Short list of notes on the election and Rouhani's victory

By Mark Pyruz

 

1) It's hoped that the election of Rouhani will facilitate better relations between the U.S. and Islamic Republic of Iran. A "Going to Tehran" moment or variation thereof as advocated by the Leveretts is now made easier. Better relations with the U.S. are the only way to allieviate the current national security posture adopted out of need by IRI. Better relations also offers the potential for economic improvement affecting ordinary Iranians, as well as more liberalized social conditions.

2) The large voter turnout (72%) caught many Iran "experts" here in the U.S. by surprise. It shouldn't have. Representation in government is an IRI hallmark. Say what one will of Iran's form of governance, the people continue to come out and vote. Together with the persuasive evidence of methodologically sound public opinion polls, it is clear ordinary Iranians inside Iran continue to maintain their stake in their Islamic Republic. 

3) Contrary to many opinions by Iran "experts" here in the U.S., this election result was not a defeat for the Leader branch of government and Khamenei, personally. In elections, Khamenei continues to advocate provision for a choice from amongst the IRI qualified political spectrum.

4) Even with the additional voting for city and village councils, this year's presidential election was conducted in a more methodical and planned manner. There were a number of changes made for this election that made the process straightforward and run smoother, including:

a) Electoral Commission announced the results after the Ministry of Interior confirmation.

b) The Ministry of Interior, under the Electoral Commission was the official reference for the election.

c) Television debates were mandated to be be live.

d) If disparaging personal claims about one candidate took place in a debate, that candidate was mandated time to defend himself in upcoming televised programs.

5) Rasfanjani's disqualification actually meant more to Ahmadinejad. The precedent has been made, where previous presidents can be disqualified from running again after the four years between terms. Ahmadinejad must realize the odds are against him being qualified in 2017; of course, depending on a variety of factors at the time this could change.

6) It was actually best that Rasfanjani was disqualified as had he been elected, the Argentina bombing incident would have been used against him and the country on the international stage.

Notable presidential candidates, registered (1)

Registration of candidates for Iran's presidency take place from May 7-11, 2013. Subsequently, registered candidates are qualified through the Guardian Council and those accepted placed on the ballot.

Notable presidential candidates registered so far:

Conservatives 

Sadeq Vaeez Zadeh, Head of National Elites Foundation (2006–2009)
Kamran Bagheri Lankarani, Minister of Health (2005–2009)
Ruhollah Ahmadzadeh, Head of Cultural Heritage Organization (2011–2012)

Reformists 

Hassan Rouhani, Secretary of Supreme National Security Council (1989–2005)
Mostafa Kavakebian, Member of the Parliament (2004–2012)

Independents 

Mohammad Saeedikia, Minister of Housing and Urban Development (2005–2009)
Ghasem Sholeh-Saadi, Former Member of Parliament
Hassan Sobhani, Member of the Parliament (1996–2008)

Source: Wikipedia

Iranian Elections--"Reformists" Meet with Khamenei

By: Jabbar Fazeli, MD

Reformist newspaper Etemaad (not to be confused with the closed Etemad-e Melli, which was affiliated with the opposition figure Karoobi) reported today that the supreme leader met with three reformist figures (1). The paper did not divulge the date of the meeting. This would be the first such meeting in the past 3.5 years.

With the presidential elections drawing near, it is still unclear whether the "reformist" candidates will be allowed to run. As most are aware, the "democratic" system in Iran is unique in that you are "free" to vote for whomever you want so long as he or she is one of the "preselected" group of individuals with proven loyalty to the IR regime. In 2009, many would argue that having failed to disqualify the "opposition" candidates from running, the regime resorted to vote rigging. 

The government body in charge of approving and disqualifying candidates is the Guardian Council (2). It consists of twelve members, half appointed directly by the supreme leader, and the other half are nominated by the judiciary and then approved by parliament. The head of the "Guardian Council", Ayatollah Janati gave an interview on Dec 14, 2012 in which he made it clear that “seditionists [a term used for reformists] could not participate in the [2013] elections" and that "they should have no misgivings about that" (3,4). It is worth noting that Janati was public in his support for Ahmadinejad's candidacy during the last "election".

For "reformists" it remains to be seen if they would even participate in the elections, and if they do, how many candidates, if any, would be considered loyal enough by the regime to allow their names on the ballot.

Even though the supreme leader has in the past pressured the guardian council to reverse their decisions to bar some candidates, there is no indications that he would do so this time around (7). The three reformists meeting with the supreme leader may still be holding hope that he might.

Aside from the fairness issue, there is no guarantee the election itself would be free at the ballot box (no international or independent monitors are allowed). Rafsanjani, Ahmadinejad, and Rezai, among others, have called for a "free and transparent election" but they were rebuffed by the supreme leader when he said that "hinting at the need for transparent and free elections plays in the hand of the enemies"(headline below).

The Supreme leader's representative in the IRGC was very open about the appropriateness of engineering the elections for the greater good (5). Whatever the degree of engineering by the IRGC, the Guardian Council, and the supreme leader, the IRGC is guaranteed to be a major player in this election, at least as the power on the street that insures the regime's survival, regardless of the election outcome.(6)

Irannewsnow.com

Even if by some miracle reformist names make it into the ballots and the IRGC allows them to win in a free and unengineered vote, we would end up with another Khatami-like era, where reformist ideas didn't see the light of day, as the supreme leader still has final say and veto power over every decision made by the elected president and the parliament. 

Despite all the political drama, the upcoming election in Iran is unlikely to alter the perception that the IR is a true dictatorship despite its complex democratic facade.

References:

(1) http://www.etemaad.ir/Released/91-11-30/150.htm

(2) http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/shared/spl/hi/middle_east/03/iran_power/html/guardian_council.stm

(3) http://www.farsnews.com/newstext.php?nn=13910924000205

(4) http://www.bbc.co.uk/persian/iran/2012/12/121214_l44_janati_presidential_election92.shtml

(5) http://www.uskowioniran.com/2013/01/reasonable-engineering-of-elections-is.html

(6)http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/tehranbureau/2012/08/the-guards-strategic-brain-trust-part-1-ghasem-soleimani-and-ahmad-vahidi.html

(7)http://www.nytimes.com/2004/01/15/world/iranian-cleric-rules-in-favor-of-some-reformist-candidates.html

Photo credit: demdigest.net