Imagined Iran Air Boeing 747-8 Intercontinetal aircraft - rendering

(click on image to enlarge)

Acceptance process of the Iran nuclear deal at the United States Congress as well as relevant branches of government in the Islamic Republic of Iran has reportedly been contentious.

In this observer's view, there are many positives to be gained in accepting the Iran nuclear deal. Above is just one example of the possibilities specifically provided for in the JCPOA: purchases of American commercial jetliners by Iran.

Above is an imagined Iran Air Boeing 747-8 Intercontinental aircraft, resurrecting the EP-IAH registration that belonged to the now retired Iran Air Boeing 747-286B that served the airliner for over 36 years.

Note: above amateur artwork not intended for commercial purposes.

Iran: One Cool Nuclear Negotiator

by Mark Pyruz

There is a mistaken impression in the West that Iran perceives itself the focus of an international demand to relinquish the majority of its low-enriched uranium, in order to prevent its imminent manufacturing of a nuclear weapon. For their part, the Iranian perspective is completely different.

Contrary to Western perceptions, the current deal put forward by the E3+3/P5+1 is not the initial proposal for refueling the Tehran Research Reactor (TRR). That initial proposal was publicly put forward last September in New York by President Ahmadinejad, where he offered to purchase medium enriched uranium from existing nuclear fuel suppliers (including the United States). Subsequently, at the Geneva 2 talks, the West and Russia provided a counter-proposal that Iran ship 1200 kilograms of its LEU to Russia by January 15, to be converted to medium-enriched uranium, whereupon France would fashion the product into fuel rods for shipment back to Iran. This complicated arrangement was explored "in principle" in Geneva and later worked on still further in subsequent talks held in Vienna. At the conclusion of those talks, a target date for a decision by all powers present was put forward by ElBaradei for the following Friday. However, the Iranians understood this date as a time frame, and surely anything but a demand. Throughout all of this, it's important to realize that Iran is not looking at this process in terms of diplomatic demand. Rather, it views this as an ongoing negotiation process being managed by the IAEA.

This nuclear proposal has since been formally introduced to Iran's decision makers. Predictably, there are quite a few who find the offer highly dubious. For starters, there is a very poor track record for both France and Russia, in regards to these two countries living up to their word in previous nuclear agreements with Iran. Thirty years ago Iran put up more than $1 billion dollars to help build a French nuclear reactor in return for access to that reactor's fuel. To date, the French have never delivered any amount of fuel- not one iota. Likewise, roughly fifteen years ago Iran signed a contract with a Russian firm to complete the Bushehr nuclear facility. What's transpired since then is an endless stream of broken promises, missed schedules and arbitrary work stoppages. To this day, Bushehr remains less than fully operational. These are the two partners Iran is expected to do business with in this proposed nuclear deal. In addition to this, there are legitimate concerns that while Iran's LEU stock is away, in further nuclear negotiations down the road, the West may try to leverage its returned fuel by imposing additional conditions for its release.

Details are sketchy of Iran's decision making, but we can make out three Iranian nuclear proposals (to the West's one) put forward in this ongoing negotiation process:

1) Iran offers to purchase the nuclear fuel required for TRR from an existing supplier.
2) Iran offers to further enrich its own LEU stock into fuel stock inside Iran for TRR, under the strict technical supervision of the IAEA (a benefit stipulated under the terms of the NPT), possibly in partnership with another country.
3) Iran may be offering to accept the current deal offered by the West with some modifications, such as transferring its LEU stock in installments. Also, Iran may yet accept the current deal as it now stands.

It's interesting to note that at this point in time, certain Western officials and media outlets are depicting this ongoing negotiation process in a dire and negative light; while in stark contrast, President Ahmadinejad publicly praises the effort. Right now, the ball seems somewhere near mid-court. One thing appears likely: it will not be the Iranians that decide to break off negotiations, if that's how this ultimately plays out.

One item of significance which seems absent from Iran's internal public debate is any talk of rejecting further negotiation based on the recent Jundallah terrorist attack in southeastern Iran. Iran maintains substantiated claims of Western support for Jundallah (see here and here), yet the Iranians haven't so much as missed a beat in their continued engagement with the nuclear negotiation process. Just imagine for a second if the United States, France or the United Kingdom had suffered a terrorist attack with any sort of linkage back to the Islamic Republic of Iran; how that would have affected the nuclear talks! Nor did the Iranians wilt under the West's bombastic assertions over its disclosure of the Qom pilot enrichment facility.

No, the West is being shown that it faces a cool yet reserved negotiator. It's not in the West's interest to attempt negotiations in bad faith or to critically overestimate the amount of leverage it has over Iran. For Iran may not need this deal as much as the West thinks it does, while Iran retains the option of the status quo.

Acknowledgments to Arnold Evans, Muhammad Sahimi and Mahan Abedin

News from Iran

The winds of war continued to dominate the media coverage in Iran. Many stories on the subject originally reported in Western media were covered by the local media. The worsening relations between Iran and US, especially after the US Congress designated the Revolutionary Guards as a terrorist organization, also received prominent coverage. The arrest of an Iranian national claimed by US military to be an IRGC general officer prompted Iran to close its border with Iraqi Kurdistan in protest. On domestic front, the largest student organization in Iran criticized President Ahmadinejad for his remarks at Columbia University calling Iran one of the freest country in the world. The students pointed out the dismal human rights records of the Islamic Republic.

The Winds of War

· New Yorker reported US war planning against Iran is intensifying; Bush administration was reported to target IRGC as main target for US air attack on Iran; rationale for bombing Iran has shifted from Iran's nuclear program to Iran's role in Iraq.
· French daily Le Canard Enchaine reported that Russian President Vladimir Putin has warned Iran that war is imminent; the paper quoted French intelligence officials as saying that the first raids on Iranian nuclear sites will be made by Israeli aircraft protected and guided by US radar airplanes; the report said that Russia is supplying Iran with modern S-300 Antey and TOR M1 anti-aircraft missiles, batteries of M82 Moskit anti-ship missiles, helicopters, and small patrol boats to disrupt navigation on Persian Gulf.
· US Air Force was reported to set up a task force to plan an air attack on Iran; Project Checkmate was reported to consist of top air force officers tasked to perfect the plan of attack.
· Reports circulating in Washington indicated Israeli raid on Syrian targets on 6 September destroyed advanced weapon facilities in Syria; former US ambassador to UN John Bolton also said the raid targeted either a joint nuclear or missile facility with North Korea; surprising element of the air strike was the ability of Israeli Air Force jets to enter deep into Syria without setting off Russian-built radar systems in place in the country; analysts regard the Israeli air attack as a test of similar Russian-built surface-to-air missile air defense system in place in Iran.
· Kuwaiti daily, Al Watan, reported US jets circled above the Israeli fighters and gave them aerial cover during Israeli air strike on Syria on 6 September; the paper said Russian experts are trying to understand how the Israeli jets managed to enter so deep into Syrian territory without setting off Russian-built radar systems that were in place in the country; the strike in Syria could also be a test of air path to Iran.

Iran-US Relations

· US Senate by a vote of 76-22 approved the Kyl-Liberman amendment designating the IRGS as a foreign terrorist organization; the House of Representatives had earlier approved a similar measure designating IRGC as terrorists; US government is soon expected to designate IRGC or its Quds Force as a terrorist organization.
· Iran's Parliament – Majlis - labeled the US Military and the CIA as terrorist organizations in retaliation to the US Senate resolution designating IRGC a terrorist organization.
· Friday Prayer Imam Ayatollah Ahmad Jannati condemned the US Congress for designating the Islamic Revolution Guards Corps (IRGC) as a terrorist organization; “Shame on you, you disgraced lot. May you be damned!” said Jannati, addressing the US.
· Iranian Foreign Minister Manouchehr Mottaki said main problem facing Iraq is deployment of US forces in the country; Mottaki also said Iraq’s security and stability is in national interest of Iran.
· Iran’s executive secretary of Supreme National Security Council Ali Larijani said Iran will help US stabilize Iraq if Washington sets out a timetable for a withdrawal of its troops.
· Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad has extended an invitation to US.President George W. Bush to speak at an Iranian university if US leader ever traveled to the Islamic Republic.

The Nuclear Issue

· World's major powers agreed to delay until November any new UN resolutions against Iran over its nuclear program; US, Russia, China, Britain, France and Germany will wait for two reports by IAEA chief Mohammad ElBaradei and EU foreign policy chief Javier Solana before putting to vote the resolution for a third round of UN sanction; postponing the vote until November was the result of Russian and Chinese insistence to give IAEA more time to do its work in Iran.
· Representatives of the five permanent members of the UN Security Council plus Germany called for Iran to suspend nuclear activities.
· Mujahedeen Khalgh Organization (MKO) claimed that Iran is constructing a secret, new underground nuclear facility near Natanz; MKO announced the news in Paris; Iran’s chief nuclear negotiator Ali Larijani denied the accusation that there is a secret nuclear site in Iran; MKO said construction of new site began in late 2006 and it is to be completed in early 2008.

Leading Domestic Storylines

· Iranian military fired artillery shells on Kurdish militants’ positions inside Iraqi Kurdistan; IRGC Maj. Gen. Yahya Rahim Safavi, military advisor to the supreme leader, said PJAK bases are some 10 kilometers inside Iraqi territory.
· The Kurdistan Regional Government of Iraq asked Iran to stop shelling Iraq’s Kurdish border areas; the regional government reaffirmed its commitment to neighborly relations on the basis of mutual respect and common interests.
· The Office for Fostering Unity, Iran’s largest student organization, has criticized President Ahmadinejad’s assertions during his Columbia speech that Iran was one of the freest nations on earth; in an open letter to Ahmadinejad, student leaders blasted his administration for human rights violations and large number of student activists detained at Evin prison.

Leading Regional Storylines

· The railroad linking Iran and Iraq was approaching completion; the first phase linked the Iranian port city of Khorramshahr with the border town of Shalamcheh; the segment linking Shalamcheh to Iraqi city of Basra were expected to finish within six months.
· Shalamcheh, the border crossing linking Iran and Iraq, was named the "friendship border"; cities of Khorramshahr in Iran and Basra in Iraq were designated as "brother cities"; Iranian officials said the moves will foster human and cultural links between the two nations.
· India did not attend the official meeting held in Tehran on construction of Iran-Pakistan-India (IPI) gas pipeline; US pressure on India not to invest in Iranian oil and gas sector was seen by observers as the reason behind India’s absence.
· Iran and Pakistan announced they will sign a gas pipeline agreement without India; Iran-Pakistan-India (IPI) gas pipeline was to be built by the three countries, but India did not attend a crucial meeting held in Tehran on pipeline construction; US had strong objections to the pipeline exporting Iranian natural gas to south Asia.