Photo depiction of IRGC-QF Commander Maj. Gen. Qasem Soleimani, appearing at the onset of attacks at Aleppo during the current Russian-supported Syrian offensive against Al-Qaeda (AQ), AQ-aligned armed groups and ISIL.
Soleimani is depicted among Iraqi Shia militia fighters inside Syria, with a militia member seen bearing identification patch of Harakat al-Nujaba ("Movement of the Noble Ones").
Clearly the object of the depiction is to suggest Iran leading a coalition of fighting forces from Iraq, Lebanon and Syria; employing aspects of grand strategy at two theaters against AQ, AQ-aligned armed groups and ISIL.
At the same time, Alaeddin Boroujerdi, the Chairman for the Committee for Foreign Policy and National Security of the Islamic Consultative Assembly of Iran, is on a tour of Syria and Lebanon, where he has been meeting with the political leadership of those countries, including Mohammad Raad, Shia Lebanese member of parliament and presiding over Hezbollah's bloc in the Lebanese parliament.
Alaeddin Boroujerdi with Mohammad Raad on 17OCT15 in Beirut, Lebanon. Military forces from both leader's countries are currently engaged in the Russian-supported Syrian offensive against Al-Qaeda (AQ), AQ-aligned armed groups and ISIL.
At Iran's Iraqi-theater during the Second Battle of Baiji, Iran-backed Asa'ib Ahl Al-Haq ("Leaque of the Righteous", AAH) leader Sheikh Qais Al-Khaz'ali (L2) outfitted in what appear to be IRGC-style BDUs. Individual (R2) appears outfitted in typical Badr commander style, while individual (R1) seen wearing communication ear-piece is equipped with what appears to be accessorized M4 type carbine assault rifle, possibly previously U.S.-supplied to Iraqi Security Force (ISF).
At Iran's Iraqi-theater during the Second Battle of Baiji, members of Iran-backed Badr fighting force, atop a formerly U.S.-supplied to Iraqi Security Force HMMWV fitted with 9M133 Kornet-type ATGM.
At Iran's Iraqi-theater during the Second Battle of Baiji, previously U.S.-supplied to Iraqi Security Force HMMWV now heavily modified and operated by Iran-backed Kata'ib al-Imam Ali.
At Iran's Iraqi-theater during the Second Battle of Baiji, members of Iran-backed Kata'ib al-Imam Ali equipped with AK-type assault rifles.
At Iran's Iraqi-theater during the Second Battle of Baiji, Abu Azrael(R1), a commander in Iran-backed Kata'ib al-Imam Ali, depicted engaging ISIL.
The
photos published in the social media reportedly show Iran’s Quds Force
Commander Gen. Qasem Soleimani back on the ground in Iraq and visiting with
Badr Organization commanders and Iranian military advisers at Fallujah front on
Thursday.
Badr is
the lead Shia militia in the Quds Force-led offensive in the Battle of Fallujah
to retake the city. The offensive that began in early July has apparently
stalled due to stiff resistance by the Islamic State fighters.
Photo
credit: Quds Force Commander General Qasem Soleimani, second from right, reportedly
visiting Fallujah front; 13 August 2015 (Twitter)
Brief perspectives on Iraqi political reform offered by Iranian Maj. Gen. Hassan Firouzabadi at Sepah News, and Iraqi Shia Militias as surveyed by Institute for the Study of War (ISW). Very brief commentary provided at end of post.
[T]he Basij commander, Maj. Gen. Hassan Firouzabadi, Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces explained in an interview: “evaluations of Iraq’ central government [show] that it has operated very well; by obtaining important achievements in stabilizing Iraq’s sovereignty and protecting its territorial integrity and independence, [the government] has been successful against the enemies of the nation of Iraq.”
[Firouzabadi] pointed to the formation of some mischievous activities in the country… “calling for street protests by stimulating specific and sometimes non-Muslim groups, and the blowing up of Iran-Iraq power lines and other vandalism.”
Chief of General Staff of the Armed Forces said that each successful revolution has seen such noise and obstructions against itself… The revolutionary people of Iraq should show self-restraint more than ever, and must help the central government on the path of progress and overcoming the enemies.”
-------------------------
According to Theodore Bell, Patrick Martin, Jessica Lewis McFate, and Kimberly Kagan at ISW:
Iranian-backed Badr Organization endorsed the peaceful protests on August 6, prior to Ayatollah Sistani’s sermon, but did not declare its intent to participate and warned against losing focus on the anti-ISIS fight. Badr issued a brief statement following the sermon in support of Sistani’s call for reform, without providing any additional details on either the sermon or the demonstrations. Amiri stated that he “added his voice” to the demonstrators, but that he could not participate because he was “busy” with the fight against ISIS, in line with Badr’s ongoing political agenda to promote itself as a capable national military force that will liberate tracts of ISIS-occupied Iraq. Kata’ib Hizbollah (KH), another Iranian-backed militia, did not issue a statement on the subject at all, despite having stated its interest on July 18 in interrogating the Electricity Minister, seeking to punish corruption, and ending the electricity crisis. The Nujaba Movement (NM), another Iranian proxy militia, had stated its intent to participate in the Friday protests but there was little indication of significant Iranian proxy participation in the largely-peaceful protests on Friday. The Iranian proxy groups’ limited public responses to the unfolding political developments are likely due their inability to rally direct opposition to Ayatollah Sistani as well as their preoccupation with anti-ISIS operations.
While AAH did not overtly participate in the demonstrations, AAH leader Qais al-Khazali, in a speech delivered on August 7, asserted that PM Abadi faced “a major historic responsibility” and that the PM should submit his resignation if he is unable to address the need for reforms. Khazali also used the speech to repeat AAH’s call for the transition to a presidential system, an initiative championed by AAH and widely regarded as a method by which to empower VP Maliki, whose relationship with AAH is well-established. In this context, Ayatollah Sistani’s sermon may be seen as an effort to empower PM Abadi against the political designs of AAH, its patrons in Qom and Tehran, and VP Maliki. AAH’s rhetoric therefore indicates the group’s political divergence from the majority of Iraq’s major Shi’a political actors and point to AAH’s intention to leverage the protests against PM Abadi to obstruct political reform by calling for the PM’s resignation and a transition to a presidential system, an initiative VP Maliki himself advocates. It will therefore remain important to monitor the development of protests in southern Iraq, where VP Maliki’s SLA is dominant, given that VP Maliki and AAH may seek to leverage the localized demonstrations against the national government.
COMMENTARY: With current military efforts directed at Ramadi and Fallujah by ISF and PMF, it has to be conceded that popular unrest against the Iraqi government is viewed favorably as a potential lifeline by ISIL.
Political instability at a time when the country is occupied to such an extent by enemy forces would present a further challenge to all parties involved in military activities, aiming to defeat ISIL.
Sixty video stills from two YouTube videos posted 11JUN15 and 12JUN15, depicting fighting advance of an Iran-backed Badr combat force in the vicinity of Saqlawiyah, the objective being military investiture of Fallujah.
Video Part 1:
U.S. supplied M1A1M main battle tank attached to Iran-backed Badr combat force, fitted with sectarian flag featuring likeness of Imam Hussein.
Formerly U.S. supplied to ISF, HMMWV seen modified with top-mounted turret fitted with ZU-23-2 autocannon and operated by Iran-backed Badr combat force.
Formerly U.S. supplied to ISF, HMMWV seen modified with top-modified turret fitted with what appears to be KPV type 14.5 heavy machine gun, operated by Iran-backed Badr combat force.
View of turret for above HMMWV, with Iran-backed Badr military wing markings clearly visible
Formerly U.S.-supplied to ISF, HMMWV seen modified with addition of steel plate attached to front of vehicle, operated by Iran-backed Badr combat force.
Wheel loader improvised into ACEV. Note Badr paramilitary in foreground equipped with U.S.-supplied AT-4 anti-tank weapon.
Badr paramilitary fighters armed with what appear to be U.S.-supplied M16 type assault rifles
Badr paramilitary fighter equipped with U.S.-supplied AT4 anti-tank weapon
Turkish-origin Otokar APV operated within Iran-backed Badr combat force
T-72 type main battle tank seen in IRGC-GF camouflage scheme, alongside Iran-backed Badr paramilitary fighter equipped with what may be a U.S.-supplied M16 type assault rifle.
Formerly U.S.-supplied to ISF, up-armored HMMWV fitted with 9M133 Kornet ATGM and operated by PMF
Badr combat operation depicting PKM gunner firing behind stacked cinder-block cover, while T-72 type MBT in IRGC-GF camouflage scheme provides direct fire support.
Iran-backed Badr paramilitary advance toward what appear to be prepared ISIL positions withdrawn or neutralized
ISIL-operated VBIED successfully hit and destroyed by Iran-backed Badr paramilitary equipped with AT4 anti-tank weapon.
Hostile position, identified with ISIL flag
Position captured from ISIL by Iran-backed combat force, hoisting of Badr and Iraqi national flags
Captured ISIL-held position, with knocked out DShK heavy machine gun
Jubilant Iran-backed Badr paramilitary fighters, amid previously U.S.-supplied to Iraqi Army M113A2 armored personnel carriers.
Iran-supplied Safir ("Ambassador") tactical vehicle equipped with M40 type recoilless gun, operated by Badr combat force.
Indirect fire by IRAM, during Iran-backed Badr combat operation in the vicinity of Saqlawiyah
Uniform adornment with image of Grand Ayatollah Sistani, in the style of adornment used by Iranian forces for Ayatollah Khomeini during the Iran-Iraq War three decades ago.
Formerly U.S.-supplied to Iraqi Army M113A2 armored personnel carrier, accompanied by Iran-backed Badr combat infantry force
Iran-backed Badr fighter firing PKM type machine gun, beside Badr-modified HMMWV equipped with top-mounted, turreted ZU-23-2 autocannon.
Iran-backed Badr ZU-23-2 gunner's view, within above HMMWV open-top turret
PKM type machine gun firing port, within Iran-backed Badr fighting vehicle
Reloading of armament for Iran-backed Badr fighting vehicle. Note Badr sleeve uniform patch on foreground figure.
Iran-backed Badr sapper, in action during combat operation in the vicinity of Saqlawiyah
IqAAC lieutenant colonel and major, coordinating helicopter support for Iran-backed Badr combat force
Iran-backed Badr paramilitary combat force leader
HMMWV and MBT festooned with Badr military identification
Firing of main armament, Badr-attached M1A1M main battle tank
Badr paramilitary advance behind T-72 type main battle tank
Firing of main armament, Badr-attached T-72 type main battle tank
T-72 type main battle tank in IRGC-GF style camouflage scheme, U.S.-supplied Guardian Armored Security Vehicle and U.S.-supplied M113A2 armored personnel carriers.
Halted advance of Iran-backed Badr AFVs
U.S.-supplied Caiman MRAP, brought to the forefront of road-bound Badr vehicle convoy
Iran-backed Badr paramilitary fighters advancing towards neutralized ISIL fortified position
ISIL fortified position neutralized by Iran-backed Badr paramilitary combat force
Iran-backed Badr military commanders, outfitted in khaki and keffiyeh
Iran-backed Badr paramilitary, noteworthy for wearing a helmet
ISIL position neutralized by Iran-backed Badr paramilitary combat force
ISIL fortified position neutralized by Iran-backed Badr paramilitary combat force
Badr paramilitary firing PKM type machine gun behind T-72 type main battle tank
T-72 type main battle tank, traversing to position frontal armor in direction of incoming hostile fire
Iran-supplied T-72 main battle tank attached to Badr paramilitary combat force
Iran-backed Badr IRAM launcher, providing indirect fire against ISIL position
