Hakim meets with Shamkhani & Zarif, while Maliki talks Mosul

Ammar al-Hakim (left), President of Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq (ISCI) meets with Iran Navy Rear Admiral Ali Shamkhani (right), secretary of the Supreme National Security Council of Iran (SNSC) on 18AUG15 in Tehran.

Iran media provided familiar talking points of Shamkhani, in alleging "Washington uses terrorism as an instrument to achieve its own objectives"; in this instance further alleging U.S.-trained "Division 30 announced their refusal to fight al-Qaeda-linked al-Nusra Front, following a series of abductions by the terrorist group." [source: PressTV]

Iranian media characterized Hakim's public statement as "Iraq would strongly resist foreign plots, which are all aimed at fueling differences". [source: PressTV]

COMMENTARY: Reforms and charges made by current Iraqi Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi have generated a power struggle in Baghdad, among the Shia power centers that include Islamic Dawa Party, Maliki and Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF). There is little doubt such was a prime topic of discussion between Shamkhani and Hakim, in addition to the war against ISIL.

Prior to his meeting with Rear Admiral Shamkhani, Hakim met with Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif. Roughly two weeks ago these figures had met in Baghdad during Zarif's visits to Gulf Arab states and Iraq.

From Tehran, former Iraqi Prime Minister on 18AUG15 provided a defense against charges being leveled against him with respect to the fall of Mosul in 2014. According to Reuters:

Maliki, who had previously accused unnamed countries, commanders and rival politicians of plotting the city's fall, on Tuesday blamed Turkish and Iraqi Kurdish leaders.

"What happened in Mosul was a conspiracy planned in Ankara, then the conspiracy moved to Erbil," he said in a second Facebook post, referring to the capitals of neighboring Turkey and the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG), a semi-autonomous region in northern Iraq whose forces have taken a leading role in battling Islamic State.

COMMENTARY: The Reuters report is somewhat disingenuous. This is what was claimed on 13JUN14 by a Maliki aide, as reported in the New York Times:

The [Maliki aide] said that the Iraqi government was not to blame alone for the success of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria’s advance through the north of the country. He blamed Turkey, because it was angry over Iraqi support for the regime of President Bashar al-Assad of Syria, and the Kurds, who wanted to profit from Iraqi weakness in the north, which on Thursday helped them to take Kirkuk, an oil rich prize long shared between the Arabs and the Kurds in an uneasy truce.

“So yes there are cases where the Iraqi army disappeared but you have to take the locality in context,” the adviser said. “The 2nd Division of the Iraqi Army is 80 percent Kurds and 20 percent locals, the Kurds withdrew to the Kurdish areas and this started a panic.” “Turkey wanted to unseat Bashar al Assad and now they see the Iraqis helping him and this is payback,” the senior official said. “This is part of that, I really believe that.”

COMMENTARY: There is little doubt the Maliki aide was sharing his boss Maliki's perspective at the time, as reported by the New York Times.

Photos: Islamic Republic News Agency

Col. Bacevich says U.S. should work with Iran to defeat ISIL

Marking the one year anniversary of ISIL capturing and occupying Mosul during the 2014 Northern Iraq Offensive, PBS NewsHour presented a panel discussion on the subject [05:50]. The four panelists included former CIA Director Leon Panetta, former Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Michèle Flournoy, former CENTCOM Commander Gen. Zinni (Ret.) and Professor Andrew Bacevich.

Near the conclusion of the panel discussion (accessible in the above embedded video), Bacevich advocates assisting Iran in that country’s efforts to defeat ISIL. Pointing to Panetta’s previous World War II analogy, Bacevich draws his own analogy to the historical example of the U.S. working with USSR in the war against Nazi Germany.

Notes on current American airstrikes against IS forces in Iraq

By Mark Pyruz

 

File photo: USN Boeing F/A-18F Super Hornet over the Persian Gulf

A collection of thoughts on the current application of U.S. airpower in the defense of Iraq:

-Drawing from public comments made in the recent past by current Iraqi Prime Minister Maliki, application of U.S. airpower in support of Iraq had been held back by the Obama administration in attempting to achieve American preferences for a new Iraqi Prime Minister. However Peshmerga setbacks and the prospect of a humanitarian disaster at Sinjar Mountain appear to have forced the Obama administration's hand, with U.S. airpower now engaging in limited airstrikes against Islamic State forces.

-Even in such a limited capacity, a small demonstration on the effectiveness of U.S. airpower in potentially rolling back an enemy offensive is now being rendered. There are a number  historical examples of this capability to draw upon, where U.S. airpower has been coupled with indigenous armed forces in successful counteroffensive operations. One such campaign took place during the Easter Offensive in Vietnam, and more recently another took place during the initial phase of Operation Enduring Freedom (from the perspective of Afghanistan's United Front, this could be considered a counteroffensive). Moreover, American military prestige is set to be reestablished in this part of the world, following less than sought-after results from ground force invasions and military occupations previously conducted in Iraq and in Afghanistan.

-Current level of force suggests a U.S. military intent to prevent further IS penetration toward sites such as Arbil and Sinjar Mountain, and the establishment of distance beyond the range of IS artillery. Actually, this can be seen as a parallel effort to that of the IRGC-QF in its direction of Shia militias in establishing defensive lines before Baghdad and the Iraqi holy cities, beyond the range of IS artillery. Thus it can be said Iranian military direction contributes towards the defense of the American embassy in the Green Zone, while American airpower contributes towards the defense of the Iranian consulate in Iraqi Kurdistan.

-As it now stands the Americans are more actively assisting the Kurds, where the Iranians are more actively supporting the Shia. These parallel efforts are being waged against a common enemy: the Islamic State, former Baath elements and their Iraqi-Sunni allies.

-Peshmerga difficulties over the past week can be seen as a setback to President Barzani's goal of an independent Kurdistan. It's possible a precondition for application of U.S. airpower in support of Iraqi Kurdistan was for Barzani to privately withdraw his stated intention of holding a referendum on independence.

-The Obama administration is open to criticism for sitting on Iraqi requests for U.S. airstrikes. Apparent Peshmerga military setbacks appear to have taken U.S. leadership by surprise, another of many surprises during the 2014 Northern Iraq Offensive. What's more, sitting on this request has further enabled the Islamic State to capture strategic hydroelectric dams, providing IS with a degree of potential leverage over much of Iraq's populated territory. 

-While it might be politically opportune to limit U.S. airstrikes to that of establishing distance zones before sites such as Arbil and Sinjar Mountain,--while attempting to render a U.S. determined political outcome in Baghdad--it makes no sense, militarily, to allow initiative to be maintained by the Islamic State and its Sunni allies.

-It should also be pointed out that whereupon the Obama administration makes the decision to apply U.S. airpower in force, in support of a genuine Iraqi counteroffensive, Islamic State forces must also be targeted in Syria. Sanctuaries for enemy forces as were experienced by the U.S. military during the Vietnam War and more recently during Operation Enduring Freedom must not be permitted. That said, the more reliable ground force partner for this adjoining theater would be the SyAA and its NDF allies. However such an alliance requires a realignment of U.S. foreign policy in synch with a revised threat assessment reflective of the new reality in Iraq and Syria.