their involvement in Iraq at this point may have the same effect.'

The authors continuously stress that United States policy in confronting ISIS must see to an atmosphere permeate whereby Sunnis feel empowered and are able to take a decisive stand and reject the Islamic State which has been forcibly established around them. The authors also argue that,

'Air strikes alone – which may be perceived as U.S. support to Iranian-backed Shi'a governments trying to oppress the Sunni Arabs – will not allow the U.S. to evaluate this variable and may well reduce the willingness of Sunni Arabs to join with us and, more importantly, to rejoin Iraqi and Syria. Developing a strategy that has a chance of success requires identifying the center of gravity of the overarching regional problem — the struggle within the Sunni Arab community itself amidst the collapse of state structures in the Middle East.'

Futhermore they reiterate their advocacy of U.S. approach which aims to remove Assad, JN and ISIS from the picture in Syria. The following paragraph aptly sums up why this is the position they take,

'ISIS must be defeated in Syria, and Assad must be removed from power. But a strategy that delivers Syria into the hands of Jabhat al-Nusra would be disastrous for the U.S. and its regional allies. JN is a loyal al-Qaeda affiliate and would establish an al-Qaeda state in Syria that would support the global jihadi movement. Any successful strategy for dealing with ISIS in Syria must also separate JN from the bulk of the opposition, marginalize it, and ultimately defeat it as well, while setting conditions for an inclusive post-Assad government that can prevent any al-Qaeda affiliate from re-establishing itself in Syria. This recovery of the opposition requires the removal of Assad as a necessary pre-condition for ending the Syrian war.'

Working closely with the Sunni communities they insist is essential for defeating such forces due to the fact that,

'Al-Qaeda and like-minded groups such as ISIS can only flourish in distressed Sunni communities. They attack every other religion and sect, but their bases must be in Sunni lands because their ideology is an extreme, exclusionary interpretation of Sunni Islam. Doing anything to al-Qaeda — defeating, disrupting, degrading, destroying, anything else — requires working with the overwhelming majority of the Sunni communities within which it lives and operates. Those communities have shown their distaste for the ideology and the groups that espouse it, rising up against them in Iraq, Afghanistan, Syria, Yemen, Somalia, Egypt, and almost everywhere else they have appeared, except Pakistan.'

While the Iranian dimension in all of this is not on the top of their proposed agenda it is nevertheless featured throughout. The authors repeatedly denounce the prospect of Iranian "hegemony" in the region and denounce its role of stoking "sectarian polarization."

They scathingly critique Iran's role in the region throughout the text. The following paragraph very aptly sums up their many contentions with Tehran's policies,

'Iran is the principal regional symbol of sectarianism, preferentially supports extremist Shi’a groups, and is integrating national security forces into an international structure that includes its own forces and terrorist groups. Working with Iran will have the same effect on Sunni perception as working with Assad. It may also drive our Gulf Arab allies away in the belief that the U.S. has made a permanent shift of alliances in the Middle East. Iran’s leaders and military commanders, finally, have consistently and loudly repudiated any notion of cooperating with the U.S. in Iraq.'

They also denounce the idea of coordinating with Iran in any way insisting that,

'Doing so legitimizes the presence of Iranian troops in Iraq, a principle to which the U.S. cannot accede. It would also effectively require a level of intelligence-sharing and mutual confidence that would place U.S. troops too much at the mercy of the IRGC. Lack of coordination with Iranian assets, however, can lead to accidental exchanges of fire between U.S. and Iranian troops. Such exchanges could in turn lead to escalating conflict with Iran.'

Regarding Iran's proxies and allies in Iraq the authors contend that,

'The U.S. must use the expanding leverage increased military support will give it in Baghdad to continue to shape the emerging Iraqi government to be as inclusive and non-sectarian as possible. Well-known sectarian actors and Iranian agents such as Hadi al-Amiri (Badr corps commander), Qais al-Khazali (Asa’ib Ahl al-haq leader), and Qassim al-Araji (Badr corps deputy) cannot have leading positions in the security ministries or security services if there is to be any hope of persuading Iraq’s Sunni Arabs that they are safe in the hands of the new government. Reported U.S. pressure to keep Hadi al-Amiri from getting a ministry was an important step. Continued pressure must be exerted to keep him and others like him from getting ministerial posts or otherwise obtaining de jure control over Iraq’s security services. If such individuals are given inappropriate portfolios, the U.S. should continue to exert leverage — including refusing to work with forces over which they have been given command or influence — to secure their removal.'

They also recommend the following regarding regional powers who have funded, directly and indirectly, terror groups operating in Syria,

'The U.S. should exert all possible pressure on states that are currently supporting extremists in Syria either to reorient that support to moderate forces or simply to cut it off. If prominent supporters of extremists such as Qatar refuse to change their behaviour, the U.S. should act in concert with international partners to interdict that support and consider sanctioning the offenders.'

The authors also make clear that the United States has and will likely continue to have little sway over the Hezbollah,

'Hezbollah’s deployment of thousands of troops to Syria — the first major external military expedition in its four-decade history — initially strained its support in Lebanon. The expansion of sectarian conflict and the increase in Sunni extremist operations and attacks in Lebanon, however, have rallied support around Hezbollah once again. Strengthening the Lebanese government and armed forces independent of Hezbollah — to the limited extent to which that is possible — could threaten the organization’s control sufficiently to distract it from Syria somewhat. It might even weaken Hezbollah’s position in Lebanon more fundamentally, although that prospect remains dim.'

More risk are acknowledged when they discuss the prospect of JN and ISIS working together when collectively targeted by the U.S. Again inaction is deemed worse since it,

'… would allow ISIS and JN to build up their forces independently and offers no assurance that they will not ultimately recombine in any event. The ongoing jihadi competition caused in part by the ISIS-al Qaeda rivalry, moreover, has already increased the likelihood of attempts by other al-Qaeda affiliates to attack the U.S. homeland and U.S. interests abroad. The additional spur such efforts might receive from an American intervention in Syria and Iraq would be more than balanced by depriving two of the most lethal affiliates — JN and ISIS — of large territorial sanctuaries.'

As for Iran's potential reaction to such operations,

'Iran may perceive intervention as a re-invasion to position U.S. forces to attack Iran in the event of the failure of nuclear negotiations and may respond with regional attacks. The geographic focus of U.S. efforts may provide Tehran some reassurance, since they will be focused in northern and western Iraq away from the Iranian border. But the U.S. should also consider supplying its Gulf allies with additional defensive capabilities to deter any such Iranian response or render it ineffective if deterrence fails.'

Arguing for "additional defensive capabilities" for the Gulf states may be considered heavy-handed when one takes into account the fact that these Gulf Cooperation Council members have already been sold billions-of-dollars in arms and sophisticated military hardware in the last five years alone – the 2010 arms deal to supply Saudi Arabia with fighter jets was the biggest in both America and Britain's history. 

 

All-in-all in both Iraq and Syria the authors determine that there is no wholly military solution nor a wholly political one. Any solution will have to be a delicate combination of the two, in their conclusion they state,

'A strategy that does not describe how Iraq will win Mosul back and how a legitimate government will regain control of Syria’s northern cities is not a strategy to defeat or destroy ISIS. ISIS can control those areas now in part because the populations violently oppose the Assad regime and the government in Baghdad. The formation of a new government in Iraq does not solve this problem by itself. It may superficially bandage sectarian wounds, but it may also exacerbate them, particularly if the leaders of sectarian militias receive security portfolios. There is no meaningful political discourse in Syria at the moment. And even if political accords were reached in Damascus and Baghdad, ISIS retains the ability to control subject populations through brutal terror. There is no purely political solution to these problems.'

Obviously there is no clear-cut simple solution when it comes to addressing such a complex set of problems. For the good of a detailed, open and informed debate the ideas proposed in this paper should be rigorously evaluated when it comes to determining what should be done about ISIS and what broader role, if any, the United States should play in the Middle East region in relation to this present ongoing crisis. 

Kerry's coalition

The United States Secretary of State has made clear that his country has no intention of working with Tehran in defeating Islamic State (IS) in Iraq and Syria. 

by Paul Iddon

Kerry and Zarif, July 2014 / Public Domain

Mr. John Kerry has been busy in recent days and weeks building his anti-IS regional coalition. As of writing ten regional countries (out of about forty in total) have "agreed to do their share in the comprehensive fight" against the terror group to help the United States to "degrade and destroy" it. Iran is not welcome in this coalition since Kerry views such a participation as "inappropriate" given the Iranian regimes continued support of Syria's Assad and the Hezbollah which is also fighting in Syria.

In his op-ed in The New York Times late last month Kerry said he seeks to loosely model his coalition against IS on the one built to confront Saddam Hussein after his annexation of Kuwait in 1990 – obviously it will be of a significantly different nature considering IS is a much more irregular force than the conventional Iraqi Army circa 1991. Realpolitik played a major role in that coalition. Especially whereby Syria's welcome inclusion was concerned. Back then Saddam's Baathist rival in Damascus essentially got a freehand in annexing Lebanon and brutally suppressing and executing at least 500 Lebanese soldiers in October 1990. A largely overlooked, overshadowed, and consequently largely forgotten, incident.

The present coalition essentially consists of Europe and the authoritarian Gulf monarchies (Turkey has refused to permit US aircraft based on its territory to attack IS from there fearing IS retribution will be taken against Turkish diplomats that group is still holding hostage in Iraq) against IS. Support of the Gulf states was obviously necessitated by the fact that US jets fly from bases situated in Kuwait, Qatar and the UAE. These states may even participate in strikes against IS forces. But what was interesting was their recent pledge that they will crackdown upon any funding reaching IS from their home turf so they aren't essentially hosting the financiers of those the US is targeting.

The Iranian regime has accused these Gulf states of supporting jihadi elements in Syria. Conservative elements within the regimes establishment say that Iran does not wish to cooperate but that such a cooperation isn't possible. Iran's armed forces deputy chief of staff who told Iran's Fars News that, "The reason for this is that Iran stands against [IS], but America created [IS]." However Ayatollah Rafsanjani has left the door open to the prospect of limited cooperation aimed at IS when he recently said it's possibly provided "America shows honesty."

Iran has of course taken an interest on what is going on essentially in its backyard, that doesn't necessarily mean that this regimes conduct in the region is exemplary or even in all cases justified – such as its support for dangerous sectarian militias. It did however support the Iraqi Kurds by providing them with arms when all the United States and its allies were providing was repetitive and unoriginal rhetoric. As Massoud Barzani pointed out, they acted at a time when everyone else was just talking about acting.

That's another element which hasn't been very widely discussed regarding potential allies that are actually on the ground in Syria to coordinate operations against IS there. Not the Free Syrian Army but Syria's Kurds. Sadly many of the Kurds fighting in defense of their homeland in Rojava are considered by the United States to be terrorists given their proximity to the PKK group. Which is a pity because they are an organized force on the ground that have a record of fighting IS. At the very least coordinating with them should be considered and the United States' stance towards that group reconsidered and reevaluated.

Iran and the Islamic State threat

By Paul Iddon

Any Iranian leader, government or regime, would be understandable impelled to at least support efforts to quash a threat like Islamic State in Iran's neighbour Iraq.

Iran's Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei

One thing the present crisis in Iraq reassured me about, and there were of course very few things to be reassured about over this long hot summer whereby the Middle East is concerned, was my view that the Ayatollah Sistani is for the most part a quite productive influence in that Shia-majority country. Before the last elections in Iraq he refused to even speak with Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki since he in no way wished to have his council directly or indirectly influence the political process let alone even tacitly endorse nor favour Mr. Maliki's government. Similarly, and contrary to the false and later withdrawn claims of some news agencies, he was sure to emphasis that this isn't a sectarian fight and accordingly called on the Shia faithful of Iraq to enlist in the army and beef-up and invigorate the states demoralized armed forces in order to fight off this Islamic State threat. By doing this Sistani wasn't calling for fighting fire with fire. On the contrary he was advocating measures be taken which would see to water being used in order to extinguish this dangerous raging fire and in the process prevent it from sparking other lethally dangerous fires of sectarian violence which have plagued Iraqi society in the past. 

The theocracy in Iran is also contributing to the fight against IS via very sectarian proxy militias and by other means – they were also quick to arm the Iraqi Kurds who are on the front-line in the fight against IS in Iraq, something which the KRG is quite thankful for given the circumstances they are facing. This is seeing to other sectarian Shia militias once again emerge armed on the streets of Iraq. They may likely in the not too distant future also enter Sunni neighbourhoods freshly liberated from IS control.

While one certainly wouldn't endorse or even excuse Iran use of such sectarian proxy forces in Iraq one must put this into its broader regional context before one can productively critique this role Iran is once again playing in Iraq. If Iran had a democratic, pluralistic and secular government it would more likely than not have feelers and advisers on the ground in Iraq right now in order to ascertain what's what and what it can do to see to it that IS is combated and doesn't also become a threat to Iran.

In other words when critiquing Iran's role in Iraq we have to recognize that as a regional power Iran has legitimate and understandable interests when it comes to assisting its neighbour combat such a dangerous foe like IS. We also should not hasten to forget, or cease to acknowledge, that it is the Iranian people who will more likely than not ultimately suffer from the brunt of any potential terrorist acts carried out by such a group in Iran. In the past they suffered from attacks by the Jundallah. In the future it could very well be the Islamic State if it isn't contained and combated. No government in Tehran after all could realistically ignore such a threat when there is something it could do in order to help alleviate and neuter it substantially.

This isn't a tacit approval or justification of any of the Iranian regimes activities in Iraq in the past or present. It is merely a contextualization of the present circumstances permeating throughout that region which is Iran's backyard in a geopolitical sense after all. The Iranian regimes present role there is still quite unproductive and may even serve to be dangerous to both the nations interests and its citizenry. And sadly if in the future IS or a dangerous fanatical group like it do manage to level terrorist attacks against Iran it is the Iranian people who will suffer from such attacks. The same people who already bear the burdens and hardships brought on them by the unproductive actions undertaken by the regime which presently rules over them.

1998 report: Clinton administration had no problem with Iran intervening in Iraq

Al-Kadhimiya Mosque in 1998 (AP Photo/Murad Sezer)

Noteworthy in light of the speculation and analysis's regarding Iranian intervention in Iraq today is this November 20 1998 newspaper report which reminds us that back in 1998 the United States openly declared that it had no problem if Iran would intervene to assist the then oppressed Shiite majority there.

Of course today a considerable amount of the controversy in Iraq stems from the fact that many Sunnis feel marginalized in the political process under the present Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki. Nevertheless one mustn't readily forget those days when the Shia were marginalized by the Tikriti mafia clan which ruled Iraq for decades.

The 1998 Associated Press report quotes then State Department spokesman James P. Rubin outlining how, "We are not going to complain about any effort Iran makes to assist Shiites or others suffering under Saddam's rule. But we are not working with them [the Iranians] in any shape or form or soliciting their support."

Those comments were also made when there was a considerable thaw in post-1979 Iran-U.S. relations. While the report stresses the fact that the U.S. maintained Iran and Saddam's Iraq were sponsors of terrorism the Clinton administration was nevertheless interested in the potential prospects for change the considerably more moderate tone coming from Tehran under then President Khatami could present.

Similarly today we have a president in Tehran who promulgates a more moderate policy and says he seeks a more productive relationship between Tehran and Washington. Indeed it was this president who only yesterday suggested that Iran may intervene in Iraq in order to protect Shiite shrines there. A statement that can be interpreted as a possible plan for direct military intervention into Iraq against ISIS.

Contrary to the inaccurate statement frequently repeated by numerous media outlets reporting on the possibility of American/Iranian cooperation in Iraq today such cooperation in the post-1979 era would certainly not be "unprecedented", as the Herat campaign of November 2001 clearly proves.

ISIL Insurgents Seize Tal Afar in Heavy Fighting

ISIL insurgents on Sunday seized Tal Afar, a mostly-Turkmen but religiously divided city in Nineveh province, midway between the Syrian border and Mosul. (Reuters, 15 June).

With the capture of Tal Afar, the ISIL now controls the entire Nineveh province, solidifying their grip on the Tigris valley north of Baghdad. The insurgents want to establish an Islamic caliphate in the area.

The city fell after heavy fighting between Iraqi security forces, aided by tribal elements, and the ISIL insurgents. The Iraqi Army division based at Tal Afar was the only unit in the north that did not disintegrate during the lightening advance of the insurgents in the first two days of conflict.

“The city was overrun by militants. Severe fighting took place, and many people were killed. Shi'ite families have fled to the west and Sunni families have fled to the east," a Tal Afar city official told Reuters on Sunday.

Meanwhile, there were reports of heavy fighting on Sunday between Iraqi security forces and ISIL in the city of Baquba, 37 miles northeast of Baghdad, and the provincial capital of Diyala. If the city were to fall, the insurgents will have three-pronged access to Baghdad: from Anbar to the west, Nineveh and Salahuddin to the north, and from Diyala to the northeast.

File photo: ISIL gunmen (townhall.com)

ISIL Summarily Executes 1,700 Shia Soldiers - Photos

ISIL terrorists have released photos of what they say were summarily execution of 1,700 Shia soldiers of the Iraqi Army and members of AAH Shia militia in Salah al-Deen province during the first days of conflict. ISIL says it has pardoned Sunni soldiers.

Photos: Twitter/@zaidbejamin

U.S. Aircraft Carrier Moves to Persian Gulf

U.S. Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel today ordered aircraft carrier USS George H. W. Bush moved into northern Persian Gulf if President Obama decides to launch air strikes against the ISIL positions in Iraq.

“The order will provide the Commander-in-Chief additional flexibility should military options be required to protect American lives, citizens and interests in Iraq,” the Pentagon said in a statement. (Reuters, 14 June)

USS George H.W. Bush was in North Arabian Sea today and is expected to complete the transit into the Persian Gulf later on Saturday. The carrier will be accompanied by the guided-missile cruiser USS Philippine Sea and the guided-missile destroyer USS Truxtun, the Pentagon said.

Photo credit: USS George H W Bush transits the Strait of Gibraltar into the Mediterranean Sea; 17 February 2014 (Lt. Juan David Guerra/U.S. Navy/Reuters)

Reports of IRGC-QF participation in counterattacking ISIL/ISIS, defending Iraq

Above: ISIL/ISIS at war with the region  (source: the Long War Journal)

Highlights from the Wall Street Journal report, followed by commentary:

Faced with the threat of Sunni extremists eclipsing the power of Shiite-dominated Iraq, Iran sprang into action to aid its besieged Arab ally and deployed Revolutionary Guards units to Iraq, according to Iranian security sources. 

At least three battalions of the Quds Forces, the elite overseas branch of the Guards, were dispatched to aid in the battle against the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham, an offshoot of al Qaeda rapidly gaining territory across Iraq, they said.

One Guards unit that was already in Iraq fought alongside the Iraqi army, offering guerrilla warfare advice and tactics and helped reclaim most of the city of Tikrit on Thursday.

Two Guards’ units, dispatched from Iran’s western border provinces on Wednesday, were tasked with protecting Baghdad and the holy Shiite cities of Karbala and Najaf, these security sources said.

General Qasem Sulaimani, the commander of the Quds Forces and one of the region’s most powerful military figures, traveled to Baghdad this week to help manage the swelling crisis, said a member of the Revolutionary Guards, or IRGC.

Qassimm al-Araji, an Iraqi Shiite lawmaker who heads the Badr Brigade bloc in parliament, posted a picture with Mr. Sulaimani holding hands in a room in Baghdad on his social-networking site with the caption, “Haj Qasem is here,” reported Iranian news sites affiliated with the IRGC on Wednesday.

The two IRGC battalions that moved to Iraq on Wednesday were shifted from the Iranian border provinces of Urumieh and Lorestan, the Iranian security officials said.

Iran has also positioned troops on full alert along its border with Iraq and has given clearance to its air force to bomb ISIS rebel forces if they come within 100 kilometers, or 62 miles, from Iran’s border, according to an Iranian army general.

There appears to be a mustering of fighting forces being organized and directed into battle by IRGC-QF officers, in roughly similar but rushed fashion as to what has been taking place in neighboring Syria. Shia militiamen and volunteers continue to mobilize, given the level of threat against Shia holy sites such as Samara, Karbala and Najaf, as well as Baghdad.

In a sign of Shia closing ranks, Senior Iraqi cleric grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani voiced his support for the Iraqi army urged the Iraqi government and political figures to stand united against "terrorists."

Below is the photo referred to in the WSJ report, of Iraqi MP Qassimm al-Araji holding hands with IRGC-QF commander Suleimani (in civvies) in Baghdad (per ABNA.ir):

At this point in the war, it would be surprising to see the intervention of Iranian combat aviation. The Iraqis (and possibly even the Iranians) hope for the intervention of American air power. However this poses something of a realignment for the United States, alongside Iran and Syria in the war against ISIS/ISIL. Additionally, much of the criticism levied against the SyAAF against built-up areas might also in some ways apply to U.S. airstrikes. The president must be weighing heavily on this.

There is some opportunism taking shape, with the Kurdish Peshmerga seizing Kirkuk. Any efforts at retaking Mosul will likely involve Peshmerga forces. At this fluid point in time, the Peshmerga act as an effective buffer force on the other side of this section of Iran's border.

Above: Kurdish Peshmerga seen deploying T-55 type tanks

Highlights from Jessica Lewis' report at Institute for the Study of War, followed by commentary:

On July 12, 2014, Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS) spokesman Abu Muhammad al-Adnani claimed that ISIS will target Samarra, Baghdad, Karbala, and Najaf. These cities and their Shi’a shrines will not fall the way that Mosul did. Tucked behind layers of Iraqi Security Forces, Shi’a militias, and Iranian Quds Force operatives, these locations represent the hardest military targets in Iraq.

ISIS may execute a tactical deception indicating their intent to destroy the al-Askari mosque in order to concentrate the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) in Samarra. ISIS may then open a corridor for advance to its main objective, which is likely the seat of Iraqi government in Baghdad.

ISIS will seek to target the seat of Iraq’s government in the Green Zone…If ISIS is able to assault the Green Zone with a ground attack force, they will realize the full defeat of the Iraqi Security Forces. The command and control of Shi’a militias, police forces, and Iraqi civilians in the wake of such an attack would overwhelm the Baghdad Operations Command. The core functions of the Iraqi state would break down. Baghdad would become a ward of the Iranian government to protect the Khadimiya shrine, and Baghdad would become a buffer zone for low-level attacks across an Iranian-ISIS demarcation line.

BLACK SWAN: ISIS may also execute a spectacular attack upon the Shi’a holy cities of Karbala & Najaf. This is not likely as a main effort, but ISIS may still view them as strategic targets that accelerate the demise of Iraq through civil war; alternatively, as a feint to support the Baghdad assault, ISIS may claim this intent in order to cause the ISF and Iranian reinforcements to concentrate south of Baghdad. Especially on Saturday, June 14, 2014, during religious processions commemorating Lailat al Bara’ah, security surrounding the shrines is likely at surge capacity.

Ms. Lewis' scenarios apply if ISIL/ISIS is able to maintain the initiative. This writer does not share her alarmism, should ISIS forward elements penetrate into Baghdad. Such penetrations into Damascus have in the past not brought down the Syrian government.

Iranian military logistics are far more direct and shorter than those to Syria.

ISF and Shia militias are currently counterattacking. Once the ISIL/ISIS advance ebbs, we're likely to see the current Syrian situation replayed in ISIL/ISIS-occupied Iraq, giving rise to what some observers refer to as areas of "Iranian protectorate."

That said, readers are encouraged to read Ms. Lewis' outstanding analysis in full.

Crisis in Iraq

Situation Remains Fluid

In a lightening and well-planned three-day offensive, the ISIL forces have advanced to within 60 miles north of Baghdad. The latest town to fall is Dhuluiyah, AFP reported.

The militants had to bypass Samarra to capture Dhuluiyah. In Samarra, the historic city 80 miles north of Baghdad, ISIL faced the first serious resistance by the Iraqi security forces and their allies, where heavy clashes took place overnight and the militants were repulsed.

To the west, ISIL militants also engaged security forces in Abu Gharib and Zeidan, some 25 miles west of Baghdad and its airport. ISIL is showing its capability to manage a two-front attack against Iraqi security forces.

Meanwhile, Kurdish Peshmerga forces took control of Kirkuk; a development with significant geo-political implications for the region.

Photo credit: Above, an AFP photo showing the ISIL’s ability to put together a motorized formation with equipment captured from Iraqi security forces. (AFP/Twitter, 12 June). Below, American-made ISF Humvees and tank captured by ISIL. (Twitter, 12 June)

Tikrit Falls to ISIL

Islamic State of Iraq and Levant (ISIL) militants overran the Iraqi city of Tikrit today, only a day after they captured Mosul. “All of Tikrit is in the hands of the militant,” a police colonel told AFP. A police brigadier general told AFP that fighters attacked Tikrit from the north, west and south of the city, and that they were from ISIL. (AFP/Al Jazeera, 11 June)

Tikrit lies on the strategic Baghdad-Mosul highway, halfway between the two cities. The city is the provincial capital of Salaheddin, the second provincial capital to fall in two days after Mosul, which is the capital of Nineveh, deepening the crisis in Iraq.

AFP, quoting a police officer, reports that the militants had freed 300 inmates from a prison in the city. Yesterday, ISIL freed more than thousands of prisoners in Mosul.

In Mosul, ISIL looted 500 billion dinars ($429 million) from city's branch of Iraqi Central Bank, making it one of the world’s richest terrorist groups.

Meanwhile, ISIL fighters today attacked the city of Kirkuk, home to Iraq’s biggest oil refinery. Also in Samarra, south of Tikrit, witnesses told AFP that that fighters had arrived in trucks mounted with machine guns.

Map: Al Jazeera

Crisis in Iraq

The capture of Mosul by ISIL today forces us all into some sensemaking. The rise of radical Islamist groups in Iraq, mainly the Sunni ISIL, but also among the Shias with their own radical armed militias, is not taking place in vacuum. The country was occupied by a U.S.-led coalition for eight years. After the U.S. withdrawal, Saudi Arabia and Iran have followed sectarian policies in Iraq that have partly caused the present situation; by supporting Sunni militias in opposition to the government and Shia militias in support of it. But at the end of the day, it is the Iraqi government and its leader, who has been in power for two full terms and is trying to stay on for a third term, that should be held responsible for maintaining security and stability in the country.

On one hand, Maliki government pushed out his rivals, especially the Sunnis, out of a power-sharing arrangement that could have rallied support for the government among all the Iraqis at this hour of need. One the other hand, the central government has failed to start meaningful development projects to address the root causes of discontent in the society, and instead has become one of the most corrupt governments in the region, which is quite a feat considering the widespread corruption in many of the countries in the neighborhood.

Using data from the World Bank, the UN, and Transparency International, CSIS’s Anthony Cordesman has developed a summary report on governance and economics challenges facing Iraq today. below are several key points that emerge from Cordesman’s report (Anthony Cordesman, Hitting Bottom: The Maliki Scoreboard in Iraq; CSIS, 10 June 2014):

• In spite of its oil wealth, Iraq has failed and remains a poor nation with the lowest per capita income of any state in the Persian Gulf except Yemen.

• The World Bank ranks Iraq as the most corrupt nation in the region except Yemen and Libya. 

• Transparency International ranks Iraq as the least transparent government in the region, and as the 171st worst country in the world out of 177 countries surveyed.

• The World Bank puts Iraq near bottom of nations in terms of rule of law, and rates its performance under Maliki as worst off than under Saddam.

• The UN ranks Iraq as 131st in the world in human development indicators, and as the worst country in the region except for Yemen in spite of Iraq’s oil income.

Iraq is on the edge of civil war. Lack of development, both politically and economically, creates fertile ground for discontent and dissent. And the sectarian policies of the government and outside regional powers pave the way for the rise of extremism that is now threatening the very existence of Iraq.

UPDATE: Aside from Mosul, several other cities have fallen to the ISIL. They include Hawija, Zab, Riyadh, Rashad and Yankaja. Also there are reports of militants in control of Qayara, Suleiman Bek, Albu Ajeel and Shirqat. ISIL has taken over a checkpoint on the outskirt of Tikrit, and have taken control of several nearby villages.

UPDATE II: ISIL is now in control of Takrit. CNN is reporting that ISF is repositioning its forces around Fallujah, bringing them back to Baghdad area to boost defense of the capital.

Photo credit: ISIL in Mosul. 10 June 2014 (rudaw.net)

ISIL Overruns Mosul

Second Largest City in Iraq

ISIL militants overran Mosul, Iraq’s second largest city, on Monday. After five days of fierce fighting, hundreds of ISIL members armed with rocket-propelled grenades, sniper rifles and machine guns seized key buildings in the city, including the provincial government’s headquarters. Reinforcements deployed to the city today by the Iraqi military failed to halt the advance by the militants. (BBC, 10 June)

Mosul becomes the second major city in Iraq to fall to ISIL. Since January, they have controlled Fallujah. They also have control over parts of Ramadi. ISIL has now established itself in Anbar and Nineveh provinces and is within threatening distance to western Baghdad.

UPDATE: Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki asked the country's parliament to declare a state of emergency after ISIL militants captured Mosul. Reports from the city indicate that police and armed forces have abandoned their posts, leaving ISIL in complete control of Mosul and its surrounding areas.

Map: BBC

Iraqi Army Launches Fallujah Offensive

Iraqi Army has launched a major new offensive to retake the city of Fallujah in Anbar province, Iraqi Ministry of Defense (MoD) announced on Friday. The Washington Post reported that 42,000 troops have been dispatched to Anbar.

The Islamic State of Iraq and Levant (ISIL) and anti-government tribesmen overran the city in January, and despite previous attempts by the army, the city remains completely out of government control. The ISIL also controls other areas in Anbar, including neighborhoods in the provincial capital of Ramadi.

The Ground Forces, Counter-Terrorism Service (CTS) forces, Iraqi Army Aviation (IAA), Ministry of Interior Forces, and tribal elements are taking part in the operation, MoD said (alsumaria.tv/iswiraq, 9 May) 

The operation, led by Anbar Operations Command, started at Naimiyah, close to Fallujah Dam, which was overrun and closed by ISIL, causing flooding around Fallujah and disrupting army’s line of communication. The MoD also said that government forces retook the control of the Tufaha Bridge in the first hours of the operation.

General Military Council for Iraqi Revolutionaries, an anti-government tribal military council, said in social media that its members responded to the attack, inflicting losses against the government security forces and were launching a counter attack. (iswiraq, 9 May)

Photo credit: Iraqi Army launching new Fallujah offensive. (alsumaria.tv)

Iraq Closes Abu Ghraib

Citing Concerns It Could Be Overrun by Insurgents

The Iraqi government said Tuesday that it had closed the Abu Ghraib prison because of fears that it could be overrun by Sunni insurgents. Iraqi Justice Ministry said it had moved 2,400 prisoners to other high-security prisons in central and northern Iraq, the New York Times reported today.

The Islamic State of Iraq and Levant (ISIL) captured Fallujah, in Anbar province, early this year. The Times is also reporting that the insurgents are in control of other areas in Anbar, including sections of Ramadi. If the insurgents are feared to overrun Abu Ghraib, they must be moving from Anbar toward western outskirts of Baghdad.

The Iraqi Army announced weeks ago it was ready to recapture Fallujah, but the Times report shows not only the insurgents are in control of the city three months after its captured, but they are also controlling sections of Ramadi and other areas in Anbar. And now they are threatening Abu Ghraib and western outskirts of Baghdad, which is home to Baghdad International Airport.

The worsening security situation in Iraq is especially troubling considering that the country will be holding its all-important parliamentary election on 30 April. Under the Iraqi constitution, the parliament chooses the prime minister. Maliki has served two terms and apparently wants to stay on for a third term.

Photo credit: Abu Ghraib Prison in western Baghdad (Andrea Bruce/The New York Times)

Iraqi Army and Syria's NDF battling Al-Qaeda fighters - Videos

Videos posted 25 January 2014:

Video depicting Iraqi Army shelling of Falluja in battling Al-Qaeda affiliated fighters, Reports indicate the city is being hit by Iraqi airstrikes and artillery fire. Elsewhere according to Iraqi sources the eastern section of Ramadi has been cleared of Al-Qaeda affiliated fighters. [video: Reuters]

Special Forces consisting of Syria National Defense Force (NDF) in the counter-insurgency role deployed to Tabqa Air Base by means of what appears to be Russian-built Mil Mi-17 type helicopter [video: al-Manar TV]

What Does ISIS Want?

Tomorrow the representatives of the Syrian regime and political opposition are due to meet at Geneva II conference in Switzerland. The aim of the UN-brokered meeting is to agree on measures including a ceasefire, prisoner release and transitional government.

The situation on the ground in Syria, however, threatens to derails talks. The opposition is factional and includes terrorist group ISIS, the Al Qaeda affiliate in Syria. The Economist had posted a brief description of the group online. To read the article, please click here.

File photo: ISIS fighters in Syria (AP/The Economist)