Kyrgyzstan's opposition forces appear to have gained the upper hand over security forces, where Iran's law enforcement have met similar pressures but persevered. Of the few photos available from Kyrgyzstan's current civil unrest, we'll point out just a few detectable differences.
(click all photos to enlarge)
Above: Well equipped Kyrgyzstan antiriot forces
on the brink of disarray.
Above: A Kyrgyzstan law enforcement firing line, equipped with AKS-74U "Krinkov" short assault rifles. In contrast, post-June civil unrest, the IRIPF has not distributed battle rifles, assault rifles or SMGs (or most any firearms loaded with lethal rounds) to its antiriot forces. It must be noted this claim is disputed. However there are no photos available to this writer's knowledge of IRIPF firing lines equipped with assault weaponry, using lethal force against rioters. (Excluding the defense of a Basij base in Tehran, where an AK-47 type assault rifle was utilized from a rooftop position.)
Above: Kyrgyzstan law enforcement on the run. Abandoned by their own leadership, they are in headlong retreat. Even during the height of Asura rioting, Iran's leadership carried on, resolutely. In Kyrgyzstan's case, the leadership finds itself heavily swayed and manipulated by external foreign powers, whereas the Islamic Republic of Iran remains fiercely independent. This is the fundamental difference between the two cases of civil unrest, and naturally it corresponds to the level of effectiveness between the two countries success or lack of success in combating cvil unrest.
A footnote: Ironic that Kyrgyzstan's government recently attempted to dispute Iran's rendering of its dramatic Rigi capture operation- by changing its own previous reporting- only to now find itself apparently out of power only a few weeks later.
According to the Los Angeles Times, a source inside Iran claims the Islamic Republic of Iran Police Force (IRIPF, or Iranian acronym: NAJA) is preparing for the potentiality of as many as 3 million protesters taking to the streets of Tehran this Thursday. The occasion is 22 Bahman: the 31st anniversary of the founding of the Islamic Republic.
In addition, the same source told the LAT that the government will be mobilizing 500,000 supporters to rally at the event, where President Ahmadinejad is scheduled to deliver a public speech, with invited members of the foreign press included in the audience. (Remarkable, given the scope of projected protests.)
Figures for IRIPF deployment have not been cited, but the LAT provides a figure for Basij volunteers at ~12,000, with many elements of this force being mobilized from various provinces around the country. Accordingly, it can be projected that the number of IRIPF policemen (cadre and conscript-soldiers) could actually be as high as triple that amount or more, with significant numbers of reinforcements being drawn from local, regional and border protection police forces.
IRIPF Mercedes-Benz C200 police car with cadre policemen
It would be surprising to see the less-lethal antiriot policy be lifted in favor of lethal force. However, given the number of cases of violence inflicted upon IRIPF police officers during the Ashura protests, there may or may not be a number of firearms distributed to key personnel, for purposes of self-defense. It can be assumed that IRIPF police officers would be in favor of such, but Iranian government policy so far- initiated after the June 2009 protests- means to prevent or minimize police-inflicted fatalities wherever possible. Perhaps there will be a greater distribution of less-lethal forms of ammunition provided for use in police officer firearms. We'll see how this plays out this coming Thursday.
It will be interesting to see if the IRIPF makes any changes to the tactics employed by its motorized reconnaissance units, which appeared vulnerable under certain conditions during Ashura, as well as if there'll be more effective use of Islamic Republic of Iran Police Aviation (IRIPA) resources, in terms of sustained, coordinated crowd control management.
Also, yet to be deployed in meaningful numbers, is the prospect of uniformed IRGC forces actively participating in crowd control operations, as a full or partial military unit(s). Perhaps they will continue on in a reserve force role, to be fully activated upon emergency.
Lastly, it is safe to assume that additional preparations are being made to accommodate large numbers of arrests, at various jail and correctional facilities.
Given IRIPF's crowd control management estimate of potentially 3 million protesters massing for 22 Bahman, this coming Thursday may see the IRIPF's greatest challenge to date.
A noisy round-the-clock protest against anti-establishment cleric Mehdi Karroubi took place upon his arrival at Qazvin (in Qazvīn Province), resulting in bricks thrown and shots allegedly fired into the bullet-resistant glass of his armored SUV.
Opposition press sources and Karroubi's web site blamed FARS New Agency for publishing a story related to his travel to the city. Karroubi's son alleges that he saw several commanders of the IRGC and members of the Basij volunteer force in the crowd that numbered ~500. He went on to state that it was his belief the intent of the shots being fired was to intimidate his father, rather than a serious assassination attempt, and that his father's armed bodyguards did not return fire.
Photo Interpretations:
click photos to enlarge
Karroubi's armored SUV under assault by angry pro-government demonstrators, while IRIPF/SF police ride atop its running boards. Visible is the vehicle's heavy duty wrap around push bumper. It's likely this armored SUV is provided to Karroubi by the state. Note the rock debris and kicked-in side panels. Under a hail of thrown eggs, tomatoes and stones, and shots allegedly fired into the windshields of his armored SUVs (presumably handgun ammunition fired into bullet-resistant glass), after repeated attempts, Karroubi did finally manage to flee the demonstration.
IRIPF/SF (Islamic Republic of Iran Police Force, persian acronym: NAJA) anti-riot police line, many wearing army field jackets. The three in the center may be carrying gas mask bags. Helmets and batons are standard issue. In this instance, police do not appear to be employing anti-riot shields.
The spectrum of the IRIPF (NAJA) is evident in this police line. Visible are two IRIPF cadre officers (center), and a lineup of attached conscript soldiers and regional (or border protection) police in DCU equivalent uniforms. Police interlock arms, while protesters don't appear to confront them in the manner now shown by Green, anti-government demonstrators. There were reports of unsuccessful crowd dispersal operations in effect, but to date none are evident in available open sourced photographs. Note the lack of firearms issued to the police.
Police form up to allow passage of a IRIPF Mercedes C200 police vehicle.
An elevated protester directs all-night chanting towards the residence Karroubi is occupying. At left are IRIPF/SF police in their woodland BDUs. While non-confrontational towards the police and the police on the sidelines, the protesters appear heated and very noisy, no doubt making things very unpleasant for Karroubi and the occupants of the residence.
Photo captures the multi-force composition of the IRIPF presence. Seen are IRIPF/SF, IRIPF conscript-soldiers, IRIPF regional (or border protection) and IRIPF cadre. A demonstrator's megaphone can also be seen near the center.
Chanting demonstrators with homemade "anti-hypocrite" signs. Slogans include "Our city is no place for a traitor", "Death to hypocrites", "Death to Karroubi", "Death to Mousavi" and "Death to Khatami". The majority of protesters appear to be young men, and could be members of the local Basij as well as their supporters. Women protesters do not appear in evidence.
There is a story revolving around the blogosphere that Iran has rush ordered armored water cannon vehicles from China, and that they may be headed to Tehran. In reality, a number of Iran's municipalities already possess them. They've been seen at previous year's military parades, including those held in Tehran. Below are photos of such vehicles taken well before the June election. So far, there's no evidence they've been activated for use in riot/crowd dispersal operations post-June 2009 election. These types of vehicles do offer a less-lethal form of riot control and have been used extensively in the West, including Switzerland, Germany, France and even Seattle, USA.
This is an Islamic Republic of Iran Police Force (IRIPF, or NAJA) armored water cannon vehicle on display in Isfahan. Visible is the large front-mounted, angled blade.
Another view of the IRIPF vehicle in the background. Visible are the top mounted (unmanned) dual water cannon stations.
The Islamic Republic of Iran Police Force (IRIPF, also referred to as NAJA) appeared hard pressed and even overwhelmed at times, during anti-government demonstrations held during Ashura. There were incidents reporting varying levels of protest around the country, including Tehran, Shiraz, Esfahan and Mashad. However, by far the greatest confrontations took place in Tehran, and that's where nearly all the photo and video evidence has been sourced (with most of the documented action located at Vali Asr Square, Azadi Avenue and under Hafez Bridge).
At times, protesters in Tehran showed exceptionally high levels of resistance to IRIPF attempts at imposing law and order. There are a number of photos and videos showing large groups of protesters seizing the initiative, and in a number of instances taking full control of key road and city centers. There are also photos and videos showing police officers beaten by angry mobs, police equipment captured, vehicles wrecked and set ablaze, and even at least one IRIPF police station and one Basij base stormed, looted and set ablaze. Protesters engaged in opportunistic destruction of public property, while elements of the IRIPF- including its motorized SF- were at times overwhelmed and rendered ineffective.
For all the protest violence and lack of effective IRIPF control over key areas of the city, it is surprising that Iran's military wasn't activated. Instead, the IRIPF (and Basij) were left to duke it out with an ever more radicalized protest movement. In fact, while the anti-establishment movement of June 2009 may have had far greater numbers, nevertheless this comparatively smaller anti-government protest (seemingly composed predominantly of students or those of similar age) is certainly willing to take increasingly more violent and destructive measures. It does so while the IRIPF has apparently (unlike in June) been ordered to confront the protesters with less-lethal means of crowd control (no standard outfitting of firearms equipped with lethal rounds).
IRIPF anti-riot management appears to rely on preplanned defensive positions, adapting to changing conditions with radio communication and applications of motorized (motorbike) reconnaissance. Despite possession of airborne police support, it doesn’t appear the IRIPF engages in sustained air-to-ground assisted tactical management.
Politically, so far the IRIPF seems to be the public face for the government’s anti-riot response during Ashura. Iran's Deputy Police Chief Ahmad Reza Radan appeared on IRINN television, to inform the Iranian public that 300 protesters had been arrested and there were several killed. Meanwhile, contrary to one of the many wild rumors propagated over Twitter of high ranking members of the government being evacuated to safety, Supreme Leader Khamenei and President Ahmadinejad attended the Ashura ceremony at Tehran's Hosseiniyeh Imam Khomeini, seemingly unaffected at all by the disturbances occuring at other parts of the city. The Iranian leadership’s strategy appears to consciously downplay the unrest. This would explain the government’s refrain from activating the military or even declaring full or even partial martial law. Instead, it appears the IRIPF is burdened with less-lethal force (in instances where even US law enforcement would use lethal means of defending itself), in confrontations that stretch its summoned resources beyond the maximum. The other side of the government's anti-protest strategy appears to be the targeted arrest of anyone perceived capable of providing any aspect of leadership to this so far leaderless movement, or anyone suspected of being able to provide linkage to identified internal and external threats.
Videos from Ashura 1388:
Incredible video of protesters engaging police forces with rocks; then on a signal from a spontaneous leader, the mob surges forward to engage the police at close quarters.
IRIPF/SF motorized detachment, contained and trapped against a doorway by vastly superior numbers. Note how quickly fires are generated, suggesting the use of molotov cocktails, but more likely ignited by the simple use of cigarette lighters.
Another view of the same incident: fully equipped anti-riot policemen cornered, surrounded and (lacking firearms or adequate backup) subjected to stoning and multiple beatings.
IRIPF/SF First Lieutenant (Sotvan Yekom) from the same detachment, beaten and stripped of gear. Demonstrators unsuccessfully attempt to set his field jack on fire.
A bloodied IRIPF anti-riot policeman is escorted away by protesters, while a IRIPF (cadre) First Lieutenant (Sotvan Yekom), with 2-way radio in hand, feebly waves him aside.
Protesters engage a heavily outnumbered IRIPF detachment at a cross street, to be dispersed by what could be shots fired (possibly less-lethal rounds, unfortunately there is constant sound buffeting on the mobile device which produces similar sounding effects). The protesters reassemble, but are then successfully outflanked by motorized IRIPF anti-riot forces approaching from up the street.
Overturned IRIPF vehicle, set afire by demonstrators. Location: Khosh Avenue.
IRIPF police van overturned and set ablaze. There are a number of YouTube videos showing IRIPF vehicles torched and destroyed during Ashura demonstrations in Tehran.
At the end of this video, two IRIPF policemen become separated from their unit and surrounded by violent protesters, to be brutally beaten and bloodied.
IRIPF police station stormed, looted and set ablaze at Vali Asr Square. At the end of the video, a severely wounded and bloodied protester is taken away; purportedly a victim of being run over by a police vehicle.
IRIPF police van surrounded and heavily vandalized. Its officers- lacking firearms and adequate backup- are seized and beaten by the angry mob.
Street melee: IRIPF anti-riot police officers are put on the defensive and swarmed, firing tear gas in retreat.
Yet another IRIPF police vehicle set afire.
Possibly an IRIPF Bell 214 helicopter zooms overhead. It appears to be operating in a transport role, rather than any sustained effort at air-to-ground, emergency management.
IRIPF police van (a type used for transporting arrested suspects) is overturned and set ablaze.
Tehran Fire Department vehicles on emergency call, situated (perhaps immobilized) at the scene of an overturned IRIPF police van.
And yet another view of an IRIPF police van attacked and overturned.
By dusk, apparently the IRIPF had still not gained full control over the city. Note several fires burning at this Tehran intersection.
Photos from Ashura 1388:
Well equipped IRIPF/SF firing a tear gas anti-riot gun, in an attempt to disperse protesters.
Well disciplined platoon of IRIPF conscript-soldiers in a defensive phalanx formation. Note the level of aggression shown by the stone throwing protesters, and the amount of expended debris on the ground.
Another shot of IRIPF conscript-soldiers in a defensive phalanx formation, with IRIPF (cadre) officers looking on. Protesters were seen tearing out slabs of concrete from Tehran's city sidewalks and smashing it to hurl stones at security forces.
Photo of incident depicted in videos 2, 3 and 4. Motorized IRIPF/SF policemen are trapped, forcefully dismounted and surrounded; to be stoned, beaten and their motorbikes set ablaze. They are not equipped with firearms for personal defense.
Another photo of the cornered IRIPF/SF policemen. At right, an un-helmeted and bloodied First Lieutenant (Sotvan Yekom) pleads on behalf of his beleaguered motorized SF detachment. This is the same officer shown in a previous video, subsequently beaten and partially stripped by the enraged mob.
IRIPF conscript-soldiers (most likely 18-20 year olds serving out their mandatory conscription terms) overwhelmed at close quarters by violent protesters; in retreat minus various pieces of their anti-riot equipment.
An abandoned IRIPF utility vehicle stoned and set ablaze by protesters.
And another demolished IRIPF utility vehicle seen burning amidst a crowd of destructive protesters.
IRIPF conscript-soldiers engaged in a contest of stone throwing with protesters on a Tehran street.
Good view of an assembled IRIPF street position, including mixed elements of conscript-soldiers and police regulars, as well as the use of an IRIPF utility vehicle. Protesters' expended stones can be seen everywhere.
Note the protesters' captured anti-riot police helmet, the combusted contents of a metropolitan garbage bin, the use of a makeshift club and the ubiquitous throwing stone.
An IRIPF regular First Lieutenant (Sotvan Yekom) leads a group of conscript-soldiers; engaging protesters in a contest of stone throwing.
A protester attempts to pick up and repel an expending tear gas smoke cartridge.
An IRIPF/SF detachment retreating, in the face of overwhelming numbers of protesters engaged in stone throwing. Note the visible expenditure of stones ssen scattered about the street.
For 16 Azar, Iran's law enforcement appeared hard pressed during student protests around the country, centered at roughly a dozen universities and at least one high school. Students appeared to achieve periods of uncontested control of their campuses, enabling them to hold loud and defiant demonstrations. This can be seen in the handful of available videos and photos, particularly at Amir Kabir University. It can actually be said that, in some respects, the students may have managed to exert initiative over their security counter-forces. For their part, the available videos and photos show the IRIPF (Islamic Republic of Iran Police Force) and Basij mostly on the sidelines, unable to effectively counter or disperse an overwhelming presence of students lodged within their university campuses.
All told, Iranian officials claim around 200 arrests were made in Tehran alone, with dozens elsewhere. These figures are low for the size and nature of these demonstrations. There are reports of isolated injuries, but open source video and photos have yet to emerge to show the same level of force used by the IRIPF in previous episodes of post election unrest. It may be the IRIPF was ordered to lessen the level of force used against the student demonstrators, or simply that dispersal efforts couldn't be used as effectively, given the circumstances of successfully assembled crowds and their positions within university campuses. Admittedly, there is not enough evidence or confirmed reports for which to draw any particular conclusion.
The Basij, on the other hand, seems to have acted in their customary manner. However the video and photo evidence depict periods where they were heavily outnumbered and reduced to harassment efforts or, at times, simply taking to the sidelines. Plainclothesman which could have been Basij were also seen filming the demonstrators as well as making what seemed to be targeted arrests. Nonetheless, there are numerous unconfirmed reports of Basidji using excessive and inappropriate force against the student demonstrators.
It doesn't appear the IRIPF was as effective in clamping down unrest as it was in September and November. Both Iranian law enforcement and Green movement activists are sure to draw respective lessons from the results of 16 Azar, for future use in anti-establishment demonstrations in Tehran, as well as other potentially coordinated flashpoints across the country.
Videos from 16 Azar:
An IRIPF motorized patrol. Both regular IRIPF and conscript-soldier elements are seen participating in what looks like a less than well directed action.
A handful of IRIPF officers look on in apparent helplessness at what appears to be the entire student body protesting within the campus of Iran University of Science Technology.
Plainclothes security elements (probably Basidji) filming student demonstrators, while a handful of IRIPF officers and attached conscript-soldiers are seen standing aside outside the school gates.
A student mob engaged in the destruction of school property at Amir Kabir University (AKU) in Tehran. Hard to see in the video, but a law enforcement presence doesn't appear evident.
Confrontation at the broken gate at AKU. Ranking security officers include no less than an IRIPF Sartip Dovom (~General) and a Sarhang (Colonel), among a vastly outnumbered collection of IRIPF attached conscript-soldiers and a few Basidji plainclothesmen (or possibly campus security). The officers clearly look exasperated amid the constant blair of students chanting "Death to Khamenei!"
Crowd control during a volatile confrontation at the broken gate entrance at AKU. An IRIPF Colonel personally intervenes at the point of contact, with only one regular policemen seen in close proximity. Meanwhile, a squad of conscript-soldiers appear in line-formation further back.
Mashad University. An IRIPF Sarvan (Captain) directs at a gallup a Sotvan Dovom (Lieutenant Second Class) soldier, in front of motorized police and IRIPF attached conscript-soldiers wearing their winter field jackets.
Photos from 16 Azar:
click photos to enlarge
Officers and dismounted motorized elements of the IRIPF assemble at Tehran University in the morning hours preceding 16 Azar activities. Note the use of a non-transparrent banner attached along the front gates of the university, blocking street level line-of-sight into the campus.
Motorized anti-riot forces of the IRIPF. Appears to be decision time for dismounting and deployment.
The view up ahead down Jamaizadeh Steet: a skirmish line is engulfed in tear gas. Note the density and resiliency of the demonstrators.
A well equipped IRIPF Ostavar (Master Sergeant), carrying what appears to be a pistol paintball gun.
Face off at Amir Kabir University in Tehran. On the other side of the damaged gate (caused by the students), stands roughly two squads of outnumbered conscript-soldier elements of the IRIPF. Center-right in front of the gate can be seen plainclothes elements of either campus security or possibly the Basij.
Members of the Basij hurl stones at demonstrating students, amid a cobbled together collection of IRIPF regulars and attached conscript-soldiers.
An IRIPF Ghuban Dovom (~Sergeant) follows the Basidji example in a contest of stone throwing, as does a soldier-conscript attached to the IRIPF. Note the curious looking home-made club-sticks of the Basij. The bunched up use of IRIPF regulars, soldier-conscripts and Basij must make for a difficult force with which to exert effective control and cohesiveness. Adding to this, attaching the severely undertrained Basij to Iran's professional police force appears to make it near impossible to maintain proper discipline. A true sense of law enforcement leadership is not evident in this photograph.
Later in the day, Tehran. Targeted arrest of a student demonstrator by plainclothesmen; either undercover security elements from some branch of the IRI, or Basij. Note the use of crowd control barriers visible in the foreground.
Frontline's latest documentary A Death in Tehran and its related web site revisit the tragic shooting of Neda Agha-Soltan, which took place during a protest last June following Iran's disputed presidential election. Readers are encouraged to view the documentary, made in association with Tehran Bureau, here.
From a law enforcement perspective, the PBS documentary provides intriguing details on Neda's shooting by an eyewitness, Arash Hejazi, a trained medical doctor who was at Neda's side when she perished.
Hejazi states that he heard a single shot coming from "in front", but did not see the shooter. He then states that a crowd had put a suspect under citizens arrest, and that the suspect admitted to the killing but stated it was not his intent to do so. The suspect is frisked and his Basij ID discovered. At this point the crowd deliberates on what to do. According to the eyewitness account, the crowd has no confidence in the police and feels itself threatened by turning him in to the authorities, so they release the suspect.
Basij ID card of shooting suspect
Hejazi's account raises questions. When the suspect was apprehended, what happened to the firearm? A single shot was heard fired in the incident. Did the crowd that apprehended him risk their lives to disarm him? Why didn't the suspect fire at those attempting to subdue him? Had the suspect actually run out of ammunition? Presumably it may have been a handgun fired at not too far a distance, but an approximation of relative distance would be helpful. Again, what happened to the firearm?
Another question is why a Basidji would be operating as such alone in a crowd. Usually you see Basidji operating in small teams. Where were the suspect's team members? Had he become separated, or had his team members abandoned him? Perhaps, as the suspect is reputed to have stated, it's possible this was an accidental discharge.
Taken at face value, that the shooter was indeed this identified Basidji, the incident really exposes the unprofessional nature of the Basij as an instrument of urban riot control, as well as the detrimental effect this can have on the reputation of the Iranian government. Severely undertrained and ill disciplined Basidjis operating alone in a high risk environment is a sure fire recipe for disaster. It would be interesting to confirm that changes have been made by the IRGC and IRIPF, as well as policy related to the distribution of lethal rounds, for subsequent Iranian law enforcement efforts at anti-riot control since the June demonstrations.
Note: I've queried Arash Hejazi by email for additional info on his eyewitness account, and will be updating this post with any forthcoming response.
Above: A Kyrgyzstan law enforcement firing line, equipped with AKS-74U "Krinkov" short assault rifles. In contrast, post-June civil unrest, the IRIPF has not distributed battle rifles, assault rifles or SMGs (or most any firearms loaded with lethal rounds) to its antiriot forces. It must be noted this claim is disputed. However there are no photos available to this writer's knowledge of IRIPF firing lines equipped with assault weaponry, using lethal force against rioters. (Excluding the defense of a Basij base in Tehran, where an AK-47 type assault rifle was utilized from a rooftop position.)
Above: Kyrgyzstan law enforcement on the run. Abandoned by their own leadership, they are in headlong retreat. Even during the height of Asura rioting, Iran's leadership carried on, resolutely. In Kyrgyzstan's case, the leadership finds itself heavily swayed and manipulated by external foreign powers, whereas the Islamic Republic of Iran remains fiercely independent. This is the fundamental difference between the two cases of civil unrest, and naturally it corresponds to the level of effectiveness between the two countries success or lack of success in combating cvil unrest.
Above: A Kyrgyzstan law enforcement firing line, equipped with AKS-74U "Krinkov" short assault rifles. In contrast, post-June civil unrest, the IRIPF has not distributed battle rifles, assault rifles or SMGs (or most any firearms loaded with lethal rounds) to its antiriot forces. It must be noted this claim is disputed. However there are no photos available to this writer's knowledge of IRIPF firing lines equipped with assault weaponry, using lethal force against rioters. (Excluding the defense of a Basij base in Tehran, where an AK-47 type assault rifle was utilized from a rooftop position.)
Above: Kyrgyzstan law enforcement on the run. Abandoned by their own leadership, they are in headlong retreat. Even during the height of Asura rioting, Iran's leadership carried on, resolutely. In Kyrgyzstan's case, the leadership finds itself heavily swayed and manipulated by external foreign powers, whereas the Islamic Republic of Iran remains fiercely independent. This is the fundamental difference between the two cases of civil unrest, and naturally it corresponds to the level of effectiveness between the two countries success or lack of success in combating cvil unrest.
