by Mark Pyruz
Mr. Eisenstadt's text in red:
"The Psychological, Moral, and Spiritual. The experience of the past thirty years shows that the IRI places great importance on the psychological dimensions of statecraft and strategy, and emphasizes the primacy of the moral and spiritual dimensions of war over the physical and technological. Thus, the IRI’s diplomacy and strategy emphasize achieving moral effects over physical effects, while the IRI sees the informational line of operation as the decisive one in war. Whereas the United States undertakes information operations to support its military activities, Iran frequently undertakes military activities (i.e., exercises, shows of force, and proxy operations) to support its information operations."To a greater extent, Iran's lessor emphasis placed on the the physical and technological aspect of this Cold War is due to Iran's relative disadvantges in such fields compared to the United States, as well as its unwillingness to spend exorbitant sums on defense which characterizes the American approach to defense.
"The IRI’s historical experience supports this approach. In the Shah’s Iran, clandestinely distributed tape recordings of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini’s sermons contributed to the success of the Islamic Revolution and the rise of Khomeini as its leader, while skillful propaganda spurred mass defections from the Shah’s armed forces and discouraged many still loyal to the old order."It's amusing Mr. Eisenstadt includes this reference, as it compares so well with revolutionary usage of pamphlets during the American War of Independence.
"The doctrine of resistance (moqavemat) as practiced by the IRI (as well as Hizballah, Hamas, and Syria) in their struggle with Israel and the United States, assigns primary importance to the accomplishment of psychological effects. It assumes that victory is achieved by demoralizing the enemy—through terrorizing its civilians, bleeding its armies, and denying it battlefield victories. Furthermore, it assumes that conflicts are zero sum games and that compromise is a sign of weakness that will be exploited by the enemy."There are contradictions to this all-encompassing view of Iran's approach (as well as Syria's). One glaring contradiction occurred when Iran assisted the United States during OEF at the onset of the war in Afghanistan. Iran went to great lengths in assisting the U.S. effort against the Taliban and Al-Qaida, going so far as to heavily influence the Afghan United Front into accepting U.S. terms of alliance. Of course, Iran was "rewarded" for this assistance by subsequently being branded a member of the "Axis of Evil" by President Bush, thereby throwing away any chance of a lasting detente and reinvigorating the Cold War that exists to this day.
"Since the late-1980s, the approach embodied by the principle of the expediency of the regime has prevailed, though this could eventually change, as a result of the perceived successes of the resistance doctrine in Lebanon and Gaza, the failure of the international community to halt Iran’s nuclear program, and the growing strength of the Mahdist (mahdaviyat) current in Iranian politics since the 2005 election of President Ahmadinejad."It should be pointed out that the "international community" represented by the 120-member Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) supports Iran's right to a peaceful nuclear program, including the right of nuclear fuel production.
"...the IRGC may be the only force in the region with regime protection duties that does not always get the newest and most capable systems—perhaps due to residual skepticism on its part regarding the importance of technology."Apparently Mr. Eisenstadt is unaware of the fact the IRGC controls Iran's higher-tech strategic forces, such its MRBM force (IRGC/ASF) and Cyber warfare command.
"The IRI prefers to avoid decisive engagements and head-on confrontations, and has repeatedly demonstrated a preference for “Fabian” strategies of delay, indirection, and attrition."As detailed previously, this narrative runs contrary to Iran's experience following the 2003 Paris Agreement, involving negotiations over its nuclear program.
"Intimidated, demoralized, and worn down the domestic opposition by holding show trials of opposition leaders, conducting mass arrests, and torturing and maltreating detainees"Even this contention can be sen through the context of Cold War. Consider American responses to the Cold War against the USSR and PRC, where American opposition elements were put through show trials (such as the Chicago Eight trials in 1969), and where numerous arrests and incidents of lethal fire were applied against protesters during the late 1960s and early 70s. click
HERE.
"The IRI has repeatedly demonstrated a tendency to be too clever by half and to overplay its hand in its diplomacy, business dealings, and military activities. For instance, Tehran’s: behavior unnecessarily prolonged and complicated negotiations with the United States over the
freeing of the embassy hostages, contributing to the deep distrust that to this day characterizes relations between the two countries"The Iranian perspective is different, in that the prolonged hostage negotiations ultimately intended to humiliate the seated U.S. president and influence the outcome of the 1980 election, to which it succeeded.
"Part of the reason that Iranian officials often find it difficult to close a deal or end a dispute, is their zero sum approach to conflicts, which precludes compromise, and the fear that in a political system characterized by extreme factionalism, rivals will claim that they could have done better. (Thus, the decision to end the Iran- Iraq War in 1988 and to temporarily suspend the enrichment of uranium in 2003, remain contentious issues in Iranian politics.) There is little sense of the utility of achieving a mutually beneficial compromise or of reaching a deal. The emphasis is on getting all one can, and of avoiding concessions."For reasons preciously stated (Iran's perspective in its war aim against Saddam, as well as Iranian assistance toward the U.S. at the onset of OEF in Afghanistan), this view contains historical contradictions.
"Conclusions: Countering Soft Power. Washington tends to focus on the Tehran’s hard power assets, at the expense of its soft power capabilities. The IRI’s soft power, however, may be a more effective means of projecting Iranian influence in the Middle East and may constitute the greater long-term threat to U.S. interests in the region. The United States needs to focus more attention and devote greater resources to countering Iran’s soft power."Easier said then done, as Iran is a regionally positioned player (as opposed to the U.S., which is an extra-regional player), with longstanding historical, cultural and social ties to the region as a whole.
"Propaganda and Psychological Warfare. U.S. policy makers tend to underestimate the value of the informational instrument of national power. By contrast, policy makers in the IRI consider information activities as their decisive line of operations. As a result, the U.S. has not exploited Tehran’s extraordinary vulnerabilities in this arena, or reaped the benefits that aggressive information activities might yield."For decades now, there have been so many US and privately funded propaganda efforts directed at the Islamic Republic of Iran, it is incredible that Mr. Eisenstadt advocates even greater resources be employed. At some point a diminishing return becomes evident, and that point was reached years ago.
"Piercing the Veil of Ambiguity. The United States has not been effective at preventing Tehran from exploiting the ambiguity that shrouds many of its policies, whether proxy operations or its nuclear program."It can be argued that the U.S. has been very effective in piercing the "veil of ambiguity" concerning Iran's nuclear program. Consider Juan Cole's argument that:
1. The U.S. entices defectors from the nuclear program and debrief them. Some come out of with documents. No weapons program.
2. The U.S. has world-beating signals intelligence capabilities. Telephone calls made by military and nuclear program officials are under surveillance. No evidence from signals of a weapons program. In fact in 2007 a call was intercepted by an angry IRGC commander complaining bitterly about the decision not to weaponize.
3. IAEA inspectors certify that no uranium has been diverted to military purposes– i.e. the seals are unbroken.
4. Inspectors find no signature of highly enriched uranium or plutonium
5. Enriching to 95% would be power and water intensive and any such facility could be detected by satellite and other intelligence.
The concern is not that there is a weapons program, it is that the civilian enrichment program might be made a platform at some point in the future for a crash high-enrichment program, using the stock of low enriched uranium already at hand. That is what is meant by a two-year window once a decision to weaponize has been made. But the intelligence estimates are that no such decision has been made, and likely none will be. Moreover, the two-year window has been repeatedly alleged of such programs, and was with regard to Iraq, and in the latter case it was a fantasy.
Missiles are irrelevant and a red herring."Deterring Adventurism. How does one deal with a political system run by politicians who thrive on isolation and conflict with the outside world, or deter decision makers who—inspired by the IRI’s resistance narrative or by mahdist ideology—might, under certain circumstances, welcome conflict?"Facts do not support Mr. Eisenstadt's contention that Iran "thrive[s] on isolation and conflict with the outside world. Consider Iran's more recent conference on terrorism in 2011, where high-ranking delegates from the United Nations, the Organization of the Islamic Conference, the Asia Cooperation Dialogue, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, the Economic Cooperation Organization, the African Union and Interpol attended. Then consider the recent "Tehran International Conference on Disarmament and Non-Proliferation, 2010" where experts and officials from some 70 countries attended.
"Countering Iran’s “Fabian” Strategy. Iran’s strategies of indirection, delay, and attrition are predicated on the assumption that time works in its favor."A response to this assertion has already been provided.
An alternate to Mr. Eisenstadt's advocacy of a perpetuating policy of Cold War directed by the U.S. toward the Islamic Republic of Iran is best put forward by U.S. policy advocates Flynt and Hillary Mann Leverett, where they state:
"The absence of US-Iranian rapprochement will perpetuate the new Middle Eastern Cold War, imposing costs on the United States, Iran and other regional and international players. However, in strategic terms, the heaviest costs of continued US-Iranian estrangement are likely to be borne by the United States. In particular, lack of productive relations with Tehran will contribute significantly to Washington’s failure to achieve important policy objectives in the Middle East, thereby conditioning further erosion of America’s regional standing and influence."
"As the new regional Cold War plays out, analysts suggest different scenarios for how the ongoing strategic competition between the United States and Iran will evolve. Some, like former Germany Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer, see this competition as a struggle for regional hegemony in the Middle East comparable to that in late nineteenth century Europe following German unification; from this perspective, Fischer warns that, without careful handling, tensions between the United States and the Islamic Republic could ultimately erupt in a large-scale military confrontation. Others, like Fareed Zakaria, believe that the United States and its regional and international partners will move inexorably toward a posture of containing and deterring the Islamic Republic and its allies, in a manner reminiscent of the West’s Cold War posture toward the Soviet Union.”
“Against the backdrop of these scenarios, we argue that the United States and the Islamic Republic of Iran should transcend the prospects for hegemonial war of strategic standoff and seek a fundamental realignment of their relations, in a manner similar to the realignment in relations between the United States and the People’s Republic of China during Richard Nixon’s tenure in the White House. We further argue that such a fundamental realignment of US-Iranian relations can only be achieved through a comprehensive rapprochement between Washington and Tehran.”
"As the new regional Cold War plays out, analysts suggest different scenarios for how the ongoing strategic competition between the United States and Iran will evolve. Some, like former Germany Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer, see this competition as a struggle for regional hegemony in the Middle East comparable to that in late nineteenth century Europe following German unification; from this perspective, Fischer warns that, without careful handling, tensions between the United States and the Islamic Republic could ultimately erupt in a large-scale military confrontation. Others, like Fareed Zakaria, believe that the United States and its regional and international partners will move inexorably toward a posture of containing and deterring the Islamic Republic and its allies, in a manner reminiscent of the West’s Cold War posture toward the Soviet Union.”
“Against the backdrop of these scenarios, we argue that the United States and the Islamic Republic of Iran should transcend the prospects for hegemonial war of strategic standoff and seek a fundamental realignment of their relations, in a manner similar to the realignment in relations between the United States and the People’s Republic of China during Richard Nixon’s tenure in the White House. We further argue that such a fundamental realignment of US-Iranian relations can only be achieved through a comprehensive rapprochement between Washington and Tehran.” For a fuller explanation of the Leveretts' U.S. policy advocacy towards the Islamic Republic of Iran, click
HERE:
