Serious Unresolved Issues - Seeking Ways to Resolve Them
Iranian President Hassan Rouhani told reporters in
Shanghai today that he was “optimistic” about the nuclear talks with P5+1 and
that it was “very likely” the two sides reach a comprehensive agreement
before the 20 July expiration date of the Joint Plan of Action (JPOA).
However, two Western diplomats told the Associated
Press after Rouhani’s news conference that they were not as optimistic. AP
quoted them as saying the two sides were not much closer than they were in
February, at the start of the talks in Vienna.
Meanwhile, IAEA is expected to report on Friday that Iran
is honoring JPOA, including an end to its 20-percent enrichment program.
A number of key issues still need to be resolved before any
comprehensive agreement could be finalized; starting with the number of
centrifuges Iran could operate. As is, Iran has some 10,000 machines in
operation, with some 9,000 installed but not operational. The West wants to
limit the number to few thousands to prevent rapid breakout capability on part
of Iran. With Iran arguing that it would need 4-5 times more centrifuges that
it currently operates just to provide the fuel for a single nuclear power
reactor it plans to build in future.
The difference on this issue is so wide that a new way of
approaching Iran’s needs for enriched uranium should be found. There must be
more than one way to skin a cat, so to speak! Numbers in 50,000-100,000 range will not be
acceptable to the West. But significantly fewer numbers of advanced centrifuges
might satisfy Iran’s needs, which could provide a possible compromise on the
issue.
The duration of the comprehensive agreement has also
become a matter of dispute; with Iran arguing for an agreement that could reach
its goals in a much shorter period than the P5+1 is proposing. This is not a
showstopper and a compromise could more easily be found. As is the case with
Arak IR-40 heavy water reactor. The two sides have almost resolved this issue
through changing the design of the reactor in a way to produce a minimum amount
of plutonium, hence blocking an alternative route for the country to build a
nuclear weapon.
The question of ballistic missiles remains a serious
issue. The UN Security Council Resolutions 1929, passed unanimously against
Iran, prohibits production and deployment of ballistic missiles designed to
carry nuclear weapons. On 11 May, during a visit to IRGC’s ballistic missile
exhibition in Tehran, Ayatollah Khamenei made his strongest public comments on the issue,
ridiculing the West for even suggesting a limit on the country’s ballistic
missiles. The P5+1, however, wants to resolve the issue before lifting all UN
sanctions as part of a final agreement. A compromise being floated is to
limit the type of Iran’s missiles to medium range ballistic missiles (MRBM) that it currently deploys.
The post-agreement inspection regime of Iranian nuclear
facilities by IAEA and the future of Fordo enrichment unit, are among other
issues that still need to be resolved.
The collapse of the talks is an unwanted option for both
sides. It will seriously hurt Rouhani politically inside Iran and could start a
very serious economic downturn in the country. The failure of the talks could
also lead to heightened military tensions in the neighborhood and a significant
increase in Western military posture in the Persian Gulf. There are so much at
stakes here that could force the two sides to compromise on all the unresolved
issues, making Rouhani’s prediction today in Shanghai to be fulfilled after
all.