Egyptian Field Marshal Abdul-Halim Abu Ghazalah on the Combat Tactics and Strategy of the Iran-Iraq War (Part 2)

A response to a book review penned by Youssef Aboul-Enein, Andrew Bertrand and Dorothy Corley at SWJ


by Mark Pyruz

The following is a response to part 2 of a book review on Egyptian Field Marshal Abdul-Halim Abu Ghazalah's "Combat Tactics and Strategy of the Iran-Iraq War" put forward by Youssef Aboul-Enein, Andrew Bertrand and Dorothy Corley, recently published in three parts by Small Wars Journal. (See HERE, HERE and HERE.) This writer's response to Part 1 can be found HERE. Let us proceed with Part 2 (reviewers passages in blue, this writer's responses in black and excerpts taken from ACIG sources in green):

"Phase I (August to November 1980), D+1: One Iraqi infantry division crossed into the Iranian border and secured the line of Zeinquwa, al-Sukra, and Bir Ali in Iran’s Bakhlian Region." 

This writer is unfamiliar with these locations given these specific spellings. It's possible CDR Aboul-Enein et al are referring to Iraq Army (IrA) 4th Infantry Division's attack and capture of Penjwin after two days of fierce fighting against Iranian border troops, gendarmerie, and the local Pasdaran, Basij, and Mostafazin units (source: ACIG.org).

"D+2 (17 August 1980): Iraqi air forces pounded the cities of Khoramshahr, Qasr-Shireen, Mehran, Ahvaz, Tehran, Tabriz, Isfahan, and Shiraz. However, the air strikes were not successful, as the Iraqis spread their air forces too thin, and the air raids were not coordinated with the advancing Iraqi ground units. Although the air raids mirrored the 1967 Six-Day War in concept, they utterly failed in competence, equipment, and capability." 

"...while the Iraqis attempted to replicate the Israeli 1967 combined air and land strike, they miscalculated distances, resilience of Iranians, and the inability of Iraq to sustain air and ground forces as well as a failure to concentrate Iraqi air and ground forces at decisive Iranians points." 

CDR Aboul-Enein et al appear to have their date wrong. The formal opening of the IrAF air war took place on 22 September 1980, with the IrAF attacking ten airfields in Iran.

Per "I Persian Gulf War: Iraqi Invasion of Iran, September 1980" by Tom Cooper and Farzad Bishop: 

The [IrAF] air offensive – flown by heavily armed aircraft but lacking the needed capabilities, and pilots lacking proper training – turned into a complete failure. Not even another try on the following morning could preclude the Islamic Republic of Iran Air Force (IRIAF) responding in full power. For instance, only four hours after the first Iraqi attack, four Iranian F-4 Phantoms bombed Rashid AB in southern Baghdad, and – utilizing IIAF-era contingency plans – on the morning of September 23, no less than 140 Iranian F-4D/E Phantoms, F-5E/Fs and F-14As – responded with a full-fledged aerial onslaught against Iraq. Thus a relative “aerial siege” of Iraq was initiated, which was to last for almost a week, during which the IRIAF continued to put large formations of fighter-bombers over Iraq each morning, systematically destroying Iraqi oil-production, reducing Iraq air war fighting capabilities, and forcing the repositioning of large parts of the IrAF to airfields in Western Iraq. Equipped with ECM pods, BL.755 CBUs, and Mk.80 series of bombs, and using specially reconnoitered ingress corridors, the Iranians had little difficulty in flying nearly unmolested deep into Iraq. If the IrAF managed to intercept any formation, its fighters were usually detected in time, and shot down in large numbers. For example, on September 25, no less than five MiG-21s and MiG-23s were shot down in a single air combat near Baghdad, in exchange for two damaged Phantoms. 


For the IrAF the invasion of Iran came at the time it was in the middle of receiving a total of 240 new aircraft and helicopters from the USSR, as well as expecting the arrival of the first 16 Dassault Mirage F.1EQs from France. In reaction to the Iraqi invasion, and expecting the war to last only a few weeks, both the Soviets and the French stopped delivery of additional aircraft to Iraq, and re-started it only in December 1980. Consequently, the IrAF had to fight the first few months of the war with obsolete or poorely equipped types. It was still heavily dependable on the MiG-21, which was no match for either the Iranian F-4 Phantom or F-14 Tomcat. Iraqis hoped that their MiG-23s could even the match to a degree, but the type suffered heavy losses: betwen 13 September 1980 and 31 January 1981 no less but 40 were shot down. Consequently, it was the Su-20/22 series that silently developed into the Iraqi "battle wagon": although never sufficiently well-equipped the Sukhois were gradually upgraded and became the first Iraqi fighters equipped with stand-off precision-guided ammunition, in turn bearing the brunt of the attrition war against Iran. 

"The former Egyptian Defense Minister believed that the Iraqis suffered from very poor planning and a profound lack of understanding of the terrain. They achieved the 800-kilometer line 20-60 kilometers inside Iran with no concentrated effort towards achieving a breakthrough. The Iraqis failed attempt to capture Abadan was attributed to a lack of coordination between commander, infantry and artillery. The Iraqi General Staff, knowing Abadan was a port town, did not anticipate naval reinforcements, and did not consider implementing a blockade with their coastal patrol craft." 

The Iraqis operated on a heavily modified and updated British plan for intervention into Iran, first envisioned in the 1950s. At this stage in the conflict, Iraqi ground ops were heavily influenced by past British examples. Referring to the successful resistance at Abadan, the field marshal apparently understates the determination of IRGC defenders, which greatly surprised the Iraqis. As for utilizing Iraqi coastal patrol craft, they no doubt would have suffered the same level of destruction sustained a few months later during Operation Morvarid.

"The Iraqi obsession with capturing cities, towns and villages led to massive casualties due to urban fighting. Iraqi armed forces were unable to exploit breakthrough operations following the main effort because of their lack of knowledge and initiative regarding the terrain. Maneuver warfare was a concept alien in practice to the Iraqi General Staff, who employed tanks in mountainous terrain as immobile artillery pieces." 

To a degree, the Iraqis did engage in exploitation. "Tank-raids" deep over the open terrain between Iranian cities several times surprised the Iranian High Command, causing shock and chaos between scattered Iranian units that were badly outnumbered, and overstretched in an attempt to defend too large parts of the frontlines. (Source ACIG.org)

"Iraq enjoyed superiority in aircraft, but no thought was given to use this arm to isolate Iranian logistical lines, or to prevent the reinforcement of Abadan. The focus among Iraqi air planners was to replicate the successful air raids of the 1967 Six-Day War, and focus on airfields, aircraft and air defenses, as the Israelis had done against Egypt, Syria and Jordan with overwhelming success. However, the raids were not nearly as successful as they were in 1967. As the war progressed, Iran would begin to successfully mount deep air strikes into Iraq when they could garner the ability to sortie aircraft."

This is plain wrong. Iraq did not enjoy superiority in aircraft during this phase of the conflict. It's incredible the field marshal is so ignorant of such details for this period of the air war, as it is known a small number of Egyptian pilots actually participated in combat within the IrAF (one is known to have been shot down in a MiG-21). The IrAF was savaged by the IRIAF, and the IrA bore the brunt of IRIAF interdiction missions, which served to undermine an already tenuous IrA logistical effort.

"After the initial attack Iraqi units became complacent and failed to prepare for the possibility of an Iranian counter-attack. Some Iraqi units stopped after the initial attack and did not set up in terrain advantageous to repelling a counter-attack. Soldiers did not question NCOs, and NCOs did not question junior officers, and junior officers did not question senior officers. Had someone simply put forth the idea of preparing for a counter-attack, the Iraqi units would have been far better prepared and able to defend themselves more efficiently." 

It is here where this writer has a hard time understanding how the Egyptian field marshal could expect so much from the inexperienced Iraqi army, where for two straight wars similar deficiencies in the Egyptian army had led to the utter routing of its forces in Sinai, and a third war had seen the bulk of its forces surrounded and invested, under siege and without access to its supply line, all in a span of days or a little over a week.

"The initial Iranian response to Iraq’s offensive attack was slow and ineffective. One early tactical blunder was the use of Shiite Peoples Brigades, a formation of irregular mass infantry formations like the Basij. They were uncontrollable in battle and their inexperience and tendency to panic while attached to more disciplined Iraqi formations caused the collapse and surrender of several border cities to Iraq. The reason why Iraqi forces did not penetrate deeper into Iranian territory was due to Iraqi combat idiosyncrasies and the dispatch of IRCG units, who, although they had no combat experience, were better armed and possessed sheer revolutionary and Islamist radical zeal. Iranians finally deployed American made cobra gunships to effectively halt Iraqi advances. Only days before the battle, the Iranians had placed the gunships in storage due to a lack of maintenance and the requisite technical knowledge to keep them operational, but in desperation were able to field the cobra gunships. This first phase of the war ended in November 1980 in a static defense reminiscent of World War I trench warfare, but with late 20th century weaponry." 

Again, the field marshal's air war narrative for this period of the conflict is deeply flawed. Also, at this point, the IRGC were not as well equipped as the Islamic Republic of Iran Army (IRIA). That the IRGC were highly motivated volunteers is correct.

"Phase II (November 1980 to late August 1981)" 

For some reason the effective destruction of the Iraqi Navy by the IRIAF and Islamic Republic of Iran Navy (IRIN) is left unmentioned.

"Saddam Hussein and his General Staff wanted Khomeini to seek a peace treaty while they still retained Iranian territory. The Iraqis failed to understand the depth of Islamist Revolutionary zeal, and the unifying power Iraq’s invasion would have on the Iranian public. The Iraqis escalated, firing SCUD-missiles on the cities of Dezful and Ahvaz, as terror weapons to bring the war to the Iranian public. The Iraqis lost control of Khoramshahr, and the 38th Infantry Division was deployed to recapture the city and to break the siege of Abadan. The Iraqis dug deep into a defensive holding position during the Abadan operation without attempting to exploit Iranian weaknesses. However, the Iraqis did not pay attention to the sea, and it made no sense to seal the city without blockading the seaward approach which provided the Iranians a method of keeping their defensive positions re-supplied." 

Actually, it was Saddam Hussein that sought a ceasefire multiple times during this period of the conflict and beyond. As said previously, the IRGC were a highly motivated force that while under-equipped fought well. As with his deeply flawed understanding of the air war, the field marshal appears equally in the dark regarding the naval war. Operation Morvarid which took place during this period underscored Iraq Navy weaknesses when pitted against IRIN and IRAF.

"The style of tactics used in the first year of the war included the staging of division level formations in Susangard and Ahvaz in mid-January 1981. Tactics also consisted of commanders pointing battalions towards the captured Iranian cities and the Iraqi border, and ordering them to simply advance. It is worth noting that such tactics were not seen since the carnage of World War I, where troops marched into the jaws of machine gun fire. Kenneth M. Pollack, in his volume titled Arabs at War, indicates that the success of these “mobilization battalions” during a battle close to the city of Qasr-e Shirin “convinced the mullahs in Tehran that large-scale infantry assaults relying on the Islamic fervor of the Revolutionary guards and the Basij were their ace in the hole”."

Actually there are many examples of such tactics being employed after WWI, the best known examples being occasions of use by the Soviet Army and Red Army. As for "convinced the mullahs" of an "ace in the hole", there were military matters of practicality that will be entailed later.

"Abu Ghazalah notes in his book that he was astonished to learn that the Iraqis did not regroup their armored divisions for an offensive, and instead simply entrenched and reacted to Iranian attacks. The Iraqis failed to comprehend and apply the lessons learned following each Iranian attack, while the Iranians began to gradually close their learning curve in combat tactics, giving them a piecemeal advantage. Iraqi artillery was spread across the 800-kilometer front instead of being redeployed and concentrated in sectors where it could have supported armored and infantry assaults."

Apparently, the field marshal is unaware of the true state of the IrA at this stage of the conflict. The first Battle of Khorramshar proved to be a "Kursk" moment for the Iraqi Army, lasting for much of the war.

Per "I Persian Gulf War: Iraqi Invasion of Iran, September 1980" by Tom Cooper and Farzad Bishop:

The battle of Khorramshahr lasted for 34 days, and saw an immense investment of Iraqi forces, far beyond what Iraqi war plans envisaged. In turn, this battle enabled the Iranians to stablize front-lines at Dezful, Ahwaz and Susangerd, and move reinforcements to Khuzestan: by the time Khorramshahr fell, the Iraqi Army units deployed to capture this province were no longer facing just the Iranian 92nd AD, but also the 16th AD, 21th ID, and 77th ID. The City of Khoramshahr was eventually captured by the Iraqis after exceptionally bitter fighting for every house, floor and room - where Iranian air power could not play a dominant role or be effective - but during which the Iraqis suffered such heavy losses that they never attempted anything similar with any other Iranian city again. By the time Khoramshahr fell, Iraqi Army strategic reserves were drained down to a point where they were incapable of re-starting any offensive operations for years to come. 

"Phase III (August 1981 to March 1982): The Iranians go on the offensive. There were limited Iranian attacks in the Northern Sector prior to the start of phase III that penetrated the Nusood area and reached a depth of approximately 6 kilometers; the Iraqis regained the territory two days later on 4 January 1981. These limited attacks were conducted in preparation for a massive attack planned for November 1981, with one armor division, one infantry division, and 10,000 IRGC forces in the Soma Region (Central Sector). The Iranians succeeded in re-occupying the city of Bostan and its surrounding villages during the offensive. The Iraqis responded by repelling the attack with the forces on hand; there was no thought to utilizing reserves despite their availability in Baghdad and near the Jordanian-Syrian border."

This is where regional positioning favored Iran, as did the relative legitimacy of its regime. Iraq was forced to maintain forces away from the Iran front, in regions bordering hostile relations, and where a strong force was necessary to check any potential popular uprising. Iran, on the other hand, could concentrate its forces in the west against Iraq, with little problems on its other borders and a very popular mandate to repel the invader.

"Iranian air forces were only capable of performing 30-40 sorties per day, a negligible amount given the size of Iraq. Iran stiffened its anti-air (AA) defenses, and purchased much-needed SAM-missile batteries from Syria. The newly acquired AA assets were used in the capital, Tehran. In the first two years of the war, Iran acquired AA assets from the Soviets, North Korea and Libya. However, the AA defenses, such as Libyan SAM-6 units, did not equal the sophisticated early air war system possessed by the Iraqis and supplied by the French." 

Again, a flawed rendering of the air war at this stage of the conflict.

Per "Fire in the Hills: Iranian and Iraqi Battles of Autumn 1982" by Tom Cooper & Farzad Bishop:

By January 1981, the Iranians already felt capable of starting a counteroffensive, but their first large offensive, Operation Howeizeh, initiated on January 5, ended in failure and caused considerable losses in equipment of the regular forces. As a result, for the next few years the IRIAF and the Army were not to intensively join into offensive operations, except in support of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC). Nevertheless, this support often proved indispensable. For example, during the retaking of Khoramshahr, in September 1982, and the final expulsion of the Iraqis from Iran, in the Spring of 1982, the IRIAF – but also the Iranian Army Aviation (IRIAA) – destroyed huge amounts of Iraqi equipment. The IrAF, on the other hand, after a short breathing space during the spring and summer of 1981, was nevertheless at the end of its strength, by late 1982. Only huge urgent deals with China – facilitated with Egyptian and Saudi help – as well as renewed deliveries of replacement equipment from the USSR (stopped earlier in protest to the Iraqi invasion of Iran), saved it from annihilation.

"While the Iranians analyzed, adjusted and re-positioned their forces, the Iraqi General Staff kept their initial front line units deployed and gave little thought to fatigue. Iraq did nothing to refresh front-line units or re-organize defenses during the first several months of phase III, which was a period of high attrition. It never set up layered kill zones or defenses in depth, and reserves were never decisively deployed to counter Iranian assaults. Iraqi armor was used as immobile artillery. This sort of tactical error negated the advantage Iraq enjoyed in tanks. Unlike the Iranians, who began to concentrate their artillery, the Iraqis still spread their artillery sporadically along the 800-kilometer front. Had the Iraqis concentrated their artillery, it could have helped to prevent the Iranian recapture of Abadan. Iran was able to adapt and evolve throughout the war, giving them the advantage over a complacent Iraqi strategy." 

"The year 1982 saw the peak of Iranian human wave assaults. Iranian success in mass assaults at night led to a May 1982 Iraqi withdrawal from Khoramshah [sic] after the Iranians had successfully retaken Mehran, Susangard, Somar and Qasr Shireen."

This writer realizes this is a very general overview being put forth by the reviewers, but to limit the successful Iranian liberation of Khorramshar to a single line of a few words appears far too trite. After all, this is supposed to be a study on Iran's military. It is also the opinion of this writer that the field marshal is overestimating combat ratings of IrA units and their potential for the tactical initiative during this period of the conflict. Many of Iraq's best troops were by now casualties, and the level of training had been severely reduced.

Per "Fire in the Hills: Iranian and Iraqi Battles of Autumn 1982" by Tom Cooper & Farzad Bishop:

After 18 months of fighting, in 1982, the Iranian ground forces finally managed to organize themselves sufficiently to expel Iraqi forces from Iranian soil. In a series of offensives undertaken between March and June, the Iranians out-maneuvered and overwhelmed the main contingent of the Iraqi Army inside the Iranian province of Khuzestan, which was completely liberated in the process. During this fighting, the Iraqi military was truly battered: its strength fell from 210,000 to 150,000 troops; over 20,000 Iraqi soldiers were killed and almost 30,000 captured; two out of four active armored divisions and at least three mechanized divisions were decimated to less than a brigade strength, and the Iranians captured over 450 tanks and APCs .The IrAF was left in no better shape, and after losing up to 55 aircraft since early December 1981, could count with barely 100 intact fighter-bombers and interceptors: a defector who flew his MiG-21 to Syria, in June 1982, revealed that the IrAF had only three squadrons of fighter-bombers left capable of mounting offensive operations into Iran at the time. The Iraqi Army Air Corps (IrAAC) was perhaps in a better state and could still operate more than 70 helicopters. The fighting in 1982 also took its tolls of the Iranian forces, but losses were not as heavy as those suffered by the Iraqis and despite the hard-felt lack of heavy weapons and empty ammunition depots spirits were high. 

"Operation Ramadan commenced on the evening of 13 July 1982, at 2215 hours. The Iranians deployed an initial strike force of one infantry division, two armored divisions and 30,000 IRGC troops who fought until 1000 the next day and advanced 15 kilometers into Basra’s suburbs. Iraqis countered with an infantry division, reinforced by an armored brigade, made more potent with the deployment of attack helicopters and pushed the Iranian force back 10 kilometers, leaving the net territorial gain for the Iranians at only 5 kilometers, amidst tremendous casualties." "Abu Ghazalah notes that the Iranian offensives on Basra were merely uncoordinated wave assaults with IRGC, who either walked or were driven to the front for slaughter." 

The reviewers offer too simple a narrative for the Iranian side.

Per "Fire in the Hills: Iranian and Iraqi Battles of Autumn 1982" by Tom Cooper & Farzad Bishop:

The Iranians supposed wrongly that they would hit one of the weak points in the enemy defenses whilst Iraqi military was still in turmoil after recent defeats, but they lacked proper intelligence. It was completely unknown to them that the Iraqis had learned about the preparations for RAMADHAN, and had reinforced the defenses of Basrah by additional units pulled back from the central and northern front sectors. As a result, the under-trained Pasdaran and Basij forces attacked some of the heaviest fortified Iraqi positions in the Zeid (Fish Lake) and Shalamcheh areas, and after a week of fighting were stopped in a hail of Iraqi defensive fire and flanking maneuvers. Even Iranian Chieftain MBTs and BMP-1 APCs of the 16th and 92nd Armored Division could not change the outcome. 


During this offensive, the IRGC for the first time deployed some of its armor, mainly T-55 MBTs and Type 63/531 APCs of the recently-established 30th IRGC Armored Division, all of which had been captured from the Iraqis during the previous engagement, for the first time were being grouped as independent units. Iranian armored units were supported by the 21st and 77th Infantry Divisions, 58th Commando and 23rd Special Forces Brigades,22nd and 33rd Artillery Groups, as well as the 1st, 3rd, 5th and 7th Infantry Divisions IRGC. The Islamic Republic of Iran Army Aviation (IRIAA) also deployed a sizable helicopter division, including 34 Bell AH-1J/T Cobras, and a number of Bell 204s, Bell 206s, Bell 214s,and Boeing CH-47 Chinooks in support role.But the Iraqis instructed also by a team of East German advisors now started operating their Mil Mi-25 Hind and Aérospatiale SA.342L Gazelle attack helicopters in “hunter/killer” teams, which proved especially effective. The tactics used by the IrAAC hunter/killer teams were simple but highly effective, as it put the best capabilities of both helicopter types to advantage: the Mi-25s would go in first and roll over the Iranian positions firing 57 mm unguided rockets, trying to suppress the anti-aircraft positions. The Gazelles would follow, using the confusion to fire their HOT ATGMs) against singled-out Iranian tanks. 

"The Iranians devised Operation Muslim ibn Aqeel as a result of Iran’s bloody experience during Operation Blessed Ramadan. Abu Ghazalah writes with great outrage that the Iraqis allowed the Iranians to regroup and conduct preparations for what was obviously another offensive without so much as disrupting them with air, armor or even artillery. Operation Muslim ibn Aqeel commenced on 1 October 1982, to occupy strategic hills that would cut off Basra’s road to Abadan. A force of one armored and one infantry division was assembled and reinforced with 20,000 IRGC skirmishers. The attack began at 0100, using Samar as a base and attacking the Iraqi village of Mandlee. This simple assault became an ebb and flow of Iranian attack and Iraqi counter-attack, employing the same tactics repeatedly as continued attrition decreased the number of forces available for each subsequent attack. Incredibly the Iraqis never learned the important lessons of denying the ability for the Iranians to regroup, and the Iranians never learned that the frontal assault was no longer effective."

Another oversimplification of the battle, particularly from the Iranian side.

Per "Fire in the Hills: Iranian and Iraqi Battles of Autumn 1982" by Tom Cooper and Farzad Bishop: 

The MUSLIM-IBN-AQIL offensive was launched on the evening of 1 October 1982, with small IRGC units in high spirits attacking Iraqi positions high on the hills, followed by mechanized Army units in the morning. Shortly after the dawn, the F-5Es from Omidiyeh TFB.5 and F-4Es from Hamedan/Nojeh TFB.3 flew their first strikes, hitting the nearby Iraqi logistical centres. On the ground, there was a lack of co-ordination between the IRIAS and the IRGC units and so the battle soon developed into a bloody struggle for every hill. The Iranian advance was very slow, and by 4 October they still had not reached Mandali. On the contrary, the Iraqis counterattacked towards Sumar, supported by artillery and helicopter gunships. That was the start of a massive air-land battle. 


According to the original plan for MUSLIM-IBN-AQIL, the 31st and 33rd TFS’s were to support the operation by flying nine to 12 strike sorties per day, with the 51st and 53rd TFS’s following with a similar number of close air support sorties. This was clearly not enough, so the IRIAA Cobras did their best by flying numerous daily combat missions per airframe and the crew. 


The IrAF responded by sending more and more fighter-bombers as it deployed additional units at airfields near the front. But, the IRIAF then deployed one MIM-23 HAWK SAM site to cover the battlefield near Mandali, which became operational on the morning of 5 October, downing one MiG-23BN. In the middle of persistent quarrels between the IRIA and the IRGC, on the evening of the same day the Iranians started the next phase of their operation, this time better combining their infantry and armour. In the event, they were stopped on the hill overlooking Mandali, some two or three kilometres outside the city. Some outskirts of Mandali were held only very briefly, as in the morning the Basij unit was hit by Army artillery’s friendly fire after it started an attack almost two hours too early. 


The Iraqis deployed their special forces brigade of the Republican Guards, trained for combat in urban areas and heavily supported by Mi-25 and SA.342 “hunter/killer” teams. By 7 October, the Iranians had lost their positions overlooking Mandali; but, they held off the other Iraqi counterattacks and also claimed seven Iraqi fighter-bombers as shot down, in addition to liberating 150 km2 of their own soil. Subsequently, the IRIAF resorted to counter attacks against the local Iraqi airfields at Subakhu, Baqubah, and Sheikh Jassem, forcing the IrAF to temporarily disperse its fighters concentrated there. 

 For some reason, the reviewers have neglected to mention Operation Moharram.

 End of Part 2

Iraq Oil Exports Booming

Iraq’s crude-oil exports have soared to nearly 2.5 million barrels per day, a 20-percent increase over last year. The Iraqi boom – coupled with increased production in Saudi Arabia and the near total recovery of Libya’s oil industry — is expected to stabilize oil prices, probably even after the sanctions against Iran’s oil take effect in July.

[The New York Times, 3 June].

‘Lightening’ Response to An Israeli Attack - Khamenei

Iran's Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei said today that any Israeli attack would be answered with a “lightening” response by Iran.

"Should they take any wrong step, any inappropriate move, it will fall on their heads like lightning," Ayatollah Khamenie warned in a speech marking the 23rd anniversary of the death of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, the leader of the 1979 Islamic Revolution.

"The obstacles enemies are creating in our path won't have any effect. Sanctions are ineffective. Sanctions can't stop the Iranian nation from moving forward," Khamenei added.

"The only effect these unilateral and multilateral sanctions have on the Iranian nation is that they deepen hatred and animosity toward the West in the heart of our people," he said.

Source: IRNA / The New York Times translation

Iran Invites Latin American Leaders to Attend NAM Summit in Tehran

An Iranian delegation headed by Second Vice President Ali Saeedlou has wrapped up a tour of Cuba, Venezuela, Nicaragua, Bolivia and Ecuador, extending presidential invitations to their leaders to attend the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) summit in Tehran.

The NAM summit is scheduled for 26-31 August. Iran currently holds the presidency of the Non-Aligned Movement.

Saeedlou told IRNA that Iran was forming strong alliance with the five Latin American countries he toured. Venezuela will host the next summit in 2015. 

Gorgan Tower

The new tower at Basij Square in the city of Gorgan was opened today. The structure will house offices, a restaurant and broadcasting antenna. Gorgan, 31 May 2012. 

Photo Credit: Hamed Barchian/Fars New Agency

IRGC Commander Visiting the Three Islands

IRGC Commander Maj. Gen. Mohammad Ali Jafari today visited the three islands of Abu Musa, Greater Tunb and Lesser Tunb and said the islands were Iran’s “strategic and sensitive territory.” The UAE also claims the ownership of the Persian Gulf islands and last month, backed by the GCC, strongly objected to President Ahmadinejad’s visit to Abu Musa.

During the visit, Jafari was accompanied by his naval commander IRGC Brig. Gen. Ali Fadavi. IRGC official website reported that its commanding general was “satisfied” with the condition of Iranian combat units stationed on Abu Musa.   

Iran Under Cyber-Attack by Data-Mining Virus

The data-mining virus called Flame has reportedly penetrated important computers in Iran in what is described as the most malicious program ever discovered. Iran’s Computer Emergency Response Team Coordination Center (CERTCC) also warned that the virus was extremely dangerous. Iranian computer experts discovered Flame, which could reportedly be as much as five years old.

“The complexity and functionality of the newly discovered malicious program exceed those of all other cyber menaces known to date,” reported Kaspersky Lab, a Russian producer of antivirus software [International Herald Tribune, 30 May].

Experts believe that the virus bears special encryption hallmarks with similarities to previous Israeli malware. In an interview with Radio Israel, the country’s vice prime minister and strategic affairs minister, Moshe Yaalon, all but took responsibility for the attack.

“Anyone who sees the Iranian threat as a significant threat — it’s reasonable that he will take various steps, including these, to harm it,” said Yaalon in response to a question on Flame virus.

Flame seems to be designed to mine data from personal computers and that it was distributed through USB sticks rather than the Internet, meaning that a USB has to be inserted manually into at least one computer in a network.

“This virus copies what you enter on your keyboard; it monitors what you see on your computer screen,” said a spokesman for Iran’s CRTCC. That includes collecting passwords, recording sounds if the computer is connected to a microphone, scanning disks for specific files and monitoring Skype.

“Those controlling the virus can direct it from a distance,” said the CRTCC spokesman. “Flame is no ordinary product. This was designed to monitor selected computers.”


Source: International Herald Tribune, 30 May 2012

Photo Source: The computer virus known as Flame as shown by the Russian computer security firm Kaspersky Lab. Agence France-Presse/Getty Images

Egyptian Field Marshal Abdul-Halim Abu Ghazalah on the Combat Tactics and Strategy of the Iran-Iraq War (Part 1)

A response to a book review penned by Youssef Aboul-Enein, Andrew Bertrand and Dorothy Corley at Small Wars Journal

by Mark Pyruz

A book review on Egyptian Field Marshal Abdul-Halim Abu Ghazalah's "Combat Tactics and Strategy of the Iran-Iraq War" by Youssef Aboul-Enein, Andrew Bertrand and Dorothy Corley has recently been ublished in three parts by Small Wars Journal. See HERE, HERE and HERE. The views put forward in the review of Ghazalah's work by Youssef Aboul-Enein et al rely on, for the most part, externally derived and out of date interpretations of the war. A freshly interpreted survey essay on the Iran-Iraq War is really called for, using newer research containing primary sources from both sides of the conflict, similar to the efforts of USA Colonel Glanz (Ret.) and his work on the "myths and realities" of the Russo-German War, 1941-1945. However, what follows here, in order, are a number of responses to the perspectives and claims made by the field marshal, as described by the reviewers. It should be pointed out this author has not had access to the actual work by Ghazalah and is relying on the reviewers for the book's content. Reviewers' passages in blue; this author's responses in black. Let us proceed with Part 1 of 3:

"For centuries, Iran has remained a strategic concern for Arab states, and in more recent times, a concern for the United States as well. The divisions between Arabs and Iranians include religious differences between Sunni and Shiite, ethnic differences between Arab and Persian, linguistic differences between Semitic Arabic and Indo-Aryan Farsi, and more recently, growing global concern over Iran’s revolutionary influences in the region." 

This view is largely that of a pan-Arab nationalist, fof which we can assume the field marshal shares sympathies. Where Iraq is concerned, there are shared senses of culture with Iran and vice-versa, particularly among the Shia populations. Today this is most visible in the cross-border pilgrimages that now exist, in both directions, involving millions of ordinary Iranian and Iraqi persons. In certain respects, this shared sense of culture transcends even religion. The very name "Baghdad" is in fact a Persian word. (For an interesting lecture on this subject given by a recent speaker at Stanford University, see HERE.)

"In 1971, Iran, under the Shah, annexed three strategic islands: the Greater and Lesser Tunbs and Abu Musa from the United Arab Emirates."

This requires clarification. The three islands were part of a deal between the UK and Iran, with Iran withdrawing its historical claim to Bahrain (recognized at least in an Iranian historical sense as its fourteenth province). Much of the Shia majority underclass of Bahrain, some with elements of Persianate lineage, with their recent addition to the unfurling "Arab Spring," are a product of this compromise.

"A few years later, Iraq was battling the Kurds in the Second Kurdish War, from 1974 to 1975. Kenneth M. Pollack, of the Council on Foreign Relations and the Brooking Institute, in his volume titled Arabs at War (University of Nebraska Press, 2002), underscores that Iran’s support of the Kurdish Peshmerga during the Second Kurdish War curtailed Iraqi momentum and “finally stalemated the war in the spring of 1975”. Saddam Hussein (then Iraq’s Foreign Minister) negotiated the subsequent cease-fire agreement known as the Algiers Accord, as described by Pollack. Although Iraq conceded territory to Iran, in return the Shah terminated support to Iraqi Kurds, which enabled Iraq to effectively quell the Kurdish revolt shortly after the Accord was signed on 6 March 1975." 

A very specific narrative provided by CDR Aboul-Enein et al on the Algiers Accord. In fact, the Accord represented much more than that, and was finely worked out by both Iranian and Iraqi diplomatic teams. However the institution of terms of the agreement was continuously stalled by the Baath regime headed by Saddam Hussein. For an overview of the Accord, see "Iraqi Attitudes and Interpretation of the 1975 Agreement" by Ibrahim Anvari Tehrani (chapter two of "The Iran-Iraq War: The Politics of Aggression" by Farhang Rejaee).

"The Revolution of 1979 toppled the Shah of Iran, and ushered in the abrupt and dramatic rise of Ayatollah Khomeini’s Islamist regime. Other Arab regimes began to reevaluate prior agreements with Iran following the events of 1979. Abu Ghazalah’s book opens during this tumultuous period, and he cites the reasons for war between Iran and Iraq as fear of Shiite Islamic fervor and agitation throughout the Arab world, and Iraq seeing a potential opportunity to replace Iran as the regional policeman of the Persian Gulf."

From the Iraqi Baathist perspective, there was more to it. Iraq's Shia majority underclass was suppressed by the Baathist regime. It began to rise up and was encouraged by the Iranian example, and was assisted in certain respects by Iran. There were forced evictions of Iranian-Iraqis from Iraq. In addition to seeking the position of "regional policeman," Saddam sought not only to nip in the bud the Iraqi Shia struggle against the Baathist minority elite that held power, but more than that to actualize imperial gains, eastward, aimed at the dismemberment of Iran and capture of oil rich Khuzestan; that is to say, to establish a new regional geopolitical order in Iraq's favor at the expense of Iran, by means of a war of aggression.

"Saddam’s generals observed Iran with interest and received briefs from anti-Khomeini Iranian exiles. The briefs documented the ideological interference of the Iranian Armed Forces and the purging of experienced commanders with a new religious-based class of officers with little tactical experience."

Figuring into Iraq's calculations on their upcoming air war (as well as Western intelligence assessments) was the aftermath of the failed "Nojeh coup" involving the CIA and certain Iran Air Force officers against the popularly elected IRI government. These intelligence estimates had practically written off the Islamic Republic of Iran Air Force (IRIAF) as an effective fighting force, following the failed coup and Iran's security crackdown upon these air force officer elements. The Iraqis were to be woefully surprised during the opening phase of the conflict by a spectacular airstrike campaign conducted by the IRIAF.

Before Saddam began the war with Iran, Iraq was transitioning from bulk Eastern weapons systems to Western equipment."

This wasn't so with regards to AFVs, combat aircraft, etc.

"Photoreconnaissance existed but was extremely elementary."

It should be pointed out that in the weeks prior to the actual Iraqi invasion, Iraq Air Force (IrAF) recce sorties had taken place but had sustained heavy losses from IRIAF F-14 and F-4 intercepts (see "Arab MiG-19 & MiG-21 Units in Combat" by David Nicolle and Tom Cooper, pages 79-80.)

"Iraq’s aerial early warning systems were in a developmental stage, and in 1979 they possessed command and control for air force and air defense units, but they lacked the ability to coordinate these two aerial defense arms. Training on this equipment was marginal, and this would come to be painfully obvious in 1981, when Israel launched an air strike and destroyed the OSIRAK nuclear reactor."

It was already painfully obvious to the IrAF/ADC following Iran's immediate air counterattack, consisting from the beginning on no less than a 140-fighter strong raid into Iraq. In fact, by the end of September 1980, the IRIAF had already exhausted its main target list, with the Iraqis having to pull back its transport and bomber aircraft, as well as its reserve fighters and other high value assets to its western airbases (see "Iranian F-4 Phantom II Units in Action" by Tom Cooper and Farzad Bishop, pgs 17-31).

"Abu Ghazalah spends a chapter discussing the economics of the Iran-Iraq War. He writes that the total Iranian and Iraqi weapons imports for the war reached a peak of $55 billion and represented approximately 1/3 of the Gross Domestic Product of all developing nations combined."

Interestingly enough, for the majority of ordinary Iranians in unoccupied territories, the economic effects of the Iran-Iraq war were not as pronounced as those experienced following the onset of the British-Soviet invasion of 1941 and the ensuing American occupation of the early 1940s, for which the Ahmadinejad administration is currently seeking reparations.

"Although Iraq’s manpower problems were in some ways similar to Iran’s, the Iranians’ inability to train in combined arms was more pronounced. Iran’s training was limited almost exclusively to light infantry tactics because of Iran’s penchant for conducting human wave attacks." 

To a certain extent, the "human wave" tactics were more of a practical solution than that of mere "penchant". More on this later in part 2 and 3.

"Iraq’s political-military objectives at the onset of the war with Iran included: Return of the Shatt al-Arab Waterway (known in Iran as the Arvand Rud) as an integral part of Iraq; Destruction of Iranian units along the border with Iraq; Securing of oil fields in Iranian Khuzestan; Toppling of or dictating terms to Ayatollah Khomeini’s revolutionary leaders and marginalizing Iraq’s source of ideological influence in the region (Arab nationalism). It is worthwhile to highlight Kenneth Pollack’s observation that the key ingredient in Iraqi’s ability to achieve the preceding objectives was the seizure of the Khuzestan province."

This was Saddam's first war of aggression in the region, and his main goal was very similar to his second war of aggression against Kuwait: a land grab won in a very short war, identified for its oil treasure and improved geographical positioning with which to manage and protect such additional resources.

"It is worth noting that there is an intriguing difference in the number of divisions listed in Abu Ghazalah’s preceding description of deployed forces when compared with Pollack’s. Abu Ghazalah’s account lists eleven divisions, whereas Pollack’s account claims Iraq initiated the war with Iran with nine divisions. Both list three infantry divisions, but Abu Ghazalah’s account includes one additional mechanized division and one additional armored division." 

Here is a more recently derived and detailed OB for the Iraq Army (IrA) at the onset of the Iran-Iraq war (Source: ACIG.org):

I Army Corps (sector between Rawanduz and Marivan)
- 7th Infantry Division (HQ Soleimaniyah)
- 11th Infantry Division (HQ Soleimaniyah; including 113IB, parts of which were detached to III Army Corps)

II Army Corps (sector between Qassre-Shirin, Ilam, and Mehran, armor deployed between Mehran and Dezful) -
- 6th Armored Division (HQ Baqubah)
- 9th Armored Division (HQ Samavah; 35AB, 43AB, 14MB)
- 10th Armored Division (HQ Baghdad, 17AB, 42AB, 24MB)
- 2nd Infantry Division (HQ Kirkuk)
- 4th Infantry Division (HQ Mawsil)
- 6th Infantry Division (HQ Baqubah)
- 8th Infantry Division (HQ Arbil)

III Army Corps (HQ al-Qurnah, sector between Dezful and Abadan)
- 3rd Armored Division (HQ Tikrit; 6AB, 12AB, 8MB)
- 10th Armored Division (HQ Baghdad; 10AB)
- 12th Armored Division (HQ Dahuoq; held in reserve)
- 1st Mechanized Division (HQ Divaniyeh; 1MB, 27MB, 34AB)
- 5th Mechanized Division (HQ Basrah; 26AB, 15MB, 20MB)
- 10th Independent AB
- 31st Independent Special Forces Brigade (minus two battalions: one was attached to 5th Mechanized Division, another to 3rd Armored Division),
- 33rd Independent Special Forces Brigade - 113 Infantry Brigade (detachments)
There were also two independent armored brigades, the 10th and the 12th, dislocations of which are as of yet unclear.

"The opening hours of the war saw Iran drained of divisional and corps level military leadership. All strategic decisions were in the hands of mullahs and revolutionary councils. The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps was newly established and did not command the respect of regular forces. It reduced its regular forces by half and many U.S. weapons contracts had been previously cancelled due to the hostage crisis in 1979. Iran’s strategy was framed as a war of ideology against imperialism, communism and Zionism and the preservation of Khomeini’s Islamic Revolution." 

In general, the units of the Islamic Republic of Iran Army were in very poor condition. Most were down to only 50% of their strenght (some even less) and under command of lower-ranking officers, as all the generals of the former Imperial Iranian Army were removed from their posts after the revolution in 1979. During the early days of the war there was considerable chaos within the chain of command, which led to a situation in which most of the larger units were scattered into small battle-groups that fought in cooperation with local militias and without a coherent overall command. (Source: ACIG.org); which is a somewhat different situation than that of "all strategic decisions [being] in the hands of mullahs and revolutionary councils."  In terms of Iran's ideological framing of the war, it was certainly stronger than the weaker ideology framed by the Baathist state, and this showed in their corresponding states of motivation and morale on the battlefield.

End of Part 1.

On Inflation

Tabnak, one of Iran’s most popular news sites, observes that the Central Bank of Iran (CBI) has lost the battle and the will to fight inflation, and its governor has quit speaking about the fight against inflation and instead keeps offering forecasts on the rate of inflation growth in the coming months. To read the article in Farsi, please click here. An excerpt on the deteriorating situation in the past two years:

"According to the Central Bank’s own statistics: the inflation rate two years ago was at 12.4 percent, the rial exchange rate to dollar was at 9,660 and the price of the official Bahar gold coin was at 4,350,000 rials. Today, the inflation rate is at 21.8 percent (nearly doubled in the two years), the rial exchange rate is at 17,300 rials (the national currency loosing its value by nearly 80 percent in just two years) and the official gold coin price is at 6,640,000 rials (more than 50 percent price increase in tow years)."

Source: Tabnak.ir, 29 May 2012 

Larijani Re-Elected Speaker of Majlis

Majlis Speaker Ali Larijani fought off a serious challenge from Qolam Ali Hadad Adel to be reelected as the speaker in the newly seated Ninth Majlis. Larijani’s brother is the head of another branch of the government, the Judiciary, and another brother is a key ideologue and theoretician of the Islamic Republic. Larijani was the speaker of the Eighth Majlis, often leading MPs in fierce opposition to Ahmadinejad administration’s policies, and at times signaling Majlis’s readiness to impeach the embattled head of the executive branch. Both Larijani and Hadad are among the most loyal and fiercest supporters of the country’s all-powerful supreme leader Ayatollah Khamenei.


UPDATE: One of our good readers has correctly reminded us that Larijani's selection was for the post of Interim/Acting Speaker, and as such he is not technically re-elected as speaker yet. My understanding is this is just a procedural matter. But many thanks to our friend and all our other longtime readers who have helped us throughout these years in many ways, including correcting our reporting, as in this case, or editing, etc. Thanks a million!

Iran Denies Link to Coup Plot in Bahrain

Iran's Foreign Ministry spokesman Ramin Mehmanparast today denied allegations that Iran was behind a plot to overthrow the kingdom in Bahrain. On Sunday, a Bahraini court sentenced eight people to prison terms after they were accused of conspiring with suspected Iranian agents to overthrow the government. Iran has also denied charges by the GCC countries that it has links to the 15-month-old uprising in Bahrain [Mehr News Agency. 28 May].

Military Option against Iran ‘Ready and Available’ - Panetta

Preference for Diplomacy

Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta said today in an interview with ABC News' This Week that military option against Iran is ready and available and neither U.S. nor international community will allow Iran to develop a nuclear weapon. Panetta also emphasized that the preference is for diplomacy over military intervention.

“The fundamental premise is that neither the United States nor the international community is going to allow Iran to develop a nuclear weapon,” Panetta said. “We will do everything we can to prevent them from developing a weapon.”

“It would be preferable to solve this diplomatically and through the use of pressure, than to use military force,” Panettal added. “But that doesn’t mean that (military) option isn’t fully available. Not just available, it’s ready. The necessary planning has been done to ensure that it’s ready.” 

ABC News' This Week, Sunday 27 May 2012

Iran Backs Away from Preliminary Agreement with IAEA on Site Inspection

Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI) Director Fereydoun Abbasi said today in Tehran that IAEA’s insistence on visiting Parchin military complex is due to pressure from the West but Iran has not been convinced to arrange the visit.

“The IAEA is interested in visiting Parchin due to pressure from countries that want the agency to investigate the issue,” Abbasi said. “(But) Iran has not been convinced and no documents or reason has been presented to us (to persuade us) to arrange a visit to Parchin military site,” he added [Fars News Agency/Press TV, 26 May].

On Tuesday, a day prior to the start of the Baghdad Talks, IAEA Director Yukia Amano announced that an agreement in principle had been reached with Iran on inspecting the site which would be signed soon. Amano made the announcement after his visit to Tehran and meetings with senior Iranian officials, including Mr. Abbasi. Amano added that the Iranians had assured him that nothing will stand in the way of signing the deal.

Today’s comments by Abbasi on Parchin, if it is indeed the new official policy, reverses earlier decision to allow IAEA free access to the site.

With the expected agreement with the IAEA now in jeopardy and with Iran’s hesitance to come to any agreement with the major powers on the future of its 20-percent enrichment program, as was evident at Baghdad Talks, and reiterated by Abbasi, saying today that there were no reasons to halt the production of higher-purity uranium, a successful outcome at Moscow now seems unlikely and out of reach.  

Iran Should Not Attend Moscow Talks - Shariatmadari

Hossein Shariatmadari, the influential editor of Kayhan, the leading conservative newspaper in Iran, and one of the shrewdest journalists in the country has called for a boycott of all future talks with the six major powers, including the Moscow Talks scheduled for 18-19 June. Mr. Shariatmadari believes that the West has not been serious in striking a deal with Iran during these talks and instead is using them to keep the price of oil under control and prevent a major shock to their weakened and falling economies. That is, until they find a comprehensive way on how to deal with a host of issues, including Iran and the uprisings in the Arab world.

Sharitmadari believes that Moscow Talks will not produce any major agreements and Iran should not attend the gathering to avoid playing into the US and European hands. It is the enemy, he says, that needs continued “negotiations” and “talks.”

To read Shariatmadari’s op-ed piece in Mashregh News, in Farsi, click here.

IAEA Data Show Iran Has Enough Uranium for Five Bombs - ISIS

The Institute for Science and International Security (ISIS), a think-tank which closely tracks Iran's nuclear program, said today that its analysis of the data recently released by the IAEA shows that Iran has produced enough low-enriched uranium in the past five years for at lease five nuclear weapons if refined to weapon-grade purity.

On Friday, the IAEA reported that Iran was pressing ahead with its uranium enrichment work. IAEA report said Iran has produced 6.2 tons of uranium enriched to a level of 3.5 percent since 2007, some 759 kg more than in previous IAEA report in February.

"This total amount of 3.5 percent low enriched uranium hexafluoride, if further enriched to weapon grade, is enough to make over five nuclear weapons," ISIS said in its analysis.

Iran began enriching uranium to a fissile concentration of 20 percent in 2010, saying it needed this to fuel a medical research reactor. It later expanded the work sharply by launching enrichment at Fordo underground site.

No agreements on scaling back the production of enriched uranium  could be reached between Iran and the six major powers during the Baghdad Talks that ended on Thursday.


Source: Reuters, 26 May 2012

No Compromise on 20-Percent Enrichment – Friday Prayers Imam

Ayatollah Ahmad Khatami, a Tehran’s Friday Prayers Imam, said in his sermons today that Iran will keep its 20-percent uranium enrichment program intact [Fars News Agency, 25 May].

“I speak on behalf of the Iranian nation that they will not be held to ransom,” the influential senior cleric added.

Khatami was referring to a demand by six major powers during the unsuccessful Baghdad Talks that Iran ends its production of the 20-percent nuclear fuel. The subject will be one of the key discussion points in Moscow during the talks in mid-June.

Iran enriches uranium to the 20 percent purity to provide fuel for Tehran's Research Reactor, which produces medical isotopes for cancer patients. The country already has a stockpile of the higher level fuel to feed the reactor for the next decade.

Farmanfarmaian, ‘Mother of Social Work’, Dies at 91

Sattareh Farmanfarmaian among students and colleagues.

Tehran School of Social Work (1960s)

Sattareh Farmanfarmaian, who introduced the Social Work profession to Iran, died today in Los Angeles at the age of 91.  After finishing high school in Tehran, Farmanfarmaian left for Los Angeles in July 1944.  At the urging of Dr. Samuel Jordan, the founder of American School in Tehran (later renamed Alborz High School), Farmanfarmaian enrolled at the University of Southern California, becoming USC’s first Iranian student and received her B.A. in sociology in 1946. In 1948 she received her Master of Social Work degree from the University of Chicago.

Prior to her return to Tehran in 1958, she worked for UNESCO as the social welfare consultant to the government of Iraq, working to improve the conditions of the Arab nomad tribes in the country. In Tehran, she founded the School of Social Work, the first of its kind in Iran, and served as its director until 1979.  She also founded the Family Planning Association of Iran.

Farmanfarmaian left Iran after the Islamic revolution and returned to Los Angeles. From 1980 to 1992 she worked for Los Angeles County’s Department of Social Services.

Her autobiography, Daughter of Persia: A Woman’s Journey from Her Father’s Harem through the Islamic Revolution, was published in 1992 and was nominated for Pulitzer Prize.  She also had many academic publications in her field.

File Photo: VOA

Egyptian Presidential Election: Tight Race Representing Wide Political Spectrum - UPDATE

Partial results from Egypt’s presidential elections announced today showed the candidate of the powerful Muslim Brotherhood leading with a narrow edge in a four-way race representing a wide political spectrum from the Islamists to a former regime official to the Left. 

The Brotherhood candidate Mohammed Morsi will most likely enter the second round on 16-17 June with the most votes, but well under the required 50 percent to win outright. Contending for the second place are former Prime Minister Ahmed Shafiq; Hamdeen Sabahi, political activist supported by the nationalists and the Left; and moderate Islamist Abdel-Moneim Abolfotoh. Egyptians went to the polls on Wednesday and Thursday to choose their leader for the first time in 7,000 years.


UPDATE: Morsi, Shafiq and Sabahi are running extremely close, only one percentage point separates the top three vote getters.
UPDATE: Mohammed Morsi of the Muslim Brotherhood and former premier Ahmed Shafiq will face off in the runoff election on 16-17 June. The Muslim Brotherhood has just announced that Hamdeen Sabahi and Abdel-Moneim Abolfotoh will back Morsi in the runoff election. Sabahi, the candidate supported by the nationalists and the Left, came surprisingly close to finish second, but Shafiq held on to his lead and will face Morsi, representing the anti/pro Mubarak-era coalitions vying for Egypt's presidency.

Baghdad Talks End in Failure

No Agreements Between Iran and Major Powers

Another Round of Talks Next Month in Moscow

The Baghdad Talks came to an end without producing any agreements between Iran and six global powers. EU foreign policy chief and P5+1 chief negotiator Catherine Ashton just held a press conference announcing that the two sides have agreed to hold another round of talks in Moscow on 18-19 June.

Iranian negotiators had earlier rejected proposals by P5+1 on the future of their nuclear program as unbalanced and offered their own counter-proposals that focused on lifting the UN, US and EU sanctions.

Baghdad was the sixth meeting between the two sides in the past five years (three in Geneva, two in Istanbul and one in Baghdad), with all ending in failure. The decade-old standoff seems to have survived yet another round of talks!

Baghdad Talks Will Resume Tonight

Iran and six global powers will hold the third plenary session of Baghdad Talks today at 18:00 local time. The decision to hold another session tonight came after a long meeting between Iran’s chief negotiator Saeed Jalili and P5+1 chief negotiator Catherine Ashton.